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Introductory remarks
During the great financial crisis, various central banks resorted to unconventional mone-
tary policies (UMP) in order to provide additional stimulus once their main instrument,
the policy rate, hit the zero lower bound. As the reasoning and targets for these UMPs
differed across central banks, so did the different UMP types. Several central banks run
extensive asset purchase programmes with a focus on credit conditions or broader interest
rates; others relied on, or complemented asset purchases with guidance on interest rates;
while again others, primarily open economies, responded to spillovers from abroad and
temporarily managed exchange rates by applying a temporary floor for the exchange rate
and/or conducting foreign exchange interventions.
The present thesis focuses on two specific topics from this wide range of types and ap-
plications: The understanding, efficacy and (optimal) conduct of forward guidance, as
one particular UMP type, and the interaction of unconventional monetary policies with
open economies. The thesis uses both empirical and theoretical approaches to tackle these
questions: The first chapter empirically addresses the impact of foreign UMPs on (the
financial markets of) a small open economy, namely Switzerland. Chapters two and three
analyze the (theoretical) efficacy and conduct of forward guidance in a closed and open
economy in stylized DSGE models.
The first chapter analyzes the impact that UMP announcements by the four major cen-
tral banks – the Federal Reserve, European Central Bank, Bank of England and Bank of
Japan – have on four different asset prices in Switzerland, representing an advanced small
open economy: Government and corporate bond yields, equities and exchange rates. The
contributions of this part are fourfold: First, it focuses on the spillovers of UMPs from
several central banks to one country, whereas other papers on spillovers often focus on
the spillovers of UMPs from one country (or focused on domestic impacts only). Second,
Switzerland as a highly globalized economy with a large financial sector and an interna-
tionally traded currency that is occasionally exposed to safe-haven demand provides a
particularly interesting case; most studies on spillovers so far focus on emerging markets.
Third, the minimum rate of 1.20 Swiss franc per Euro – enforced by the Swiss National
Bank between 6 September 2011 and 15 January 2015 – allows to examine the effectiveness
of domestic monetary policy responses to external financial shocks. Last but not least,
this chapter provides an extensive, newly constructed data set of UMP announcements
of the major central banks. This increases the number of observations sharply and allows
for a more thorough analysis of the impact of different UMP programmes or features.
The second and third chapter tackle the identification issues with respect to the effects of
particular UMPs types – induced by the wide range of different types, few observations
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and the fact that UMP announcements often comprise multiple UMP types – from a
theoretical side and analyzes the efficacy of forward guidance in stylized (DSGE) models.
Specifically, a closed economy (second chapter) or a open economy (third chapter) is hit by
negative shocks that drive interest rates to zero or lead to negative spillovers from abroad.
The central bank may then revert to forward guidance in order to offset the negative
impact of such shocks. The contributions of this part are fourfold: First, it analyzes
forward guidance for a closed and an open economy, whereas the majority of the academic
literature on forward guidance so far focuses on closed economies. Second, it analyzes and
compares various specifications of forward guidance, besides the common ’low for long’
interest rate announcement. For instance, it also covers a temporary overshooting of
inflation through a more expansionary policy rule, or so-called state-contingent forward
guidance. In doing so, it also provides an idea about the ‘best’ specification, or conduct,
of forward guidance in a stylized DSGE model. Third, forward guidance in the open
economy can also target exchange rates, not only interest rates. The central bank of the
small open economy may pre-announce a temporary management of the exchange rate,
for instance through a temporary floor for the exchange rate. Last but not least, the open
economy part also evaluates the spillovers of foreign shocks (potentially exacerbated by
foreign forward guidance) to a small open economy; a topic shared with the empirical
analysis in the first chapter.
The analysis of the three chapters leads to the following main conclusions. First, forward
guidance is (highly) effective in providing stimulus to the economy, in theory at least.
This particularly holds for a closed economy, but also for a small open economy. Second,
forward guidance and other UMP programmes lead to considerable and harmful spillovers
to other countries, not only in theory but also in reality. Specifically, exchange rates of
small open economies appreciate in response to expansionary UMP policies abroad, with
potentially negative effects on inflation and demand from abroad. Third, central banks of
small open economies are able to at least partly offset such spillovers from abroad through
domestic (unconventional) monetary policies. Last but not least, the common low-for-
long forward guidance specification is generally the most effective, but also most sensitive
with respect to a potential mis-specification of the duration or future shocks. Alternatives
such as a temporarily higher inflation target, or a temporary exchange rate peg in the
open economy, are much more stable through their endogenous response without loosing
too much effectiveness.
The following sub-sections provide non-technical overviews of the methodology and addi-
tional results for the three chapters.
Chapter 1: Cross-border Spillover Effects of Unconventional Monetary Poli-
cies on Swiss Asset Prices
This first chapter analyzes of UMP announcements by the central banks of the four major
currency areas (the U.S., Euro area, U.K. and Japan) on four types of Swiss asset prices
(government and corporate bond yields, equities and exchange rates).
The empirical strategy adopted follows a time-series approach and is based on two core
elements: First, the chapter evaluates the daily changes in Swiss asset prices on days
with UMP announcements by foreign central banks. The timing of the announcements is
pinpointed by an extensive, newly constructed event set. The second element is the extent
2
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to which financial markets anticipate the content of these UMP statements. We identify
the surprise part of these statements using a market-based surprise measure that relies
on the daily changes in the price of 10y government bond futures. Controlling for market
anticipation proves necessary to properly identify the financial market impact of UMP
announcements. For instance, on the day of its announcement, an increase in the size
of an asset purchase programme – at face value arguably an expansionary policy – may
exert contractionary (expansionary) financial market effects, if markets have anticipated
a larger (smaller) increase of the programme.
The chapter finds that UMP announcements by the four major advanced central banks
significantly affect Swiss financial assets. The size and direction of the impact depend
on the degree of policy anticipation and the specific asset class under consideration. An
expansionary foreign UMP shock induces a decrease in Swiss long-term government bond
yields, a decrease in Swiss long-term corporate bond yields, a decline in the Swiss equity
index and an appreciation of the Swiss franc against the Euro and the U.S. dollar. The
effects are strongest for UMP announcements by the ECB and, among Swiss government
bonds, for those with residual maturities of 7-10 years. The implementation of the min-
imum rate of 1.20 CHF per EUR tends to attenuate the spillover effects on bond yields
and exchange rates but not those on Swiss equities. This result indicates that the do-
mestic monetary policy stance can exert some limited effect on the cross-border financial
spillover impact of foreign monetary policy decisions.
The chapter further confirms the finding of Glick and Leduc (2012) that the sign of
spillover effects differs between positive and negative UMP surprises, whereas it cannot
lend support to their conclusion that the strength of spillover effects is larger for positively
surprising announcements.
Chapter 2: The optimal conduct of forward guidance (in a closed economy)
This chapter analyzes the theoretical efficacy of forward guidance in a stylized DSGE
model for a closed economy. Amid the differences in forward guidance applications by
major central banks, this paper furthermore evaluates and compares various forward
guidance specifications in order to provide some guidance about the ‘best’ conduct of
forward guidance. The chapter measures the effectiveness of such announcements twofold:
The positive analysis compares impulse response functions of different forward guidance
policies on key variables of interest, the normative analysis instead compares welfare
proxied by utility.
Forward guidance always represents a credible and pre-announced temporary change in
the regular policy rule, varying in three dimensions: Timing (duration and start), trigger
(a specific date or a condition), and specification (the central bank may announce low
interest rates, or lower interest rates than usual, through a more dovish reaction function
with a temporarily higher inflation target or higher sensitivities regarding inflation or
output). We reduce the set of possible combinations to three main cases: First, the
chapter analyzes calendar-based forward guidance, inspired by that of the Federal Reserve
in 2011 and 2012 (until a specific date). Second, the chapter follows the Federal Reserve
in December 2012 and replaces the calendar-based duration with a condition (inflation
must exceed a specific threshold). Third, the chapter addresses the effect of guidance on
policy normalization, i.e. the promise to allow for higher inflation for a specific number
3
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of periods, as soon as interest rates lift off from the zero lower bound. Any ‘gradual’
approach in raising interest rates may come close to this. In all three cases, the chapter
evaluates the two main specifications: low or lower interest rates.
The chapter shows that forward guidance is generally effective at providing policy ac-
commodation at the zero lower bound. Calendar-based forward guidance expressed as
a constant interest rate over a given period is especially effective, but also most prone
to a mis-specification of the duration (or future shocks). Forward guidance that allows
inflation to temporarily overshoot can achieve similar results, and additionally provides a
‘hedge’ against duration mis-specification or future shocks. In contrast, state dependent
forward guidance and forward guidance with higher (inflation or output gap) sensitivities
yield much less policy accommodation. State dependent forward guidance reveals to be
highly sensitive to the parameters announced by the central bank: If the threshold re-
quires an overly aggressive monetary policy easing, the central bank may be expected to
give up its accommodative stance too early, thereby undermining its intentions to stabilize
the economy. This reduces the feasible set of parameter values and its efficacy. Allowing
for an overshooting of the conditions for an extended periods (e.g. inflation must exceed
the threshold for one year) can, however, offset this shortcoming. Finally, forward guid-
ance concerning the path of interest rate normalization can be as effective as guidance
extended during the zero lower bound period.
Chapter 3: Forward guidance in a small open economy: the transmission of
international shocks
The third chapter combines elements of the two previous chapters and analyzes the (the-
oretical) efficacy of forward guidance in an small open economy. The central bank of the
small open economy may apply forward guidance in two cases: In response to a large
negative domestic shock that drives domestic interest rates to zero, or in response to
spillovers from abroad, induced by a large negative shock abroad. The first case reveals
the effect that international linkages (e.g. the exchange rate) have on (the effectiveness
of) forward guidance. The second case addresses the international transmission of shocks
and the ability of forward guidance to counter (the transmission of) such shocks.
The central bank of the small open economy may announce three types of forward guid-
ance. First, the central bank may announce low interest rates for an extended period,
by means of a constant interest rate path. Second, it may announce lower interest rates
than usual, by means of a more expansionary policy rule with a higher inflation target.
These first two cases are simplified versions of the closed economy analysis in the second
chapter (forward guidance always starts today, and we consider calendar-based triggers
only). Additionally, the central bank may not only announce forward guidance on inter-
est rates, but also on exchange rates: It may announce a temporary peg for the exchange
rate. Technically, we implement such a temporary peg via a modified interest rate rule
that responds to exchange rate deviations. The entire analysis takes place in a stylized
two-country (DSGE) model.
The chapter shows that forward guidance is effective in both cases, whether the small open
economy suffers from a domestic shock or faces negative spillovers from abroad. One major
channel for its efficacy is the exchange rate, besides the general effects of lower interest
rates (such as higher inflation expectations). One additional equation of open economies
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with complete international markets, the international risk sharing condition, however
seems to dampen the effect of forward guidance on consumption; the response is much
smaller than in the closed economy. Forward guidance is also successful in altering the
international transmission of foreign shocks, such that spillovers to the domestic economy
are less pronounced (or even positive for long forward guidance durations). Among the
three forward guidance types, results are similar to the second chapter: The promise
of low interest rates is the most effective but also most sensitive type, a temporarily
higher inflation target and the temporary peg are somewhat less effective, but provide
sort of a hedge against an excessive overshooting of output gap and inflation. Note that
the implementation of the temporary peg reveals questionable effects on interest rates,
for specific periods towards the end of forward guidance, an explicit modeling of foreign
exchange interventions seems due in this respect. At present, these results should be





Cross-border Spillover Effects of
Unconventional Monetary Policies
on Swiss Asset Prices
Abstract
Unconventional monetary policies (UMPs) announced by the Federal Reserve, the Euro-
pean Central Bank, the Bank of England and the Bank of Japan exert important spillover
effects on asset prices in Switzerland. Using a broad UMP event set and a long-term
bond-futures based measure of market anticipation, we show that surprisingly expansion-
ary UMPs lower Swiss government and corporate bond yields, induce the Swiss franc to
appreciate, and dampen Swiss equity prices. Four extensions provide further insights.
First, the estimated effects are strongest for announcements by the ECB. Second, the
impact on government bonds is largest for bonds with residual maturities of 7-10 years.
Third, the impact of foreign UMP shocks on exchange rates and Swiss bond yields is less
pronounced after the introduction of the minimum rate of 1.20 Swiss franc per Euro by
the Swiss National Bank on September 6, 2011, indicating that domestic monetary policy
action partially affects the impact of external monetary shocks on domestic financial mar-
kets. Fourth, the sign of spillover effects differs for positive and negative UMP surprises,
but their strength does not.
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1.1 Introduction
Empirical evidence strongly suggests that unconventional monetary policies (UMPs) im-
plemented by core advanced economy central banks in response to the financial crisis
exert significant spillover effects on global financial markets. Globally, yields on short-
and long-term bonds issued by governments and corporates decline in response to expan-
sionary UMP announcements (Glick and Leduc (2012), Neely (2015), Chen et al. (2012),
and IMF (2013b)). Further, the spot exchange rates appreciate relative to the currency
of the central bank implementing an expansionary UMP (Diez and Presno (2013), Glick
and Leduc (2015), and Neely (2015)), whereas the evidence on the spillover effects on
global equity prices and on capital flows is mixed (IMF (2013a), Berge and Cao (2014),
Fratzscher et al. (2013), Glick and Leduc (2012), and Ahmed and Zlate (2014)). In gen-
eral, the observed size of spillover effects depends on push factors such as the specific
characteristics of the UMP programme implemented (Fratzscher et al. (2013), Chen et al.
(2012), Christensen and Rudebusch (2012), and IMF (2013b)). At the same time, and
unsurprisingly, domestic pull factors are important to explain differences across recipi-
ent economies of the observed size and scope of cross-border effects of foreign monetary
policies.2 In this regard, both structural and cyclical factors are important, such as the
degree of global financial and economic integration, the presence of imperfections in do-
mestic financial markets, the domestic business cycle as well as dometic macroeconomic
policy choices (IMF (2013b), Chen et al. (2014), Fratzscher et al. (2013), and Caruana
(2012)).3
To date, analytical contributions and policy debates focus predominantly on the spillover
effects of UMPs to emerging economies (e.g. Bowman et al. (2015), and Chen et al.
(2012)) or on those among large advanced economies (e.g. Bauer and Neely (2014), Glick
and Leduc (2012), Rogers et al. (2014), and Neely (2015)), while only limited evidence
has been provided on UMP spillovers on financial markets in small advanced countries as
of yet.
In an effort to fill this gap, we empirically assess the impact of UMP announcements by the
central banks of the four major currency areas (the U.S., Euro area, U.K. and Japan) on a
broad range of Swiss asset prices (government and corporate bond yields, equities and ex-
change rates). In doing so, our study complements the empirical literature on the financial
market impact of unconventional monetary policies in four respects: First, Switzerland,
a highly globalized economy, with a large financial sector and an internationally traded
currency that is occasionally exposed to safe-haven demand, provides a particularly in-
teresting case to discuss global implications of foreign monetary policy. While analyses
of the asset price impact of domestic UMPs are available for Switzerland, this does not
hold for an assessment of the effects of foreign UMPs (Kettemann and Krogstrup (2014),
and Christensen and Krogstrup (2014)). Second, due to the minimum rate of 1.20 Swiss
franc (CHF) per Euro (EUR) that was enforced by the Swiss National Bank between 6
September 2011 and 15 January 2015, the Swiss case also allows us to examine the ef-
2Throughout this study, we denote the economies hosting the central bank originating an UMP as
foreign and the economy potentially affected – namely Switzerland – by the spillovers emenating from
these policies as domestic.
3This corroborates the evidence for the important role of pull factors in case of conventional monetary
policy (Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2009)).
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fectiveness of domestic monetary policy responses to external financial shocks. Third, we
rely on a newly constructed set of nearly 100 UMP statements by the Fed, ECB, BoJ and
BoE from 2008 to 2014, whereas a large part of the literature analyses only the first asset
purchase program of the Fed. In this regard, the studies by Chen et al. (2012), Diez and
Presno (2013), and Rogers et al. (2014) are closest to ours. However, their analyses rely
on a different event selection scheme and focus mainly on the domestic effects and U.S.
dollar (USD) exchange rate effects of UMP announcements. Fourth, this extended set of
UMP events allows us to re-assess the results by Glick and Leduc (2012), who find that
both the direction and strength of cross-border asset price effects differs between positive
and negative UMP surprises.
The empirical strategy adopted follows the linear time-series approach of Glick and Leduc
(2012). It is based on two core elements: First, we evaluate the daily changes in Swiss
asset prices on days with UMP announcements by foreign central banks. The timing of
the announcements is pinpointed by our newly constructed event set. By this choice, we
focus our analysis on the immediate effects of policy announcements, but abstain from
assessing longer-term effects (e.g. Wright (2012), Neely (2014), and Chen et al. (2015)).
The second element is the extent to which financial markets anticipate the content of these
UMP statements. We identify the surprise part of these statements using a market-based
surprise measure that relies on the daily changes in the price of 10y government bond
futures. We thus closely follow the approach proposed by Wright (2012). Controlling for
market anticipation proves necessary to properly identify the financial market impact of
UMP announcements. For instance, on the day of its announcement, an increase in the
size of an asset purchase programme – at face value arguably an expansionary policy – may
exert contractionary (expansionary) financial market effects, if markets have anticipated a
larger (smaller) increase of the programme.4 In the following, we classify announcements
that are more expansionary than expected or those that are less restrictive than expected
as a positive surprise and announcements that are more restrictive or less expansionary
than expected as a negative surprise.
We find that UMP announcements by the four major advanced central banks significantly
affect Swiss financial assets. The size and direction of the impact depend on the degree of
policy anticipation and the specific asset class under consideration. An expansionary for-
eign UMP shock equivalent to a 25-basis-point decline in foreign long-term bond yields in-
duces an approximately 6-basis-point decrease in Swiss long-term government bond yields,
a 4.5-basis-point decrease in Swiss long-term corporate bond yields, a 1-percentage-point
decline in the Swiss equity index, an approximately 0.6-percentage-point appreciation of
the Swiss franc against the Euro and an approximately 0.9-percentage-point apprecia-
tion against the U.S. dollar. Qualitatively, our estimates for Swiss assets corroborate the
spillover effects estimated for comparable assets in other advanced economies (Glick and
Leduc (2012), Diez and Presno (2013), and Rogers et al. (2014)). For Swiss assets, the
effects are strongest for UMP announcements by the ECB and, among Swiss government
bonds, for those with residual maturities of 7-10 years. We further confirm the finding of
Glick and Leduc (2012) that the sign of spillover effects differs between positive and nega-
tive UMP surprises, whereas we cannot lend support to their conclusion that the strength
4The same logic applies to announcements intended to be restrictive: If markets anticipated an even
more (less) restrictive policy than announced, then an announcement would lead to expansionary (con-
tractionary) effects on the day of the announcement.
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of spillover effects is larger for positively surprising announcements. The implementation
of the minimum rate of 1.20 CHF per EUR tends to attenuate the spillover effects on
bond yields and exchange rates but not those on Swiss equities. This result indicates that
the domestic monetary policy stance can exert some limited effect on the cross-border
financial spillover impact of foreign monetary policy decisions.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the theoretical
literature on UMP spillover channels. Section 3 outlines the empirical set-up and data,
section 4 describes the UMP event selection strategy and section 5 explains the approach
relied upon to identify monetary policy surprises. The empirical results are discussed in
Section 6, followed by a discussion of their robustness in section 7. Section 8 concludes.
1.2 UMP spillover effects in theory
We start by reviewing the theoretical literature on the channels through which UMPs –
both asset purchases (quantitative easing or credit easing) and forward guidance state-
ments by central banks – can affect international financial markets. We focus on a set
of four UMP spillover channels relevant for the remainder of this chapter, without claim-
ing to be exhaustive: an international portfolio re-balancing channel, an international
liquidity channel, an international signalling channel and an exchange rate channel.5
The international portfolio re-balancing channel applies in particular to government bonds.
It is based on the notion that investors have a preference for bonds with certain charac-
teristics such as their maturity (Vayanos and Vila (2009), and Greenwood and Vayanos
(2010)). Given a foreign UMP focuses on purchasing such preferred bonds, thereby reduc-
ing their supply and hence their yield, then optimizing investors will seek to re-balance
their portfolio internationally to bonds with sufficiently similar characteristics. As a
consequence, a foreign UMP focused on purchasing foreign long-term government bonds
tends to lower yields of domestic long-term government bonds. Such portfolio re-balancing
effects need not be confined exclusively to the closest substitutes only. Alternatively, if op-
timizing investors act upon a pre-determined return goal, a decline in foreign government
bond yields could induce them to shift their portfolio holdings also towards more risky
assets – for instance domestic and foreign corporate bonds – thereby driving up (down)
the prices (yields) of those assets both locally and internationally (Krishnamurthy and
Vissing-Jorgensen (2011), Gagnon et al. (2011), and Bauer and Neely (2014)).
Second, and related, the international liquidity channel emphasises the fact that asset
purchases by a central bank increase the amount of liquidity available to the counter-
parties of the trade (Krogstrup et al. (2012), and Korniyenko and Loukoianova (2015)).
Optimizing agents will seek to invest the newly available liquidity profitably by increasing
their demand for a broad spectrum of assets, thereby pushing up their prices. In a similar
vein, more ample availability of liquidity lowers expected average risk-free interest rates
5Unlike in the literature on conventional monetary policy channels, no settled consensus has been
reached so far on the distinction and nomenclature of transmission channels of unconventional monetary
policies. The channels selected here are varieties of a core set of channels discussed recurrently in the
literature, see, among others, D’Amico et al. (2012), Haldane et al. (2016), Joyce et al. (2012), Bauer
and Neely (2014), Miyajima et al. (2014), and Chen et al. (2012).
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and tends to increase the risk-taking capacity of market participants. The latter implies
that risk premia fall and hence asset prices rise across the board. Importantly, there is
nothing specifically local to these effects. The main complication arising in the interna-
tional case is the fact that investors must take the currency risk into account. However,
while the currency risk premium may alter the size of the effect an UMP has on global
risky assets relative to local risky assets, this does not imply that the liquidity channel is
muted completely.
Third, foreign UMP announcements exert domestic financial market effects through an
international signalling channel. This channel relates to the notion that monetary policy
announcements convey relevant information regarding the commitment of a central bank
to a given path of the policy rate as well as regarding its assessment of the economic
situation (Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), Bauer and Rudebusch (2014), and Bauer
and Neely (2014)). The underlying mechanisms apply similarly both within a given
economy as well as across borders. The latter holds in particular for announcements by
central banks of core economies of the global economy, i.e. exactly those central banks
focused on in this study. Specifically, a policy decision in a major foreign economy can
signal to market participants that the domestic central bank in a small economy will
subsequently implement comparable policies thereby driving up domestic asset prices
through standard domestic transmission channels, as discussed in Taylor (2013), Chen
et al. (2012), or Caruana (2012). Further, it may also signal to market participants that
the major central bank has changed its assessment of the global economic outlook or its
assessment of global risk.
Through these signalling mechanisms, a foreign UMP announcement may induce adjust-
ments in the pricing of domestic financial assets. Importantly, the net effect of a foreign
UMP announcement on domestic asset prices and yields through the signalling channel
is ambiguous. It crucially depends on whether markets coordinate on an optimistic or
pessimistic interpretation of the policy announcement. For government bonds, a positively
surprising foreign UMP tends to lower yields, as it signals a lower and flatter expected
path of the domestic policy rate. The same holds if the foreign UMP announcement
indicates a less benign economic outlook, as the latter tends to compress the domestic
term premium. Both effects (lower expected short-term rate, lower term premium) im-
ply a downward shift in the domestic government bond yields in response to a foreign
UMP through the signalling channel. For corporate bonds, essentially the same narrative
applies. An additional, offsetting effect is conceivable if markets interpret the foreign
UMP announcement as negative news regarding the domestic corporate default risk, i.e.
if the default risk premium increases. For equities, such a default risk premium effect
may apply as well. Furthermore, if a foreign UMP is read as indicating a downgrading
of the global economic outlook, then expected earnings are negatively affected globally,
which also weighs on domestic equity prices. These negative signalling effects may be
compensated by a positive effect through lower than expected discount rates due to a
lower and flatter than expected path of the domestic policy rate. For exchange rates,
signalling effects tend to dampen the appreciation pressures on the domestic currency
through their impact on the expected domestic policy reaction. However – and this holds
specifically for the Swiss case as well as other safe haven currencies – if the foreign UMP
announcement signals higher risk and a downgrading of the global economic outlook, the
CHF tends to appreciate (e.g. Ranaldo and Söderlind (2010)).
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Forth, foreign monetary policy announcements – both conventional and unconventional –
can have a significant bearing on domestic financial assets through an exchange rate chan-
nel. Standard monetary models imply that a more expansionary foreign monetary policy
in one economy induces a depreciation of the nominal spot exchange rate of the foreign
currency – or, consequently, an appreciation of the domestic currency (Krugman et al.
(2011, chapter 14)).6 In general terms, similar effects ensue in the case of expansionary
unconventional monetary policy abroad.
Through the appreciation of the spot exchange rate, which implies that domestic monetary
conditions become more restrictive, a foreign UMP also affects other domestic asset prices:
For government bonds, more restrictive monetary conditions will lead to, ceteris paribus,
lower expected short rates, whereas the term premium is not necessarily affected. In
sum, an appreciation thus tends to lower government bond yields. For corporate bonds,
the same holds true. In addition, the impact on the default risk premium needs to be
considered. As long as the exchange rate appreciation does not alter the perceived default
risk of domestic corporates, then expected effects for corporate bond yields do not differ
from those on government bond yields. For equities, an appreciation of the domestic
currency has the main effect of negatively affecting expected earnings as it reduces the
competitiveness of internationally exposed firms. It thus weighs on their share price.7
Finally, for all assets considered, an appreciation of the domestic currency may have
two further, possibly offsetting effects: On the one hand, an appreciation of the spot
exchange rate implies that the price of domestic assets increases relative to comparable
assets abroad. This again dampens domestic equity prices and increases domestic bond
yields. On the other hand, if investors believe the domestic currency to appreciate further
over time, they expect domestic assets to provide appreciation-induced valuation gains,
making them relatively more attractive.
The net spillover effect induced by foreign UMPs comprises the sum of individual effects
through each of these distinct channels. As the discussion so far showed, the impact
of foreign UMPs can differ substantially for different domestic assets, possibly even in
direction. Disentangling and quantifying the relative importance of the individual spillover
channels poses a set of methodological challenges and asks for specific empirical models for
each asset under consideration (Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011), Fratzscher
et al. (2016), Bauer and Neely (2014), Neely (2015), Bhattarai and Neely (2016), and
Bauer and Rudebusch (2014)). As such, a formal analysis of the question which channel
dominates under which circumstances and for which asset in the Swiss case goes beyond
the scope of this chapter. Yet, by uncovering the overall impact of foreign UMPs on a
set of different domestic assets, and squaring the results obtained with the theoretical
mechanisms outlined here, this study allows us to draw some tentative conclusions on
this question in qualitative terms.
6This is a consequence of Mundell’s “trilemma”: in economies with open capital accounts, exchange
rate fluctuations ensue in response to foreign monetary policy shocks (e.g. Obstfeld et al. (2005)).
7This is the transaction effect of exchange rate changes on firms’ financial statements.
In the context of our study, it is important to recognize that the firms listed in the Swiss Market Index
(SMI) generate on average about 90% of their turnover abroad, whereas more significant parts of their
cost arise domestically. The latter is indicated by the fact that, on average, almost 25% of the employees
of the SMI-listed firms are Swiss-based (Rasch (2015)).
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1.3 Empirical framework and data
We estimate the UMP spillover effects on Swiss asset prices using the econometric model
described by equation (1.1) based on daily data. We apply the time-series set-up as in
Glick and Leduc (2012), using an explicit measure of the surprise component of policy
announcements, following Wright (2012).8
∆yt = α + β∆stdt,events + γ
′zt + εt (1.1)
The dependent variable ∆yt represents the one-day change in the following Swiss asset
prices: the main Swiss equity price index (Swiss Market Index, SMI), bilateral nominal
Swiss franc exchange rates versus the U.S. dollar (Dollar) and the Euro (Euro), yields on
Swiss government bonds with 10-year maturity (Gov.) and yields on Swiss franc denom-
inated bonds of AAA-BBB rated domestic corporates with 7-10-year maturity (Corp.).9
The dummy variable dt,events takes the value of one on all days specified as foreign UMP
announcement days and zero otherwise. The strategy adopted to designate specific days
as UMP announcement days is explained in section 1.4. ∆st represents a quantitative
measure of monetary policy surprise, that is, the extent to which a policy announcement
differs from market expectations. The baseline measure used as a proxy for monetary
policy surprise is the one-day change in the price of longer-term government bond futures
(approximately 10y, active contract). The underlying motivation for the use and the qual-
ity of this proxy is discussed in detail in section 1.5. The surprise measure for each central
bank is set to its market-derived value on corresponding UMP announcement days. The
vector zt denotes the vector of control variables. The baseline set of controls comprises
the one-day lagged values of the dependent variable, the one-day lagged change in the
VIX, and the lagged change in the U.S. 10y treasury yield.
In extensions, we interact the explanatory variable ∆stdt,events with a dummy for the
implementation of the minimum exchange rate (dt,mer , taking the value of one after 6
September 2011 and zero otherwise), dummies for each central bank (dt,cb , taking the
value of one on days with announcements by the corresponding central bank), or a dummy
for positive and negative surprises (dt,∆s>0 and dt,∆s<0, taking the value of one for an-
nouncements that surprise markets positively and negatively, respectively), with positive
surprises being defined as announcements that are more expansionary than expected.
We estimate equation (1.1) by OLS, accounting for heteroscedasticity based on White
(1980). We do not expect serial correlation to be a crucial problem for changes in asset
prices and is indeed dismissed by preliminary checks.10
8The approach is closely related to the event study approach commonly relied upon in the empirical
UMP literature. An event study using a one-day event window and the same control variables as here,
yields comparable results.
9Exchange rates are represented as Swiss francs per unit of foreign currency (i.e. EURCHF and
USDCHF, respectively), such that an increase (decrease) indicates a CHF depreciation (appreciation).
10The assumption of normally distributed coefficients seems robust, although asset price changes per se
follow a t-distribution rather than the normal. While tests for normally distributed asset prices changes
do indeed reject the null of normal distribution, corresponding tests for non-parametric bootstrapped
coefficients do not – we are thus confident in assuming this distribution for the coefficients. At the same
time, estimation based on a GARCH specification of the variance structure yields qualitatively similar
results.
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Two sources of bias are conceivable when assessing the impact of monetary policy on
asset prices using such an event study-inspired set-up.11 First, reverse causality must
be taken into consideration. In general, monetary policy decisions are taken as a func-
tion of economic and financial conditions. Hence, market developments may influence
monetary policy decisions, as shown, e.g., by Rigobon and Sack (2003). Second, other
important news, such as GDP releases or labour market data released during the mea-
surement window (in our case, on the same day as a monetary policy announcement)
may simultaneously affect asset prices and the market-based measure of monetary policy
surprise. In other words, ex ante, we cannot rule out an omitted variable bias.
We address these issues as follows. On the one hand, we use control variables to take
account of previous trends in asset prices and market developments, which could be trig-
gers of subsequent policy interventions and asset price changes. Integrating the baseline
controls contributes to effective containment of potential endogeneity issues. Moreover,
testing for Granger causality in our data set suggests that the surprise measure relied
upon is not driven by past asset price developments. In any case, from a central banking
practice perspective, policy decisions are unlikely to be made based on short-run devel-
opments in asset prices, which by itself reduces the relevance of the endogeneity bias.12
On the other hand, by measuring the daily change in asset prices, we allow markets suffi-
cient time to process policy news without contaminating the measurement with too much
noise.13
The financial market data are obtained from Bloomberg. We compute one-day changes
as differences in basis points for bond yields (xt−xt−1), and changes in percentage points
for equities and exchange rates ((xt − xt−1)/xt−1 × 100).14 The sample data set spans
from January 2008 to December 2014, containing 1827 non-weekend observation days.
Depending on trading holidays and data availability, the effective number of observations
entering the analysis varies among the individual assets, ranging from 1688 to 1763.
Due to Swiss trading hours, announcements by the Fed released after 10.45 a.m. local
time (ET) are assumed to affect Swiss equity and bond yields one day after the an-
nouncement is made, whereas exchange rates are affected on the announcement day.15
11Gürkaynak and Wright (2013) provides an overview of the strengths and limits of the event-study
approach.
12Endogeneity should be even less of an issue in the small open economy case considered in this study.
Swiss asset price developments are very unlikely to affect foreign monetary policy decisions or foreign
asset markets more generally.
13This is in line with the event-study literature that indicates a one-day window to be a reasonable
length for measuring the financial market impact of monetary policies (e.g. Gürkaynak et al. (2005),
Glick and Leduc (2012), Rogers et al. (2014), and Wright (2012)). More generally, the literature focused
on estimating the asset price effects of conventional monetary policy suggests that both endogeneity and
the omitted variable bias are minor issues (Rigobon and Sack (2004), Rosa (2011), and Gürkaynak et al.
(2005)).
14Two-day changes are computed accordingly (xt replaced by xt+1).
15Swiss equity and bond market closure times, which are the cut-off points for daily values, vary between
5 p.m. and 6 p.m. Swiss time, in contrast to the market close for daily exchange rates, which is 10 or
11 p.m. Swiss time. For the purpose of our analysis, we assume that U.S. announcements made after
4.45 p.m. Swiss time affect Swiss equity and bond prices on the day following the announcement. One
UMP event (a TALF extension on 10 February, 2009, which was released at 5 p.m. Swiss time) would be
affected by a shift in the cut-off threshold from 5 p.m. to 6 p.m. An alternative approach to circumvent
time zone-related issues is to rely on a two-day measurement window, see section 1.7.
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BoJ announcements are consistently released before markets open in Switzerland. There-
fore, they are assumed to affect Swiss asset markets on their release day. For ECB and
BoE announcements, time zone differences do not matter in the Swiss case. Two ECB
statements are released on a Sunday and are thus assumed to affect Swiss asset markets
on the subsequent Monday.
1.4 UMP event selection
Estimating the impact of unconventional monetary policy announcements requires an ap-
propriate, robust identification of unconventional monetary policy shocks. Identification
entails two steps. First, a definition of the analysed policy ‘events’. That is, we must
determine when information about a specific policy was released (Faust et al. (2007)).
Second, once the timing of the policy events is pinned down, we need a valid and robust
measure of the extent of policy surprise – in other words, we need a measure of the size of
the policy shocks. This section explains the strategy underlying the designation of UMP
events, and section 1.5 explains the strategy used to identify the extent of policy surprise.
When selecting UMP events, we rely on the narrative approach of policy shock identifi-
cation outlined in Romer and Romer (1989, 2004). To viably conduct such an approach,
we have to outline the narrative of the crisis and the unconventional policy responses it
evoked. To this purpose, annex tables A.1 and A.2 provide short descriptions of the key
unconventional monetary policy programmes implemented by the Fed, ECB, BoE and
BoJ between 2008 and 2014.16
Building on these programme descriptions, we identify the specific set of UMP announce-
ments based on a thorough analysis of statements by the four central banks through press
releases, media conferences and speeches of their governors. In doing so, we apply the
following criteria to designate an announcement as an UMP event.
First, because our study focuses on measures aimed at securing monetary and macroeco-
nomic stability, only those liquidity measures implemented predominantly for monetary
policy reasons are included in our definition of UMP programmes; those focused mainly
on financial stability are excluded. Hence, the first announcement entering as an UMP
event dates in 2008. Obviously, it is not always easy to make an unambiguous distinction
between liquidity provision programmes implemented as financial stability policies and
those implemented for monetary policy reasons. To make the distinction, we rely on the
crisis response narrative outlined above and an analysis of the key objectives of individual
policy programmes as stated in their official descriptions.
Second, among the monetary policy announcements entering this group, announcements
that do not include any changes in wording – i.e., contain no intended ‘news’ – regarding
an UMP programme (for instance, a mere confirmation that a previously announced
programme will continue as planned) are not included in our baseline event set. In this
regard, our approach differs from Diez and Presno (2013), and Rogers et al. (2014), who
base their analyses of exchange rate effects on all official (and scheduled) governing board
16Fawley and Neely (2013), Lenza et al. (2010), Cour-Thimann and Winkler (2012), and Rogers et al.
(2014) provide detailed narratives of the financial crisis and the policy responses.
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meeting statements over the course of the crisis. The key advantage of the more restrictive
approach applied here is that it mitigates the problem caused by a large number of no
news’ events, i.e., it reduces the inclusion of noise, which weakens identification. One
might argue that disregarding these events excludes the conceivable situation in which
markets are expecting a central bank to move, but no move is announced. Although this
argument is clearly important in theory, practical experience suggests that this problem
is contained during the crisis because policy makers worked hard to ensure that markets
knew in advance that policy would be changed on a specific day; the issue of surprise
mainly concerns the scale of an announced policy change, not the change per se. In
any case, we check the robustness of our event set selection by estimating the spillover
effects based on an event set containing all monetary policy-related statements of the
policy-setting bodies of the four central banks during our sample period.
The baseline event selection approach yields 97 UMP policy announcements: 34 by the
Fed, 20 by the ECB, 16 by the BoE, and 27 by the BoJ. In seven instances, two different
central banks release a statement on the same day; hence, the event set entering the
estimation comprises 90 identified unique event days. The enlarged event set used for
robustness contains 379 announcements, of which 73 were announced by the Fed, 98 by
the ECB, 92 by the BoE, and 104 by the BoJ.
1.5 Measuring monetary policy surprise in the UMP
era
The comparatively large number of announcements in our event set mitigates a crucial
limitation of most studies on the impact of UMP announcements, namely, restrictions
on inference and interpretation due to the small number of observations. However, given
our expanded set of announcements, it is no longer plausible to argue that all events are
fully surprising to market participants. Rather, it is appropriate to assume that market
anticipation of unconventional policy announcements improves over time (e.g. McLaren
et al. (2014)).17 We therefore need an explicit measure of the anticipation of the content
of a monetary policy announcement to correctly gauge the impact of policy statements
on asset prices.18
17To circumvent this issue, many studies on UMP effects focus exclusively on the early rounds of UMP
announcements, such as the QE1 or Fed LSAP1 programmes, arguing that these announcements can
confidently be assumed to be fully surprising (e.g., Gagnon et al. (2011), Joyce et al. (2011), or Neely
(2015)).
18Although there is broad consensus on the best (market-based) measure to capture the surprise con-
tent of conventional monetary policy announcements – the change in the federal funds rate futures in
combination with the change in a somewhat longer-term financial instrument such as term federal funds,
term eurodollars, or eurodollar futures (Gürkaynak et al. (2007), Gürkaynak et al. (2005), Poole et al.
(2002), Rigobon and Sack (2004), and Piazzesi and Swanson (2008)) – a consensus has not yet emerged
for measuring UMP surprises. A wide range of alternative measures is proposed in the literature. Quanti-
tatively, one alternative is to take account of pre-event developments in financial markets (e.g. Fratzscher
et al. (2013)). A second alternative is to use changes in the lagged dependent variable under scrutiny.
In this spirit, Aı̈t-Sahalia et al. (2012) use the difference between the asset price change on event day
and its average daily change on the twenty days preceding the policy event. A third alternative that
is similar but not identical to our baseline measure is the use of longer-term government bond forward
rates (e.g., Chadha et al. (2013)). Fourth, changes in shadow policy rate estimates may prove useful for
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We use the daily change in the price of 10-year government bond futures as a proxy for
the extent of market surprise linked to unconventional monetary policy announcements
and standardize this measure according to equation (1.2) by their standard deviation to
ensure comparability among the measures for different economies. A positive change of
the surprise measure – i.e., an increase in the price of the longer-term bond future –
indicates that the policy is more expansionary than expected by market participants (and
vice versa). Specifically, on average, a one-standard-deviation increase in the surprise
measure implies a reduction in the corresponding foreign 10-year government bond yield








Our UMP surprise measure is closely related to the measure proposed by Wright (2012),
which is also relied upon in Diez and Presno (2013) and Glick and Leduc (2012). However,
we reduce its complexity threefold. First, we disregard the extraction of common factors
from a broad range of futures contracts. Second, we rely on the change in these medium-
term futures prices as a simplified approximation of their yields. Third, whereas Wright
(2012) calculates intra-day changes in the futures yield, we rely on day-to-day changes.
These simplifications allow us to use the same policy surprise proxy for all central banks
and to circumvent issues regarding the limited scope of non-U.S. bond futures and the
differences among futures contract specifications across economies.19
Because we rely on a market-based measure, it is not inconceivable that other market
developments in addition to the policy announcement induce changes in this measure,
particularly because we consider its daily changes. As previously discussed in section
1.3, this possibility potentially reduces the quality of this measure as clean identifier of
monetary policy surprise. To verify that this issue is minor, we show that bond futures
are a good proxy for ‘news’ in general and thus are a good proxy for ‘monetary policy
news’ during the UMP period.
By construction, the announcements days selected in our event set contain news or a
surprise regarding UMP. Hence, any good surprise proxy must – on average – exhibit
stronger dispersion on these days than on days not selected as event days. As shown in
capturing the change in the monetary policy stance in an UMP/ZLB environment (Wu and Xia (2014),
and Lombardi and Zhu (2014)). Qualitative measures of UMP expectations include survey-based data,
such as the Reuters survey of London City economists (used, e.g., in Joyce et al. (2011) for the analysis
of BoE UMPs), the Primary Dealer Survey (PDS) conducted by the New York Fed one week before each
FOMC announcement (used, e.g., in Cahill et al. (2013)) and an ex-post analysis of newspaper articles
on the market assessment of policy announcements (used, e.g., in Rosa (2012) and Lambert and Ueda
(2014)).
19Wright (2012) uses two-, five-, ten- and thirty-year U.S. government bond futures contracts to com-
pute changes in the yields of these futures in a short window spanning 15 minutes before to 1 hour and 45
minutes after a policy announcement. The futures yield change is approximated by dividing returns by
the duration of the cheapest-to-deliver underlying bond. The first principal component of these changes
in futures yields is then used as a proxy for the monetary policy shock. By definition, our simplifications
reduce the information content entering the construction of the surprise measure. However, comparing
the values of our surprise measure with those extracted by Wright (2012) for Fed announcements reveals
that the statistical properties of these two series are similar in qualitative terms.
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Panels 1, 2 and 3 of Table 1.1, descriptive statistics reveal that unconditional means and
standard deviations of the daily change in long-term bond futures prices are considerably
higher on event days than on non-event days. With the exception of BoJ announcements,
dispersion is roughly 1.5 to 2 times higher on event days suggesting that the change in
long-term government bond futures is a fairly well-suited proxy for market surprise on
these days.
Table 1.1: Descriptive statistics: UMP surprise measure
Country/region US EA UK JP
Panel 1: All UMP event days (90 obs.)
Mean 0.18 0.13 0.15 0.23
Standard dev. 1.69 1.34 1.10 1.05
Panel 2: UMP event days of corresponding central bank
Mean 0.77 -0.25 0.19 0.35
Standard dev. 2.06 1.43 1.50 0.90
Panel 3: Non-UMP days (1656 obs.)
Mean 0.01 0.04 -0.01 0.01
Standard dev. 0.94 0.98 1.00 0.98
Panel 4: Correlation with change in 10y gov. bond yield
UMP event days of corr. central
bank
-0.97 -0.98 -0.99 -0.79
Non-UMP days -0.85 -0.91 -0.72 -0.63
Table reports descriptive statistics of the baseline surprise measure – the change in
U.S., German (as proxy for the euro area), U.K., and Japanese longer-term govern-
ment bond futures price for a sample running from 1 January 2008 to 31 December
2014. Panel 1 reports the statistics on all UMP event days, whereas Panel 2 focuses
on the UMPs announced by the corresponding central bank, and Panel 3 on the days
in the sample without a UMP announcement. Panel 4 reports the correlation of the
change in the surprise measure with the corresponding local government bond yields.
For example, on days with a Fed announcement, the first element in the ‘US’ column
provides the correlation coefficient of the change in U.S. 10y government bond yields
and the standardised change in the U.S. long-term bond futures price.
In addition, Panel 4 of Table 1.1 shows the correlation between changes in bond futures
prices – the baseline proxy for market surprise – and changes in the corresponding foreign
long-term interest rate – the implicit policy target in the UMP era. Overall, reported
correlations are close to 1 in absolute terms. Moreover, the correlations are higher on
event days than on non-event days. Considering these two facts together suggests that the
baseline surprise measure is not only a good proxy for market surprise in general but also
particularly well-suited for capturing news regarding unconventional monetary policies.
Relatedly, using the publicly stated intention of the central banks implementing UMPs
as a gauge, most announcements in our event set would be classified as expansionary.
However, as Table 1.2 reveals, almost half of these announcements were in fact negatively
surprising, i.e. less expansionary than expected. This underscores the importance of
controlling for market anticipation.
Before turning to the empirical results, a remark on the ECB surprise measure is due.
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Table 1.2: Announcements: Central banks’ intention and market perception
Intention Expansionary Neutral Restrictive Σ
Perception
Expansionary 48 3 4 55
Restrictive 36 1 4 41
Σ 84 4 8
Table compares the UMP announcement events in our data set classified by two
different schemes: the first classification relies on the change in the policy stance
as intended by the announcing central bank (expansionary, neutral or restrictive),
whereas the second scheme relies on the policy stance as perceived by the markets
based on our measure of policy surprise (expansionary = positive surprise, restrictive
= negative surprise) described in section 1.5).
Summary statistics provided in Table 1.1 indicate that ECB announcements are, on av-
erage, less expansionary than expected, in contrast to the average announcement by the
other central banks. This feature of ECB announcements can be linked to the fundamen-
tal challenge of implementing policies that have similar effects in every economy within
a heterogenous monetary union. For instance, in response to the ‘Whatever it takes’
statement by ECB president Mario Draghi in July 2012, yields on German 10y bonds
increased, whereas Italian and other periphery country long-term bond yields dropped.
Put differently, in such a case, a decrease in the price of German bond futures indicates
a more restrictive stance for safe assets, but it does not necessarily imply the same for
more risky assets. This reasoning suggests that, to gauge the impact of ECB announce-
ments on comparatively safe assets (such as Swiss assets), it is more appropriate to rely
on the German long-term bond futures price than on a surprise measure derived from the
movements of relatively risky assets, such as changes in Italian bond futures. We return
to this issue in the robustness section.
1.6 Empirical results
1.6.1 Asset price summary statistics
As a starting point of the empirical analysis, we report key stylised facts on the one-day
changes in Swiss asset prices and yields in our sample data set. Panel 1 of Table 1.3 reveals
that the changes in all Swiss asset prices considered are substantially larger in absolute
numbers on days with UMP announcements than on days without UMP announcements.
The conclusion that the days designated as events are ‘special’ – that is, that they are
surprising or reflect news of some sort – is also supported by higher standard deviations
of asset price changes on event days.
Panel 2 of Table 1.3 shows that the introduction of the exchange rate floor in September
2011 by the Swiss National Bank (often referred to as ‘minimum exchange rate’, MER)
has exerted an important impact on the average asset price reaction to foreign UMP
announcements: after the MER has been put in place, the average changes are clearly
smaller in absolute value for all assets. Moreover, with the exception of 10y government
bond yields, the unconditional asset price changes on announcement days are positive
on average, whereas they are negative in the ‘before-MER’ sample. Additionally, the
dispersion of asset price reactions on days of foreign UMP announcements is more muted
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Table 1.3: Descriptive statistics: Changes in Swiss asset prices
Asset price SMI Euro Dollar Gov. Corp.
Panel 1: Whole sample (1 Jan 2008 to 31 Dec 2014)
UMP event days (90 obs.)
Mean -0.18 -0.16 -0.14 -0.42 -0.43
Standard dev. 1.59 0.60 0.97 4.32 3.57
Non-event days (between 1598 and 1651 obs.)
Mean 0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.13 -0.14
Standard dev. 1.22 0.52 0.73 3.52 3.14
Panel 2: UMP event days before vs days during minimum exchange rate regime
Before MER (47 obs.)
Mean -0.53 -0.31 -0.31 -0.71 -0.89
Standard dev. 1.89 0.77 1.11 5.05 4.36
During MER (43 obs.)
Mean 0.25 0.01 0.04 -0.08 0.07
Standard dev. 1.04 0.18 0.73 3.16 2.33
Panel 3: Positively surprising versus negatively surprising UMP event days
Positive surprise (51 obs.)
Mean -0.43 -0.26 -0.24 -2.51 -2.06
Standard dev. 1.32 0.65 1.05 3.38 3.20
Negative surprise (38 obs.)
Mean 0.17 -0.02 -0.04 2.39 1.76
Standard dev. 1.84 0.47 0.81 3.75 2.86
Table reports summary statistics of the daily changes in the following Swiss asset prices: Swiss
equity market index (SMI), bilateral exchange rates of the Swiss franc vs. the Euro (Euro) and
U.S. dollar (Dollar), 10 year Swiss government bonds yields (Gov.) and the yields on CHF-
denominated bonds of Swiss corporates with maturity between 7 and 10y, rated at least BBB
(Corp.). Panel 1 compares the respective changes on UMP event days and on non-UMP days in
the sample running from 1 January 2008 to 31 December 2014. Panel 2 compares the statistics of
the asset price changes on UMP event days between 1 January 2008 and 5 September 2011 with
the statistics for the event days in the period running from 7 September 2011 to 31 December
2014. On 6 September 2011, the Swiss National Bank introduced its minimum exchange rate
policy (MER). Panel 3 compares the statistics of the asset price changes on days with positively
surprising UMP announcements with those on days with negatively surprising announcements.
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after the implementation of the MER. Thus, at first glance, the summary statistics support
the hypothesis that the temporary change in the Swiss monetary policy regime had a
containing impact on the spillover of foreign policies on Swiss asset prices.
Panel 3 of Table 1.3 indicates that examining positively and negatively surprising foreign
UMP announcements separately is worthwhile. Taking the descriptive statistics at face
value, positive surprises induce a fall in bond yields and equity prices and induce the Swiss
franc to appreciate. In contrast, negative surprises push bond yields and equity prices
higher and induce only very contained appreciation of the Swiss franc. In absolute terms,
the unconditional means suggest that negative surprises have a more muted impact on all
Swiss assets analysed.
1.6.2 The key role of market expectations
We start the empirical analysis by gauging the response of Swiss asset prices to foreign
UMP announcements days without controlling for the extent of the surprise entrenched
in such announcements. Panel 1 of Table 1.4 reveals that foreign UMP announcements
have no significant impact on Swiss bond yields and equity prices, whereas the Swiss
franc bilateral exchange rates appreciate, on average, on days with UMP announcements
by foreign central banks. However, as discussed in section 1.5, the estimates tend to be
biased if we do not control for market expectations regarding the policy announcements.
In sufficiently efficient financial markets, only unexpected changes (‘news’) of monetary
policy should have a systematic impact on asset prices. It is therefore likely that the
empirical model used for the first regression mis-measures the true extent of anticipation
and thus the true effect of foreign policy announcements on Swiss asset prices.
Results change considerably as soon as we include our benchmark proxy for market sur-
prise – the change in the price of long-term government bond futures – as an explanatory
variable instead of relying exclusively on a UMP day dummy, i.e. if we estimate equation
(1.1).
Panel 2 of Table 1.4 provides the point estimates using the UMP event set as specified in
section 1.4. Swiss long-term government and corporate bond yields and Swiss equity prices
decrease in response to a positively surprising UMP announcement, and the Swiss franc
appreciates against the U.S. dollar and the Euro. All estimates reported are significantly
different from zero on a fairly high level.20
In qualitative terms, the spillover effects on bond yields obtained corrobarate the cross-
border impact of UMPs uncovered by studies focusing on different sets of advanced or
emerging economies (Glick and Leduc (2012), Rogers et al. (2014), and Bowman et al.
(2015)). The effect on long-term Swiss government bond yields suggests that this specific
asset class tends to be an adequate substitute for foreign long-term government bonds, i.e.,
the international portfolio channel appears to be important to explain how foreign UMPs
spillover to Swiss government bonds.21 Similarly, thedirection of the reaction in corporate
20Statistically, the overall explanatory power of our model for the variation in asset prices as measured
by R2 is small. This is not surprising, given the specification applied (a time-series approach with
dummies) and the low ratio of event days to non-event days in our sample.
21Section 1.6.6 discusses the impact on the entire Swiss government bond yield curve in more detail.
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Table 1.4: Foreign UMPs: Spillover effects on Swiss asset prices
Asset price SMI Euro Dollar Gov. Corp.
Panel 1: All UMP events, not controlled for surprise
Constant 0.04 -0.01 0.01 -0.13 -0.13†
(0.199) (0.453) (0.762) (0.134) (0.083)
UMP event day dummy -0.24 -0.14† -0.24* -0.34 -0.29
(0.175) (0.060) (0.021) (0.457) (0.470)
No. obs. 1694 1763 1763 1718 1692
Panel 2: All UMP events, baseline surprise
Constant 0.03 -0.01 0.00 -0.12 -0.13†
(0.287) (0.259) (0.910) (0.159) (0.089)
UMP surprise (90 obs.) -0.26** -0.14* -0.22** -1.46** -1.07**
(0.007) (0.017) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000)
VIX -0.03** 0.00† 0.00 0.03† 0.04**
(0.000) (0.094) (0.520) (0.054) (0.001)
US Gov bonds 0.02** 0.00 0.00 0.15** 0.14**
(0.003) (0.629) (0.879) (0.000) (0.000)
Lagged dep. -0.08 0.04 -0.01 -0.06† -0.02
(0.225) (0.361) (0.642) (0.093) (0.505)
No. obs. 1694 1741 1741 1706 1692
Panel 3: All UMP events distinguished by origin of monetary shock, baseline surprise
Federal Reserve UMPs (34 obs.) -0.11 -0.16† -0.38** -1.28** -0.96**
(0.225) (0.052) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
European Central Bank UMPs (20 obs.) -0.84** -0.25* -0.02 -2.06** -1.34**
(0.005) (0.047) (0.792) (0.000) (0.000)
Bank of England UMPs (16 obs.) -0.17 -0.06 0.09† -1.72** -1.54**
(0.333) (0.333) (0.081) (0.001) (0.000)
Bank of Japan UMPs (27 obs.) -0.40* 0.05 -0.03 -1.16* -0.39
(0.014) (0.578) (0.866) (0.044) (0.442)
(Constant and controls omitted)
No. obs. 1694 1741 1741 1706 1692
Table reports the main regression results. Significance levels are 1% (∗∗), 5% (∗), and 10% (†).
Values in parentheses represent p-values. Panel 1 relies on a UMP event day dummy, whereas
Panel 2 includes our baseline surprise measure. Panel 3 reports results obtained when separating
the underlying event set by announcing central bank. Dependent variables reported are the Swiss
equity market index (SMI), bilateral exchange rates of the Swiss franc vs. Euro (Euro) and U.S.
dollar (Dollar), the yields on 10 year Swiss government bonds (Gov.) and the yields on CHF-
denominated bonds of Swiss corporates with maturity between 7 and 10 years, rated at least
BBB (Corp.). Asset prices enter as daily changes, measured either in percentage points (SMI,
exchange rates) or in basis points (bond yields). UMP surprises are measured in units of standard
deviations of the daily change in longer-term government bond futures. The sample runs from
1 January 2008 to 31 December 2014. The UMP event set comprises 97 statements (34 Fed, 20
ECB, 16 BOE and 27 BoJ), 14 of which were announced pairwise on the same day, yielding a
total of 90 days on which at least one of the central banks released an UMP statement. The total
number of observations for the assets may differ due to missing values on non-event days.
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bond yields suggests that foreign UMPs spill over through international portfolio re-
balancing and liquidity channels. The smaller size of the impact on corporates compared
to long-term government bond yields is consistent with the reading that corporate bonds
are less close substitutes to foreign risk-free bonds, as suggested by theory. In addition, it
may also indicate that markets read the foreign UMP predominantly as a negative signal
for the economic outlook and, consequently, may ask for a higher default risk premium.
The negative response of the Swiss equity index to foreign UMP announcements is con-
sistent with the results obtained by Glick and Leduc (2012) for equity markets in other
advanced economies. This result suggests that the negative variety of the exchange rate
channel (appreciation weighing on expected earnings) and the international signalling
channel (risk-off, negative economic outlook) outweigh the price-boosting impact induced
through the international portfolio re-balancing and liquidity channels.
The estimated effects on bilateral exchange rates (FX) are in line with theoretical predic-
tions and empirical results for other currency pairs (Glick and Leduc (2015), and Diez and
Presno (2013)). Arbitrage conditions for currency triangles, e.g. for the Euro, U.S. dollar
and Swiss franc, and the different sizes of bilateral exchange rate markets may affect the
bilateral foreign exchange rate impact. Therefore, caution is warranted in interpreting
the FX coefficients.
The control variables influence Swiss asset prices as expected. An increase in overall
market uncertainty – indicated by an increase in the VIX – lowers the prices of risky
Swiss assets. The U.S. long-term bond yield covaries positively with Swiss government
and corporate bond yields, providing further evidence of the importance of cross-border
financial market interlinkages. The lagged dependent variables do not affect changes in
same-day asset prices, as suggested by the efficient market hypothesis. Nonetheless, these
variables are included for identification reasons, as described in section 1.3.
1.6.3 Spillover effects by announcing central bank
Thus far, announcements by the various central banks have been analysed together. Bi-
lateral asset price effects may be disguised. A more granular analysis separating the
announcements by corresponding central banks – i.e., multiplying ∆stdt,events in equation
(1.1) with a dummy dt,cb for each foreign central bank – provides a better reading of
bilateral effects.22
The coefficients reported in Panel 3 of Table 1.4 broadly indicate that the depth of fi-
nancial linkages to be an important determinant of the strength of cross-border spillover
effects. ECB announcements exert the strongest and broadest impact on Swiss asset
prices, followed by U.S. and U.K. announcements, whereas BoJ events have only limited
or no impact on the Swiss assets considered. This result is consistent with evidence ob-
tained for other economies with close ties to, but outside, the euro area (e.g. Falagiarda
et al. (2015)) and indicates that the degree of financial and economic integration mat-
ters for the exposure of an economy to foreign monetary policy shocks. Moreover, the
22The resulting surprise series takes the value of the foreign surprise measure on the day of an UMP
announcement by the corresponding central bank and is set to zero otherwise. The number of events per
central bank ranges from 16 to 34.
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coefficients for bilateral exchange rates indicate that UMPs announced by corresponding
central banks are most relevant for the respective effects. As an aside, the analysis reveals
that indirect FX effects are present as well, with Fed events affecting the EURCHF and
BoE events affecting the USDCHF exchange rate. This result is in line with predictions
from monetary models of the FX (see e.g. Jackson et al. (2005)) and is supportive to the
view that the FX estimates measured in our framework should be interpreted prudently.
Less intuitively, Fed and BoE statements do not have significant effects on Swiss equi-
ties, whereas BoJ events do. The U.S. and U.K. results indicate either that the effects
of different channels (e.g., signalling and liquidity effects) cancel each other out in the
Swiss case or that that the announcement effects per se are in fact negligible. The BoE
result specifically may be explained, at least to some degree, with the comparatively low
relevance of the U.K. economy for Swiss enterprises. The BoJ result, on the other hand, is
largely driven by the initial announcement of the Quantitative and Qualitative Monetary
Easing (QQME) program on 4 April 2013. BoJ events have no significant effect on the
SMI when controlling for this outlier, which is more in line with expectations based on
rather weak economic and financial links between Switzerland and Japan.23
1.6.4 Impact of SNB’s minimum exchange rate policy
The introduction of an exchange rate floor of 1.20 Swiss franc per Euro by the Swiss
National Bank on 6 September 2011 provides a perfect setting to test the impact of
domestic monetary regime change on the size and scope of spillover effects of foreign
monetary policy shocks on domestic financial markets.
To evaluate whether the UMP spillover effects are significantly affected by this exceptional
change in policy in the recipient country, we interact the ∆stdt,events term in equation (1.1)
with a dummy dt,mer . This dummy takes the value of 1 for the time period during which
the minimum exchange rate was in place.
The results reported in Table 1.5 reveal that the direction of the reported spillover effects
is not affected by the MER introduction. However, the average size of UMP spillover
effects on bond yields and exchange rates is attenuated after the introduction of the
MER. In particular, bilateral exchange rates no longer respond significantly to foreign
UMP announcements. In contrast, the Swiss stock price index is more strongly affected by
foreign UMPs after the MER introduction, and the effect is more significant. This outcome
is consistent with the asymmetric design of the MER policy, which allowed the Swiss franc
to depreciate freely, but capped its appreciation. This reading is also supported by more
analyses (not reported to conserve space), which indicate that positive UMP surprises
exerted substantially smaller and less significant effects during the MER period, whereas
spillover effects related to negative surprises remained largely intact. That said, for all
assets considered, F-tests do not allow us to reject the null of equality of the ‘before’-MER
and ‘during’-MER coefficients.
23The QQME announcement marked an important change in the BoJ monetary policy regime by
substantially increasing its efforts to fight deflation. The QQME is a comprehensive programme, en-
compassing a change in the main operating target from an overnight call rate to monetary base and a
substantial increase in the size of asset purchases.
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Table 1.5: Foreign UMPs: Minimum exchange rate (MER)
Asset price SMI Euro Dollar Gov. Corp.
UMP events before MER (47 obs.) -0.24* -0.17* -0.27** -1.52** -1.13**
(0.041) (0.043) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
UMP events during MER (43 obs.) -0.33** -0.05† -0.04 -1.27** -0.85**
(0.000) (0.065) (0.629) (0.000) (0.000)
(Constant and controls omitted)
No. obs. 1694 1741 1741 1706 1692
F-test 0.33 1.91 3.50† 0.54 0.76
(-0.56) (-0.17) (-0.06) (-0.46) (-0.38)
Table reports results obtained when spitting the sample on the day of the implementation of the minimum
exchange rate (MER) by the Swiss National Bank on 6 September 2011. The F-test tests the null of equality
of the coefficients obtained for the UMP surprise variable before and during the minimum exchange rate. For
values in parentheses, significance levels, and units see Table 1.4.
The estimates obtained for spillover effects observed during the MER period suggest that
the channels of international UMP transmission likely to be important for different asset
classes – portfolio re-balancing and liquidity channels for government and corporate bonds;
signalling and exchange rate channels for equities – remained operational. However, their
relative weight may have changed to some extent with the introduction of the MER.
The relatively more contained effect on bond yields suggests that Swiss government
and corporate bonds have lost some of their appeal during the MER period, as they
no longer provided expected appreciation-induced valuation gains for foreign investors –
thus spillover effects through portfolio re-balancing and liquidity channels tend to be less
important.24
For equities, the same logic applies. In addition, however, we would also expect earnings
of SMI-listed companies to be less negatively affected through the exchange rate channel.
Although our empirical set-up does not allow for measuring the individual impact of these
two counterbalancing effects, the obtained coeffcient for the SMI suggests that the ‘loss
of attraction’ tends to outweigh the effect of an improved outlook for earnings in the
Swiss case.In fact, the ‘loss of attraction’ argument may be most relevant for risky Swiss
assets as they do not provide any specific characteristics that would make them more
valuable compared to foreign risky assets. Swiss government bonds may still be of value
to investors as safe assets, even without providing any expected appreciation gains.
1.6.5 Spillover effect asymmetry
The average effects reported thus far do not account for the fact that certain UMP an-
nouncements surprise markets positively whereas others are read as a disappointment (see
Table 1.2). Hence, results based on the average extent of surprise only tell part of the
24It is important to note that this interpretation hinges crucially on the assumption that the average
investor’s risk aversion did not change with the MER introduction. Otherwise, it would be difficult to
reconcile the reported estimates with the proposed narrative. For instance, if investors become more risk
averse, we would expect Swiss government bonds to become relatively more attractive and their yields
to fall more pronouncedly, given the role of Swiss government bonds as safe assets.
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story. In this section, we discuss whether UMP spillover effects on Swiss asset prices differ
between positively and negatively surprising announcements, as suggested in the analysis
of Glick and Leduc (2012) with respect to other advanced economies. The question of
asymmetric effects has two components: first, it is a question of whether the sign of the
spillover effects differs between the two sub-groups of announcements. Second, it is a
question of whether the strength of the corresponding spillovers differs between positively
and negatively surprising announcements.
To address these two questions, we interact the main explanatory variable (∆stdt) of
equation 1.1 with a dummy for positive surprises (dt,∆st>0) and a dummy for negative
surprises (dt,∆st<0). The first dummy takes the value of 1 if the surprise measure is
positive, whereas the second dummy is set to 1 if the measure returns a negative value.25
To check whether the signs of spillover effects differ, we interact the absolute value of the
explanatory variable of interest with two dummies for positive and negative surprises. In
line with the results in Glick and Leduc (2012) for other advanced economies, Panel 1 of
Table 1.6 indicates that Swiss equity prices and bond yields react negatively to positive
surprises and positively to negative surprises and that the Swiss franc appreciates versus
the Euro in the former case and depreciates in the latter. The Swiss franc appreciates
against the US dollar in the case of positive surprises, but shows no significant reaction
to negative surprises. F-test results indicate that the differences between the coefficients
are indeed significant.
From a policy perspective, it is not only crucial to understand whether announcement
effects differ in direction but also to know whether the size of the spillovers differs between
positive and negative surprises. Therefore, we compare the coefficients from an estimation
based on the the interaction of the dummies with the surprise measure as such, ∆stdt, not
on its absolute values. The corresponding results reported in Panel 2 of Table 1.6 suggest
that the SMI and all bond yields considered respond more strongly to announcements
that do not meet the expected degree of expansion, whereas the opposite holds for the
bilateral exchange rates.26 F-test results imply that the long-term yields of both Swiss
government and Swiss corporate bonds, as well as the USDCHF exchange rate, are more
strongly affected by negative surprises than by positive surprises, whereas the impacts for
the other asset prices do not significantly differ in terms of size.
The difference-in-size result contrasts markedly with the conclusion of Glick and Leduc
(2012) that in a number of advanced economies, the spillover effects on asset prices in-
duced by UMP announcements by the Fed and BoE are more important for positive
monetary surprises than for negative surprises. This discrepancy can be attributed to
various reasons. Glick and Leduc seem to draw their conclusion based on a set-up that
allows for assessing the equality of coefficients in general but not the equality of the size of
the estimated effects. Moreover, although the general estimation set-up is similar, crucial
details differ in the specification and data base used. Most importantly in this regard,
Glick and Leduc (2012) focus on the Fed’s LSAP programmes and BoE’s APP, relying
25Recall for interpretation purposes that in our classification, we denote as positive those announce-
ments that are perceived as more expansionary and as negative those perceived as more restrictive relative
to expectations.
26Note for purposes of interpreting the coefficient of the interaction with the negative surprise dummy: a
negative value indicates a positive asset price change because it implies the multiplication of two negative
values (a negative coefficient times a negative value of the surprise measure).
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Table 1.6: Foreign UMPs: Spillover effect asymmetry
Asset price SMI Euro Dollar Gov. Corp.
Panel 1: All UMP events distinguished by surprise direction (abs. value of surprise)
Positive Surprise (51 obs.) -0.20* -0.15† -0.30** -1.27** -0.97**
(0.036) (0.055) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Negative Surprise (38 obs.) 0.48* 0.11** -0.07 2.13** 1.38**
(0.016) (0.002) (0.439) (0.000) (0.000)
(Constant and controls omitted)
No. obs. 1694 1741 1741 1706 1692
F-test 9.63** 9.56** 4.31† 65.70** 47.39**
0.00 0.00 -0.04 0.00 0.00
Panel 2: All UMP events distinguished by surprise direction (baseline surprise)
Positive Surprise (51 obs.) -0.20* -0.15† -0.30** -1.27** -0.97**
(0.036) (0.055) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Negative Surprise (38 obs.) -0.48* -0.11** 0.07 -2.13** -1.38**
(0.016) (0.002) (0.439) (0.000) (0.000)
(Constant and controls omitted)
No. obs. 1694 1741 1741 1706 1692
F-test 1.55 0.15 10.99** 4.15† 1.35
-0.21 -0.7 0.00 -0.04 -0.25
Table reports regression results obtained when separating the underlying UMP event set into expansionary
and restrictive UMP announcements. An announcement is classified as expansionary (restrictive) if the
corresponding surprise measure is positive (negative). Panel 1 uses the absolute value of the surprise measure,
thus allowing to test whether the sign of the coefficients differ among the sub-samples. Panel 2 relies on the
standard surprise measure allowing for a test in the difference in size of the coefficients (see text for more
details). For values in parentheses, significance levels, and units see Table 1.4. The F-tests test the null of
equality of the coefficients for positively and negatively surprising announcements.
only on 15 announcements in total and a commensurately smaller number of negatively
and positively surprising announcements.
1.6.6 Spillover effects along the Swiss yield curve
This section assesses the impact of foreign UMP announcements on Swiss government
bond yields more thoroughly by extending the set of bonds examined along the maturity
spectrum covering maturities of two, three, five, seven, nine, and ten years.27
The estimation results reported in Table 1.7 are again based on equation (1.1) and indi-
cate that the impact of foreign UMP announcements on Swiss government bond yields
increases with maturity until approximately 10 years. All estimated coefficients point to
a dampening effect of foreign UMPs on yields and are highly significant.28
27We rely on generic (“benchmark”) government bond yield series derived from Bloomberg, which does
not provide trade volumes. By using these data, we assume that bonds are actually traded and that
volumes - and therefore precision - are comparable. Qualitatively, the results are similar when using yield
changes derived from a term-structure model calculated based on Swiss Government bond data.
28Note that the number of observations is similar for all bonds. For the 30y bonds, several missing
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Table 1.7: Foreign UMPs: Spillover effects along the Swiss yield curve
Maturity 2y 3y 4y 5y 7y 9y 10y
Constant -0.08 -0.1 -0.11 -0.12 -0.12 -0.12 -0.12
(0.463) (0.231) (0.174) (0.143) (0.145) (0.167) (0.159)
UMP surprise -0.69* -0.82* -1.02** -1.15** -1.16** -1.55** -1.46**
(0.030) (0.011) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
(Controls omitted)
No. obs. 1707 1662 1707 1708 1615 1663 1706
Table reports regression results for Swiss government bond yields at different maturities using the baseline
surprise measure. The underlying event set comprises all UMP events. For values in parentheses, significance
levels, and units see Table 1.4.
Combining the result that the effect on Swiss government bond yields is largest at 7-10
year maturities with the fact that foreign bond purchase programmes focus predominately
on precisely those maturities supports the view that Swiss government bonds are seen as
close substitutes for foreign government bonds. This reasoning in turn lends support to
the interpretation that an international portfolio re-balancing channel is important to
an explanation of the transmission of foreign monetary policy shocks to the Swiss yield
curve, whereas government bonds at different maturities within Switzerland seem to be
imperfect substitutes.
Taking a more granular look, Figure 1.1 suggests that the MER introduction dampened
the spillover effect along the entire Swiss yield curve and that negatively surprising an-
nouncements exert a stronger effect than positive surprises on government bond yields -
the latter result being particularly relevant at 7 to 10 year maturities.
In the figure, the upper row of panels depicts the unconditional average yield changes
on event days for the respective group of announcements and the lower row depicts the
estimated coefficients obtained by the corresponding least squares regressions. For all
government bond yields considered, the reported coefficients are smaller in absolute val-
ues in the sample that considers UMPs since the MER introduction. However, F-tests
do not allow us to reject the null of equality between pre- and during-MER announce-
ment coefficients for any maturity. Regarding the question of spillover effect asymmetry,
the reported coefficients indicate, as they did in section 1.6.5 above, that the sign of the
spillover differs between positive and negative surprises for yields at all maturities con-
sidered. Corresponding tests for asymmetry in the strength of spillover effects suggest, as
above, that longer-term yields (7y to 10y) are slightly more affected by negative surprises
than by positive surprises.
1.7 Robustness
The results reported in section 1.6 are robust to alternative choices of the event set,
the policy surprise proxy, control variables, and the length of the sample and of the
values are reported primarily at the beginning of the sample. The results are qualitatively unchanged in
an analysis based on a balanced sample of events (i.e., if the number of observations is balanced across
maturities).
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Figure 1.1: Spillover effects along the yield curve


















































































































All events Pos. Neg.
The charts in the first row depict the average change (vertical axis) of Swiss government
bond yields at different maturities (specified on the horizontal axis in years) on event
days. The charts in the second row depict the coefficients of the corresponding
regressions using the baseline surprise measure. The charts on the left are based on all
foreign UMP announcements; the charts in the middle separate these announcements
into pre- and post-6 September 2011 (when the SNB announced the EURCHF-floor)
samples; the charts on the right group the announcements by the sign of the surprise
measure. Blue shaded areas represent the 95% confidence bands for the coefficient
estimated based on all announcements.
measurement window, as well as to alternative specifications of the econometric set-up.
We report the most important checks here.
First, following Rogers et al. (2014) and Diez and Presno (2013), we conduct the empirical
exercise using an enlarged set of monetary policy events that contains all monetary policy
statements between 2008 and the end of 2014, for a total of 379 announcements, including
several instances of policy rate changes. Specifically, in addition to the baseline event set,
this enlarged event set comprises all press releases or press conferences following regular,
scheduled monetary policy council meetings that do not contain news regarding UMP
programmes. The results of this exercise, reported in Panel 1 of Table 1.8, indicate
that the estimates reported in the results section are in general robust to the inclusion
of this broader set of policy announcements, with the exception of the impact of ECB
annoucements on the USDCHF exchange rate, which is significantly larger in this case.
This lends further support to our prudent approach when interpreting the exchange rate
coefficients, as discussed in section 1.6.3.
< Table 1.8 about here >
Second, the discussion in section 1.5 indicate that the surprise measure used may be
unreliable for BoJ announcements. Thus their inclusion may have detrimental effects on
the statistical significance of our results. Excluding all BoJ announcements from the event
set does not materially alter either the point estimates or their statistical significance.
Third, using the change in foreign 10y government bond yields on announcement days
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Table 1.8: Robustness
Asset price SMI Euro Dollar Gov. Corp.
Panel 1: Alternative event set: All monetary policy events, baseline surprise
Constant 0.03 -0.02 0.00 -0.13 -0.13†
(0.394) (0.169) (0.794) (0.118) (0.068)
Federal Reserve events (73 obs.) -0.05 -0.11 -0.28** -1.57** -1.02**
(0.703) (0.117) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
European Central Bank events (98 obs.) -0.77** -0.25** 0.22* -1.99** -1.32**
(0.000) (0.002) (0.015) (0.000) (0.000)
Bank of England events (92 obs.) -0.11 -0.03 -0.07 -0.95** -1.50**
(0.321) (0.536) (0.529) (0.009) (0.000)
Bank of Japan events (104 obs.) -0.26† -0.04 -0.07 -1.26** -1.20**
(0.070) (0.473) (0.457) (0.001) (0.000)
(Controls omitted)
No. obs. 1694 1741 1741 1706 1692
Panel 2: Alternative surprise: sum of foreign futures changes
Constant 0.03 -0.02 0.00 -0.12 -0.13†
(0.335) (0.199) (0.797) (0.143) (0.086)
Federal Reserve UMPs (34 obs.) -0.08 -0.07* -0.12* -0.56** -0.47**
(0.101) (0.023) (0.044) (0.000) (0.000)
European Central Bank UMPs (20 obs.) -0.35* -0.13* -0.04 -0.73** -0.59**
(0.011) (0.048) (0.374) (0.001) (0.000)
Bank of England UMPs (16 obs.) -0.05 -0.02 0.04† -0.64* -0.47**
(0.524) (0.481) (0.061) (0.017) (0.000)
Bank of Japan UMPs (27 obs.) -0.13* -0.02 0.05 -0.47** -0.33*
(0.026) (0.614) (0.378) (0.002) (0.014)
(Controls omitted)
No. obs. 1694 1741 1741 1706 1692
Panel 3: Alternative specification: Two-day event window, baseline surprise
Constant 0.04 -0.03† -0.01 -0.29* -0.29**
(0.365) (0.055) (0.698) (0.015) (0.007)
Surprise -0.38** -0.15* -0.33** -2.12** -1.64**
(0.009) (0.028) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000)
(Controls omitted)
No. obs. 1717 1741 1741 1729 1715
Table reports results of main robustness checks. Panel 1 reports the coefficients obtained in a regression
based on an extended policy event set containing all monetary policy announcements during the sample (1
Jan 08 to 31 Dec 14). Panel 2 reports the results based on the sum-of-surprise’ measure described in the text.
Panel 3 reports the results when measuring the impact on asset prices over a two day window around UMP
announcements. For values in parentheses, significance levels, and units see Table 1.4.
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instead of the change in the bond futures price as alternative surprise measure indicates
that a positively surprising shock – a decline in the foreign bond yield – induces a fall in the
SMI and the Swiss long-term bond yields, and a depreciation of the US dollar against the
Swiss franc, thus confirming the results obtained in the baseline exercise in qualitative
terms. On a per-central-bank basis, the baseline results are consistently confirmed for
Fed, ECB and announcements individually. For the BoJ, the use of government bond
yield changes as a proxy for market surprise indicates that BoJ announcements do not
exert significant effects on Swiss equities – in line with the relatively weak economic and
financial links between the two economies.
Forth, due to the lack of Euro area-wide bonds, we use the change in the price of the 10y
German Bund futures as a proxy for measuring the surprise in ECB policy announcements.
To address potential mis-measuring issues, Rogers et al. (2014) rely instead on the change
in the spread between yields on Italian (relatively risky) and German (relatively safe)
10y government bonds, and interpret a lower spread as a positive UMP surprise. Using
this spread as an explanatory variable, we do not find any significant spillovers on Swiss
assets induced by ECB events. This result is similar to the international effects reported
in Rogers et al. (2014), indicating that ECB announcements do not have an impact on
bond yields in the US, Japan and France. This result is unsurprising, given that a decline
in the aforementioned bond spread can be due to an increase or due to a decrease in the
price of relatively safe assets. Moreover, it lends further support to our prior assumption
that it is more appropriate to rely on a surprise measure derived from the reaction of a
relatively safe euro-denominated asset, such as German long-term government bonds, if
we are to gauge the announcement effect of ECB UMPs on relatively safe Swiss assets.
Fifth, although our estimates hint at significant effects of UMP announcements, we cannot
guarantee that these estimates reveal the direct impact on Swiss asset prices exclusively
from the origin country. The indirect effects of foreign policy announcements through their
impact on asset prices in a third country could possibly dampen or magnify the bilateral
effects on Swiss assets, because policy shocks may induce asset price co-movements around
the world. The possibility of indirect effects potentially hampers the measurement of the
true size of the cross-border asset price effects of monetary policy. To account for this
possibility, we sum the individual changes in long-term government bond futures prices in
all four foreign economies considered – that is, we assume that a event drives changes in
futures prices in all four economies. For instance, on a BoE event day, we consider not only
the change in value of the Gilt future but also the changes in the Bund future, Treasury
future and Japanese long-term bond future price. This process is conducted for each event
day accordingly, and the resulting sum of surprise’ series is used as an explanatory variable
in the regression. Summing all four foreign surprise measures on any UMP announcement
day in this manner broadly confirms the baseline results. More specifically, as Panel 2 of
Table 1.8 reveals, using this ‘sum of surprise’ measure returns coefficient values that are
2 to 3 times lower than those in the baseline analysis. The smaller size of the coefficients
is related to the fact that the individual surprises are positively correlated, particularly
on UMP announcement days, and hence the sum-of-surprise measure is larger than the
individual surprise measure, on average. This allows us to interpret the size of the baseline
results as an upper bound and the size of the sum-of-surprise-based estimates as a lower
bound of the average spillover effect of foreign UMP announcements on Swiss asset prices.
Sixth, in qualitative terms, the estimations of the effect of monetary policy surprises on
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Swiss asset prices based on one-day asset price changes can be repeated using a two-day
window, see Panel 3 of Table 1.8. The coefficients tend to be larger than in the one-day
window suggesting that markets may need a prolonged period of time to fully digest the
UMP news.29
1.8 Concluding remarks
This study shows that UMP announcements by major central banks since 2008 have
substantial spillover effects on asset prices in Switzerland. Specifically, an expansionary
foreign UMP shock equivalent to a 25-basis-point decline in foreign long-term bond yields
induces an approximately 6-basis-point decrease in Swiss long-term government bond
yields, a 4.5-basis-point decrease in Swiss long-term corporate bond yields, a 1-percentage-
point decrease in the Swiss Market Index, an approximately 0.6-percentage-point appre-
ciation of the Swiss franc against the Euro and an approximately 0.9-percentage-point
appreciation against the US dollar. Qualitatively, these estimates of immediate spillovers
to Swiss assets corroborate the results regarding cross-border effects of UMPs on asset
prices reported by Glick and Leduc (2012), Neely (2015) (selected advanced), Diez and
Presno (2013) (bilateral and effective US dollar exchange rate effects), Chen et al. (2012)
(Asian emerging markets), and Fratzscher et al. (2013) (groups of advanced and emerging
economies, respectively).
Four extensions provide further insights. First, the degree of economic and financial
linkages matters. Quantitatively, UMPs announced by the ECB have the most impor-
tant impact on Swiss asset prices. In particular, bilateral exchange rates respond more
strongly to announcements of corresponding central banks. Second, in contrast to Glick
and Leduc (2012), our results suggest that the size of spillover effects does not differ
materially between negatively and positively surprising announcements. Third, using the
implementation of the minimum exchange rate policy, we show that even decisive domestic
policy action only partially mitigates the spillover effects of foreign UMP announcements
on domestic asset prices and bond yields. Fourth, a more granular bond market analysis
suggests that Swiss 7-10y government bonds are fairly close substitutes for foreign long-
term government bonds. Although substantial, the degree of substitutability is weaker for
Swiss long-term corporate bonds and particularly for Swiss government bonds of shorter
maturity.
A comparison of the spillover effects predicted by our estimates with the observed change
in the corresponding Swiss asset prices on foreign UMP announcement days indicates
that the estimated spillover effects are economically important: On the days of their
announcement, foreign UMPs are by and large responsible for the observed decline in
Swiss longer-term government and corporate bond yields, whereas they account for ap-
proximately 60% of the decline in the SMI and for approximately 35% and 40% of the
appreciation of the Swiss franc against the Euro and the US dollar, respectively.
The reported results must be interpreted with appropriate prudence. A first note of cau-
29The two-day change is measured as the difference between the end-of-day value on the day after
the announcement and the end-of-day value of the corresponding asset price on the day before the
announcement.
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tion concerns the role of market functioning and its potential impact on the reported
results. The estimated effects of UMP statements are based on observations in a pe-
riod during which markets may not have functioned fully or properly. Applying similar
policies may not be as effective in more ‘normal’ times. Second, the jury is still out
on the best approach to capture the surprise part of an unconventional monetary policy
announcement. Third, this chapter approach does not allow for assessing quantitatively
the contribution of individual transmission channels to the overall asset price effects.
Nevertheless, our estimates tentatively suggest that a portfolio re-balancing channel is
important for explaining spillover effects to Swiss government and corporate bond yields,
in line with evidence provided by Bauer and Neely (2014) for other economies. For Swiss
equity prices, on the other hand, negative effects through international signalling and ex-
change rate channels seem to outweigh the price-boosting effect of more abundant global
liquidity and lower global discount rates. However, a formal assessment of the relative
importance of the distinct spillover channels at work for different Swiss financial assets is




Ahmed, Shaghil and Andrei Zlate. 2014. Capital Flows to Emerging Market Economies:
A Brave New World? Journal of International Money and Finance 48(PB): 221–248.
Aı̈t-Sahalia, Yacine, Jochen Andritzky, Andreas Jobst, Sylwia Nowak and Natalia
Tamirisa. 2012. Market Response to Policy Initiatives During the Global Financial
Crisis. Journal of International Economics 87(1): 162–177.
Bauer, Michael D. and Christopher J. Neely. 2014. International Channels of the Fed’s
Unconventional Monetary Policy. Journal of International Money and Finance 44(C):
24 – 46.
Bauer, Michael D. and Glenn D. Rudebusch. 2014. The Signaling Channel for Federal
Reserve Bond Purchases. International Journal of Central Banking 10(3): 233–289.
Berge, Travis J. and Guangye Cao. 2014. Global Effects of U.S. Monetary Policy: Is
Unconventional Policy Different? Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Economic
Review Q I: 5–31.
Bhattarai, Saroj and Christopher J. Neely. 2016. A Survey of the Empirical Literature on
U.S. Unconventional Monetary Policy. Working Papers 2016-21, Federal Reserve Bank
of St. Louis.
Bowman, David, Juan M. Londono and Horacio Sapriza. 2015. U.S. Unconventional Mon-
etary Policy and Transmission to Emerging Market Economies. Journal of International
Money and Finance 55(C): 27–59.
Cahill, Michael E., Stefania DAmico, Canlin Li and John S. Sears. 2013. Duration risk
versus local supply channel in Treasury yields: evidence from the Federal Reserve’s asset
purchase announcements. Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2013-35, Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Caruana, Jamie. 2012. International Monetary Policy Interactions: Challenges and
Prospects. Speech held at the CEMLA-SEACEN conference on “The role of central
banks in macroeconomic and financial stability: the challenges in an uncertain and
volatile world”, Punta del Este, Uruguay, 16 November 2012.
Chadha, Jagjit S, Philip Turner and Fabrizio Zampolli. 2013. The Interest Rate Effects
of Government Debt Maturity. BIS Working Papers 415, Bank for International Set-
tlements.
Chen, Jiaqian, Tommaso Mancini Griffoli and Ratna Sahay. 2014. Spillovers from United
States Monetary Policy on Emerging Markets: Different This Time? IMF Working
Papers 14/240, International Monetary Fund.
Chen, Qianying, Andrew Filardo, Dong He and Feng Zhu. 2012. International Spillovers
of Central Bank Balance Sheet Policies. In Are Central Bank Balance Sheets in Asia
too Large?, ed. Bank for International Settlements, BIS Papers chapters, volume 66,
220–264. Bank for International Settlements.
Chen, Qianying, Andrew Filardo, Dong He and Feng Zhu. 2015. Financial Crisis, US
34
References References
Unconventional Monetary Policy and International Spillovers. BIS Working Papers
494, Bank for International Settlements.
Christensen, Jens H. E. and Glenn D. Rudebusch. 2012. The Response of Interest Rates
to US and UK Quantitative Easing. Economic Journal 122(564): F385–F414.
Christensen, Jens H.E. and Signe Krogstrup. 2014. Swiss unconventional Monetary Policy:
Lessons for the Transmission of Quantitative Easing. Working Paper Series 2014-18,
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
Cour-Thimann, Philippine and Bernhard Winkler. 2012. The ECB’s Non-Standard Mone-
tary Policy Measures: the Role of Institutional Factors and Financial Structure. Oxford
Review of Economic Policy 28(4): 765–803.
D’Amico, Stefania, William English, David López-Salido and Edward Nelson. 2012. The
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Chapter 2
The optimal conduct of forward
guidance (in a closed economy)
Abstract
During the great financial crisis, various central banks resorted to forward guidance to
provide additional policy accommodation at the zero lower bound. Yet, providing empir-
ical evidence is difficult, as instances of forward guidance are few and have been deployed
very differently over time and across countries. This chapter takes a theoretical approach
to analyze the overall effectiveness and the ‘optimal’ specification of forward guidance,
and compares the outcome of several types of forward guidance in a stylized DSGE model
for a closed economy. These types cover promises to keep interest rates low until a spe-
cific date or until a specific condition is met, alternatively with a promise to simply keep
interest rates lower than usual (through a more expansionary policy rule), or to conduct
a more accommodative policy during interest rate normalization. Technically, the chapter
distinguishes such types by specification (low interest rates vs more dovish rule), timing
(immediately vs pre-announced), and triggers (calendar-based vs state-dependent). The
effects of each type are compared on the basis of impulse response functions and utility-
based welfare. Overall, guidance based on calendar dates emerges as more effective, as
long as the central bank does not deviate too much from its traditional Taylor rule. Cred-
ibly delivering temporarily higher inflation can replicate the effects of committing to low
interest rates. Guidance over the normalization path of interest rates can almost be as
effective as immediately responding to an adverse demand shock.
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2.1 Introduction
When monetary policy hit the zero lower bound and purchases of assets no longer seemed
sufficient, central banks reverted to an old instrument: forward guidance. This instrument
involved no action, only words, nevertheless many thought it could be the most powerful
yet. Central banks tried to convince markets they would keep interest rates low(er) for an
extended period and allow for a little higher inflation in the future, in order to decrease
real long-term interest rates deemed pivotal for the economic recovery.
In hindsight, gauging the actual effects of this new instrument is difficult: It was used
to different extents, by different central banks, had different goals in different countries,
and nearly always coincided with news of other policies, such as asset purchases. Some
central banks tried to clarify their traditional reaction functions to market participants
(as did the ECB in 2014), others tried to convince markets they would opt for a more
aggressive reaction function temporarily, until the recovery was well established. Some
expressed the deviation from their traditional rules over a given calendar period (as did
the U.S. Federal Reserve between August 2011 and December 2012), others linked the
new policy action to the evolution of one or several key variables (as did the Fed starting
in December 2012).2 Given this heterogeneity and the few instances of unique forward
guidance announcements, empirical analysis is fraught with hurdles – not only regarding
the overall effectiveness of forward guidance, but particularly with respect to the different
types implemented by central banks.
This chapter tackles these two questions – the overall effectiveness and the ‘optimal’
specification of forward guidance – through the lens of a stylized DSGE model for a
closed economy. The chapter first simulates the response of the economy to several types
of forward guidance, then compares the outcome of the different types to each other, and to
the baseline without forward guidance. Each forward guidance type represents a credible
and pre-announced temporary change in the regular policy rule, followed by the central
bank in normal times. A first dimension to alter the rule is timing: Deviations can last
to different extents, and begin today or in the future. A second dimension is the trigger:
The central bank can either announce a specific date for the start or end (‘calendar-
based’) or make them conditional on certain economic conditions (‘state contingent’). A
third dimension is the specification: The central bank may commit to keep interest rates
low, in our case at zero, or lower, as the adoption of a more dovish reaction function by
temporarily raising either the inflation target or the sensitivities regarding inflation or
output.3
We reduce the plethora of potential types to three main examples. First, we analyze a
calendar-based forward guidance type, inspired by that of the Federal Reserve in 2011 and
2012. In addition to the Fed’s promise to keep interest rates low, the chapter also evaluates
lower interest rates than usual, by means of a more expansionary policy rule. Second, we
follow the Federal Reserve in December 2012 and replace the calendar-based duration with
2See Woodford (2013) for an overview and the following examples, for instance. Alternatively, Char-
bonneau and Rennison (2015) or Moessner et al. (2015) also provide excellent overviews.
3A fourth possible dimension over which forward guidance can evolve is credibility: The central bank’s
policy announcement can be more or less credible in the eyes of market participants. We leave this last
iteration for future work, building on the intuition and methodologies developed to study the first two
possible variations.
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a condition: Inflation must exceed a specific threshold, before the central bank returns
to the usual policy rule (state-dependent duration). Throughout the chapter, this case
is referred to as ’state-dependent’ forward guidance. In order to reduce complexity, we
assume that this type of forward guidance always starts today. Third, we address the
effect of guidance on policy normalization, i.e. the promise to allow for higher inflation
for a specific number of periods, as soon as interest rates lift off from the zero lower
bound (state-dependent start). This case has no precise equivalent in reality, but might
be linked to any ‘gradual’ approach in raising interest rates. Technically, the central bank
replaces the calendar-based start with a condition, but announces the duration ex ante.
The chapter assesses both the positive and normative effects of such policies. The positive
analysis compares impulse response functions of different forward guidance policies on key
variables of interest: inflation, the output gap, and nominal and real interest rates, the
normative analysis compares welfare – proxied by utility – resulting from different forward
guidance policies. In each case, forward guidance is deployed in response to an aggregate
demand shock large enough to temporarily bring nominal interest rates to the zero lower
bound.
The method to solve the model and generate impulse response functions is chosen to
account for two sources of non-linearities. The first is the zero lower bound, which im-
poses a non-linear constraint on the policy interest rates. And the second is the actual
formulation of forward guidance, which also involves a non-linear path of interest rates:
either remaining at zero for an extended period, or generated by switching between dif-
ferent Taylor rules. The model is thus solved using the perfect foresight approach, based
on Newton methods, assuming the economy returns to steady state in finite time and
that future shocks equal their expected value. The model is solved without recourse to
linearization, so as not to affect solution paths away from steady state. Other papers
discussed further below have tackled the hurdle of non-linear constraints differently, by
either feeding shocks into the model after it is solved so as to respect the zero lower bound
constraint, through piece-wise linear approximation, or through policy function iteration
methods.
This chapter finds that forward guidance is generally effective at providing policy ac-
commodation at the zero lower bound. In particular, calendar-based forward guidance
expressed as a constant interest rate over a given period is especially effective at increasing
welfare, measured by utility. Forward guidance can achieve the same results if the central
bank convinces the markets it will allow inflation to temporarily overshoot its target. This
is akin to the effects of a price-level target. State dependent forward guidance is sensitive
to the parameters announced by the central bank. This is more than a technical point.
Intuitively, if the central bank announces a threshold to return to its traditional Taylor
rule that requires an overly aggressive monetary policy easing, it may be expected to give
up its accommodative stance too early, thereby undermining its intentions to stabilize
the economy. This reduces the feasible set of parameter values to those that allow for a
measured, and sufficiently long, period of policy accommodation and, as a result, state-
contingent forward guidance yields lower utility. This shortcoming can, however, easily be
offset by announcing an overshooting of the conditions for a specific number of periods.
Finally, forward guidance concerning the path of interest rate normalization can be as
effective as guidance extended during the zero lower bound period. All results should
be considered against their technical background: the perfect foresight solution method.
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The usage of other solution methods, in particular stochastic methods, may affect and
alter the results.
The chapter is structured as follows. The next section reviews the relevant literature.
Section 2.3 reviews the solution methods and forward guidance specifications. Section
2.4 then summarizes results from the numerical simulations for i) calendar-based forward
guidance, ii) state-dependent forward guidance, and iii) forward guidance related to nor-
malization of monetary policy after lift-off from zero lower bound. Section 5 takes a closer
look at state-contingent forward guidance, to explore sources of instability and the set of
parameters allowing for model convergence. The last section concludes.
2.2 Related literature
The literature on forward guidance can be roughly split into two camps, corresponding
to the two types of forward guidance discussed earlier. The first is Delphic guidance, and
the second Odyssean, as defined in Campbell et al. (2012). Delphic guidance provides
information on the central bank’s existing reaction function or Taylor rule. The goal of
Delphic guidance is to improve the signal to noise ratio of central bank actions, allowing
markets to refine their expectations of monetary policy responses to specific shocks hitting
the economy. Odyssean guidance, instead, aims to introduce a temporary deviation in the
central bank’s reaction function, often with the goal of providing additional policy accom-
modation at the zero lower bound. The literature on Delphic guidance is older and well
developed, generally underscoring the efficiency gains from having a better understood
reaction function. Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) provide a useful summary.4
The literature on Odyssean guidance – more relevant for this chapter – has instead at-
tracted significant attention more recently, following its use by various central banks in-
cluding the Fed, Bank of Canada and Bank of England, as reported in Woodford (2013).
Early papers include Levin et al. (2010), and Carlstrom et al. (2012b,a, 2013, 2014).
These papers study the effect on inflation and output of credibly committing to a more
expansive monetary policy stance for a temporary period. In general, the effects of fixing
interest rates a zero for an extended period led to implausibly large effects on inflation
and output, as suggested in Negro et al. (2012).
Various papers have tried to understand why the effects of forward guidance are so large.
A first strand of the literature alters the effectiveness of forward guidance through changes
to the model specification. de Graeve et al. (2014), Kiley (2014) and Chung et al. (2015)
show that sticky prices cause a large part of the huge responses, and introduce sticky
information to dampen market responses to a central bank announcement. One channel
for this dampening is that “agents may confuse the exogenous expansive nature of the
policy announcement with (an endogenous policy response to) a worse outlook for the
4Moessner et al. (2015) notice that researchers and practitioners often talk differently about Odyssean
forward guidance: Researchers often assume perfect credibility (or time-consistency), while practitioners
seldom promise a deviation from their usual policy rule, if applicable, but are rather unusually transparent
about their policy response in order to achieve at least some policy accommodation (that is, without
publishing interest rate paths on a regular basis, such as the Reserve Bank of New Zealand or Norges
Bank). Moessner et al. call the latter Aesopian forward guidance.
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economy”.5 McKay et al. (2015) obtains similar results after introducing imperfect mar-
kets and precautionary savings. Cole (2015, 2016) shows that the expectation formation
and financial frictions also dampen the effectiveness of forward guidance (in particular
during a crisis where policy accommodation is heavily needed). The effectiveness of for-
ward guidance can also be mitigated strongly if agents have heterogenous interpretations
about the forward guidance, see Andrade et al. (2015). Another strand alters the effec-
tiveness through changes to the solution methods or technical implementation of forward
guidance. Chen (2014) or Boneva et al. (2015) attribute a considerable share of the ef-
fects to the (non-) stochastic environment, while Bundick and Smith (2016) show that
the implementation of forward guidance may also explain part of the difference.6 Last
but not least, Harrison (2015) questions the assumption of modest policy interventions
being still appropriate for models using forward guidance, given large deviations from the
usual policy rate.
Fewer papers have studied state-contingent forward guidance and guidance provided on
the path of normalization. Campbell et al. (2012), Christiano et al. (2014), Chung et al.
(2015), and de Graeve et al. (2014) each introduce different thresholds to which forward
guidance responds to successfully support the recovery. Florez-Jimenez and Parra-Polania
(2016) and Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2014) find that rules leading to an overshooting of
inflation during the normalization period yield a faster economic recovery. More recently,
Boneva et al. (2015) show that state-contingent forward guidance is successful in both
providing accommodation and providing a hedge against future (positive or negative)
shocks.
The literature is also venturing into the field of forward guidance with imperfect credibil-
ity. Bodenstein et al. (2012) and Dennis (2014) assume, as in the Calvo framework, an
exogenous probability that the central bank may revert back to its traditional monetary
policy rule. As a result, forward guidance loses some effectiveness, and central banks
promise especially aggressive monetary policy easing.
Finally, this literature should be distinguished from that on optimal monetary policy at
the zero lower bound. Such papers aim to uncover a unique policy rule that is optimal
both outside of, and at, the zero lower bound, as in Eggertsson and Woodford (2003),
Jung et al. (2005), Nakov (2008), Levin et al. (2010), Adam and Billi (2006), Werning
(2011), or Hasui et al. (2016). This aim is inherently different from that pursued by
the literature on Odyssean forward guidance that explicitly allows for central banks to
switch between two or more policy rules. Proponents of this literature are, for instance,
well-known price-level targeting.7 Bilbiie (2016) is an interesting extension in this regard
– deriving an analytical expression for the optimal forward guidance length – while most
aforementioned papers derive the ‘best’ solution by evaluating different specifications of
forward guidance. Additionally, we should also separate this literature from that on the
5Quote from de Graeve et al. (2014). In consequence, the fall in the (nominal) long rate must not
necessarily be due to forward guidance, and furthermore, the real rate drops less. Overall, imperfect
information “limits the ability of the announcement to generate a boom”.
6The former argue that deterministic solution methods, e.g. perfect foresight, lead to implausibly
large effects. The latter show that implementing the desired policy rate as an inertia term into the policy
rule proves sufficient to dampen the responses considerably.
7This literature also heavily relies on, and contributes to the question of discretion vs. commitment,
and is thus related to the paragraph above.
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optimal rate of inflation in the light of the zero lower bound, for instance as in Coibion
et al. (2012).
This chapter distinguishes itself from the literature on Odyssean forward guidance in
three ways. First, the model studies a variety of different forward guidance specifications
with the same model, allowing for utility based comparisons. Second, this chapter gives
particular weight to state-contingent forward guidance, and is among the first – to our
knowledge – to investigate the conditions under which forward guidance is effective and
feasible.8 Third, the model is solved non-linearly, so that solution paths away from steady
state – as they naturally emerge from interest rates remaining at the zero lower bound for
an extended period – can be considered. Last but not least, the chapter puts particular
emphasis on the mechanics, and comparison, of different varieties of forward guidance.
2.3 Methodology
In this section, we briefly outline the model, solution method, and various forward guid-
ance specifications considered in this chapter.
2.3.1 Model and calibration
Our baseline model is a simple, stylized DSGE model with quadratic price adjustment
costs à la Rotemberg (1996). Upon linearization (around a zero inflation steady state),
this model is equivalent to the Calvo (1983) pricing framework, yet does not exhibit
endogenous state variable price dispersion.9 This is convenient in our non-linear model;
in Calvo set-ups, dispersion usually disappears upon linearization.
We closely follow Braun et al. (2012) for the specification of the model. Briefly sum-
marized, the model features a representative household with consumption, labour and
inter-temporal bonds issued by the government, but no capital accumulation, investment
or habit formation. Final good producers are perfectly competitive, intermediary good
producers monopolistically competitive facing quadratic price adjustment costs. The final
good producers have a CES production function with intermediate goods as only inputs,
and producers of such goods have a linear production function with labour as the only
input. Factor markets are perfectly competitive. The government runs a balanced budget
with lump-sum transfers adjusted to the issuance of new bonds and (exogenous fraction
of output) government purchases.
In this section, we only highlight the conditions that are different to the Calvo pricing
framework, and refer to appendix B.1 for the full set of equilibrium conditions. Specifically,









8As of 2015, this chapter was indeed the first. Since then, the paper from Boneva et al. (2015) addresses
very similar questions.
9See Ascari and Rossi (2012) for a thorough comparison of the two frameworks, in particular if steady-
state inflation is non-zero.
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where γ the price adjustment cost parameter and pt(j) the (optimal) price set by the




















where mct are real marginal costs (equal across firms), πt is gross inflation and ε is the
elasticity of substitution.
Due to the (aggregate) price adjustment costs, aggregate output generally does not corre-
spond to Gross Domestic Product (GDP).10 Aggregate (real) price adjustment costs are
κtyt, and the fraction of output that the government consumes is ηt. As a result:
yt = ct + gt + κtyt = ct + ηtyt + κtyt ↔ ct = (1− ηt − κt)yt
ỹt ≡ ct + gt = (1− κt)yt
The model is calibrated using standard parameters. Inter-temporal substitution is set to
one, implying log-utility for consumption. This is somewhat lower than values in Levin
et al. (2010), but if anything should dampen the response of economic conditions to
forward guidance.11 We further set ν = 0.2 (inverse elasticity of labour supply), ε = 6
(elasticity of substitution), β = 0.994 (discount factor), and set the labour weight ψ such
that the share of steady-state hours worked corresponds to a third.
2.3.2 Monetary policy and forward guidance
To simplify the reading, we use two variables for the central bank’s interest rates. Zt
denotes the desired interest rate, which may get negative (or smaller than one, using
gross interest rates). This can either be the interest rate implied by the regular Taylor
rule (Znt ), or an expansionary alternative, stemming from any particular type of forward
guidance (Zet ). Rt instead denotes the realized interest rate, the interest rate that the
central bank can achieve on money markets respecting the zero lower bound.
Rt = max {1, Zt}
The normal policy rule Znt is a common Taylor rule, responding to an inflation and output
gap based on the gross domestic product ỹt. The Taylor rule parameters φπ and φx are











10This is the Rotemberg (1996) ‘friction’. In contrast, the Calvo (1983) framework generates different
prices and output levels across firms, which leads to inefficiencies, measured by an additional variable:
price dispersion. Price dispersion generally follows a recursive process and is often accompanied by
two auxiliary equations – the Calvo framework thus often carries two additional equilibrium conditions.
Economically, price dispersion drives a wedge into the aggregate labour demand equation atht = yt. In
contrast, in the Calvo framework aggregate output corresponds to GDP.
11Nakov (2008), for instance, also considers values below unity.
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Forward guidance, represented by the expansionary rule Zet , can take different specifi-
cations. The promise of low interest rates corresponds to a constant interest rate path,
denoted as c below (technically, the central bank could announce an arbitrary interest rate
path). The promise of lower interest rates than usual refers to the Taylor rule, but raises
either the inflation target (πe > π?), the inflation sensitivity (ϕeπ > ϕπ) or the output




c (IRP t) constant interest rate path
Znt with π
e > π? expansionary rule: higher inflation target
Znt with ϕ
e
π > ϕπ expansionary rule: higher sensitivity to inflation
Znt with ϕ
e
x > ϕx expansionary rule: higher sensitivity to output gap
Timing is also key for forward guidance. The central bank follows the expansionary
rule Zet for a specific period of time, from a starting date T1 to an end date T2, with
t ≤ T1 < T2, where t is today. In all other periods, the central bank follows the regular
policy rule Znt . Both dates are announced at the beginning (with the specification of the
forward guidance), in accordance with the triggers below.
Zt =
{
Zet for t ∈ {T1, . . . , T2}
Znt otherwise
}
Finally, the expansive monetary policy rule is set, or dropped, in response to specific
triggers. In the case of calendar-based forward guidance, the triggers are specific dates,
credibly announced at the beginning. These dates change to a value of chosen variables,
say dt = d̄, for state-dependent forward guidance. The same holds for forward guid-
ance over the normalization path, which is triggered once the economy has sufficiently




t+ j t+ j +K pre-announced calendar-based
t t(dt > d̄) state-dependent
t(dt > d̄) t(dt > d̄) +K guidance over the normalization path
Each forward guidance type thus draws one element from the last three equations arrays.
For all rules, we assume that the information set of the central bank and the public are
identical and common knowledge.
2.3.3 Channels of forward guidance
Forward guidance works by affecting the real interest rate. This follows intuition: at
the zero lower bound, policy can only provide further accommodation by decreasing the
real interest rate through higher inflation expectations, or expectations of lower future
interest rates. Forward guidance affects both. The relationship is clearly seen by iterating
forward the (linearized) dynamic IS equation. Today’s output gap is affected by future
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real interest rates, composed of the difference between nominal rates it+j and inflation
πt+j+1, as in




it+j − πt+j+1 − rnt+j
)
It is thus important to underscore that forward guidance only works through the signaling
channel of monetary policy. Most DSGE models abstract from term premia (long-term
rates are merely the expectation of future short-term rates) and thus do not leave room
for the portfolio rebalancing channel.
Under forward guidance, the expected short-term interest rates it+j are either fixed (in the
constant interest rate path case) or follow a more expansionary policy rule (in the inflation
target or sensitivities case) while forward guidance lasts. In the former case, there is no
feedback from economic conditions to interest rates, while interest rates may respond in
the latter case: they are lower given the same economic conditions, but not necessarily
low. If forward guidance is overly effective, interest rates may thus also rise from the zero
lower bound even before forward guidance ends. This feedback, the endogenous reaction to
changes in economic conditions following the expansionary policy rule, is what de Graeve
et al. (2014) refer to as the endogenous channel. Notably, such an endogenous reaction
will alter the effectiveness of forward guidance.
2.3.4 Solution method
The model is solved using the perfect foresight (PF) approach, using Dynare (Adjemian
et al., 2011). This approach assumes that the economy returns to its steady-state in finite
time, and that agents replace future expected shocks with their expected value, so that
certainty equivalence applies. As a result, the perfect foresight method numerically solves
a finite set of equations using Newton methods.
For our analysis, this approach has several advantages. First, it accommodates the non-
linear zero lower bound constraint, and the design of non-linear policy rules. Second, the
method also allows for rules to be defined with indicator functions based on conditions with
inequalities (such as dt ≥ d̄). This is particularly convenient to study state-contingent
forward guidance. Third, the full non-linear model can be solved. This allows us to
study solution paths that are away from steady state, following a lengthy period at the
zero lower bound, for instance. The main draw-back from this method is the inability to
account for the uncertainty over future shocks (a fully stochastic environment).12
Alternatives to the PF method exist. The most common, introduced in Laséen and
Svensson (2011), feeds anticipated shocks, known to agents at t, into the model to ensure
that the zero lower bound restriction and the announced interest rate path will hold in
equilibrium. However, the introduction of shocks is not innocuous, and can bias results as
these become increasingly larger. Harrison (2015) finds that for large deviations from the
12Adjemian and Juillard (2014) introduce a solution method, the stochastic extended path (SEP), that
allows for a limited degree of stochastic effects: It considers shocks during k periods ahead and reverts to
the perfect foresight beyond. The computational burden, however, increases substantially for even small
numbers of k. Since (our) forward guidance often lasts for several periods, the method did not prove
useful for our purpose.
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usual policy path, the underlying assumptions of ‘modest policy interventions’ (and/or
rational expectations), and by these means the results seem questionable. Guerrieri and
Iacoviello (2015), Jung et al. (2005) and Levin et al. (2010) instead rely on a piece-wise
linear approximation – around the normal steady-state, and the steady-state where the
constraint is binding. Papers focused on optimal policy at the zero lower bound resort to
policy function iteration, value function iteration, and projection methods. While these
methods are well-suited to investigate optimal policy, their use for (Odyssean) forward
guidance has been limited so far, notable recent exceptions are Boneva et al. (2015), Gavin
et al. (2013, 2014) or Keen et al. (2015).
The baseline scenario in the subsequent analysis is a large adverse shock, pushing the
economy to the ZLB for four quarters (without forward guidance). This follows from a
shock to the stochastic discount factor, as in Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2015).
2.4 Simulation results
We start the analysis by illustrating the effects of the zero lower bound on nominal interest
rates. Figure 2.1 shows the response of the economy to a (large) negative shock on the
discount factor, once without (blue), and once with the ZLB (red).
Figure 2.1: Effect of ZLB to a large negative demand shock




































This figure depicts the impact of a large negative demand shock to the economy. If the zero lower bound does not
bind (blue line), the central bank slashes nominal interest rates deeply into negative territory and dampens the
negative of the shock somewhat. As soon as zero lower bound binds (red line), nominal interest rates remain at zero
for four periods, real interest rates remain positive and exacerbate the slump in the economy. All units are
percentage points, with inflation and interest rates in annualized terms.
Economic conditions deteriorate considerably when the zero lower bound binds. Without
the ZLB, policy responds by cutting interest rates into negative territory for four periods,
thereby generating negative real interest rates to stimulate the economy. As the ZLB
binds, nominal interest rates remain at zero for four periods. Due to negative inflation,
this yields positive real interest rates, and thus a more pronounced decline in output gap
and inflation. Note that the response without the ZLB is by far not the optimal response
to the negative shock – we do not consider optimal monetary policy in this chapter – the
central bank merely follows the normal, unconstrained Taylor rule.
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2.4.1 Date-based forward guidance
In the entire date-based forward guidance exercise, the date T2 must be chosen larger
than the ZLB would hold without forward guidance – otherwise forward guidance has no
effect at all (the central bank would like to be more expansionary, but cannot since ZLB
binds).
Constant-interest rate forward guidance
Constant-interest rate (CIR) forward guidance, if not overly extended, allows central
banks to effectively stimulate the economy. We assume Zet = 1 for all t ∈ {T1, T2}, where
T2 is chosen such that it is greater than the period up to which the ZLB is binding.
Forward guidance clearly improves economic outcomes up to a certain point (orange, blue
and green lines in Figure 2.2). But as forward guidance is extended over longer horizons,
economic conditions explode (thin orange lines).13 The response based on CIR forward
guidance also outperforms the response to the regular Taylor rule without the ZLB.
Figure 2.2: Constant-interest rate forward guidance




































This figure depicts the impact of calendar-based, constant-interest rate forward guidance, where the central bank
promises to keep interest rates at zero for a prolonged period of time. In the baseline ZLB scenario (red line),
negative inflation leads to positive real interest rates and a pronounced drop in output gap and inflation. Already a
few periods of additional stimulus (violet to orange solid-dotted lines) lead to a decrease in real interest rates and
increases in the output gap and inflation. However, economic conditions explode with longer durations (thin orange
lines). All units are percentage points, with inflation and interest rates in annualized terms.
The sensitivity of results – and the power of forward guidance – come from the forward
looking nature of the model and perfect credibility of central bank communication. Fu-
ture real interest rates decrease with forward guidance, and have an immediate effect
on the output gap and thus inflation. In a model with additional stickiness, such as
habit formation, forward guidance might loose some of its impact, though the channels
of transmission and basic takeaways remain unchanged. Models with imperfect central
bank credibility also exhibit smaller effects of forward guidance. But the central bank
might merely offset these hurdles with longer commitments to keep interest rates low.
Raised inflation target forward guidance
A temporary rise in the inflation target (πe > π? for t ∈ {T1, T2}), credibly announced by
the central bank, leads to lower interest rates given equal economic conditions (Zet < Z
n
t )
and also considerable amelioration of the recession. An immediate announcement that the
13Results do not change qualitatively if we allow forward guidance to start in the future (T2 > T1 > 0,
graphs omitted). This is true for sufficiently short periods of forward guidance to warrant a smooth
return to steady state.
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inflation target is raised to 6% for two years (tripling the inflation target of 2%, orange line
in figure 2.3) leads to zero nominal interest rates for most of the forward guidance duration
and, through deeply negative real interest rates, a noticeable stimulus and overshooting of
output gap and inflation. Increasing the duration while reducing the rise in the temporary
inflation target (4% for three and 3% for five years, blue and green lines) has diverging
effects: output gap overshoots less but longer, inflation overshoots more and longer, but
overall, there is less amelioration today. Generally, this type of forward guidance is akin
to announcing an overshooting of inflation in the return to steady state and, by these
means, similar to price-level targeting.14
Figure 2.3: Raising the inflation target




































This figure depicts the impact of calendar-based forward guidance based on a more expansionary policy rule, where
the central bank announces a temporarily higher inflation target for a prolonged period of time. Relative to the
baseline ZLB scenario, the promise of a higher inflation target of 6% for two years (orange line), 4% for three years
(blue line) or 3% for five years (green line) leads to overshooting inflation, lower real interest rates (at least partly)
and an improvement and overshooting of the output gap. The economic conditions improve such that nominal
interest rates lift off from the zero lower bound even before it ends to bind in the baseline scenario. All units are
percentage points, with inflation and interest rates in annualized terms.
The responses differ from the constant interest rate case in two ways: First, in none of
the cases, economic conditions explode as in the previous section. Second, the central
bank raises interest rates even before the ZLB would end. Both are consequences of
the lower than otherwise feature of inflation-target forward guidance, compared to the
low (or zero) interest rate promise in the constant-interest rate case. Formally, this is a
result of the endogenous channel introduced in section 2.3: The central bank responds
endogenously to the improved economic conditions – themselves a result of the forward
guidance announcement – while it keeps interest rates at zero no matter what in the
constant-interest rate case. Put differently, the central bank mitigates the effectiveness of
its own forward guidance.15
Additional remarks are noteworthy: First, the inflation target forward guidance can al-
most replicate the zero-interest rate forward guidance if the parameters are chosen ac-
cordingly, for instance a short but steep rise in the inflation target. Second, real interest
rates are often equivalent to the case without forward guidance, they are lower only at
the beginning and toward the end of the forward guidance. As we approach the end of
forward guidance, the agents expect less remaining periods with expansionary monetary
14We assume that inflation in steady state returns to the ‘normal’ inflation target, i.e. (long-term)
inflation expectations are not affected.
15For the sake of completeness, note that de Graeve et al. consider the effect of a pre-announced
one-period shock, which would be akin to pre-announced date-based CIR forward guidance with length
one in our case. Until the pre-announced shock takes place, the central bank of de Graeve et al. follows
the regular Taylor rule. In contrast, we consider a more expansionary Taylor rule applied from period
one, or today, to a specified period in the future.
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policy, respond more mutedly, and the central bank sets a lower nominal interest rate
(which leads to lower real interest rates). Third, it is unclear yet which specification of
inflation target forward guidance is preferable. It seems that a high inflation target and
a short duration provides the benefits of ameliorating the recession without the costs of
an over-shooting inflation for several periods, but section 2.6 will shed more light on this.
Inflation and output gap sensitivity forward guidance
In sharp contrast to previous results, raising the sensitivity parameters for inflation and/or
output gap (ϕeπ > ϕπ or ϕ
e
x > ϕx) does not yield noticeable policy accommodation, see
figure 2.4. This is somewhat surprising at first sight, given another less than otherwise
promise of the central bank. But, the purely forward-looking behaviour of the baseline
model explains most of these disappointing results. First, both output gap and inflation
return relatively quickly to their steady-state values. The scope for additional accommo-
dation, relying on their deviation from their steady-state values, is thus limited. Second,
the endogenous channel further mitigates any effect of the forward guidance. Last but not
least, and in contrast to the previous results, output gap and inflation never overshoot.
Due to the symmetric impact of the sensitivities, this type of forward guidance would
even penalize such an overshooting.
Figure 2.4: Raising sensitivity on inflation




































This figure depicts the impact of calendar-based forward guidance based on a more expansionary policy rule, where
the central bank announces a temporarily higher sensitivity on inflation (results for the output gap sensitivity are
essentially equivalent and omitted). Relative to the baseline ZLB scenario, raising the sensitivity by three for two
years (orange line), two for three years (blue line) or one for five years (green line) has no noticeable impact on
economic conditions. All units are percentage points, with inflation and interest rates in annualized terms.
Combined inflation target and sensitivity forward guidance
If per se not effective, can inflation or output gap sensitivities assist in improving other
types of forward guidance? Yes and no, see Figure 2.5. Solid-dotted lines represent com-
bined (both inflation target and sensitivities raised), thin dashed lines the corresponding
inflation-target only forward guidance. Announcing higher sensitivities for both output
gap and inflation thus dampens the overshooting of inflation and output gap, particularly
for longer durations, but, at first sight, cannot provide additional amelioration of the
recession today compared to the inflation-target only forward guidance case. The overall
effect thus remains unclear at this stage (section 2.6 provides corresponding results for
utility).
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Figure 2.5: Raising sensitivity and inflation vs inflation only




































This figure depicts the impact of calendar-based forward guidance based on a more expansionary policy rule, where
the central bank announces a temporarily higher inflation target (c.f. figure 2.3 for durations and levels) and higher
sensitivities on inflation and output gap (both increased by two). Compared to the inflation target case only (dashed
lines), raising the sensitivity contemporaneously (solid-dotted lines) considerably reduces overshooting of inflation
and the output gap, yet without losing too much stimulus. In contrast, for longer durations (e.g. green line),
combining the target and sensitivities proves rather beneficial. All units are percentage points, with inflation and
interest rates in annualized terms.
2.4.2 State-dependent forward guidance
In December 2012, the Federal Reserve moved from date-based towards state-dependent
forward guidance: Interest rates shall remain low until unemployment drops below a
certain threshold while inflation must remain below a specified value. In our terminology,
the forward guidance specification – the expansionary policy rule (Zet ) – will be applied
until one or multiple conditions (dt > d̄) are met.
16
Figure 2.6: Zero interst rates until inflation exceeds a threshold




































This figure depicts the impact of state-dependent forward guidance, where the central bank promises zero interest
rates until inflation exceeds thresholds of approximately 1% (orange line), 1.2% (blue line), and close to 1.5% (green
line). Compared to the ZLB baseline and previous figures, the impact on economic conditions of such forward
guidance is visible but limited; three periods of additional stimulus (green) is the best the central bank can achieve.
Overall, state-dependent forward guidance seems rather limited in providing policy ac-
commodation. Figure 2.6 shows, for instance, the effect of promising to keep interest
rates at zero until inflation reaches a certain threshold. Different colours imply different
(possible) thresholds, however, none of them provides nearly as much accommodation as
previous forward guidance specifications did. The most accommodative (feasible) forward
guidance specification (green line) implies three additional periods of zero interest rates
– one or two periods less than implied by the most successful specifications so far. One
16A simple way to implement state-dependent forward guidance is to calculate forward guidance for
several durations and check for each duration whether economic outcomes meet their conditions at the
corresponding duration. Using the perfect-foresight solution method in Dynare, we can circumvent this
manual selection process and impose the condition directly by using an index function. In addition, we
replace unemployment conditions with output gap conditions, similar to Chung et al. (2015).
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potential explanation is that the inflation condition is not sufficient. However, adding a
second condition for the output gap does not improve the outcome, if not worsen (results
omitted). Since the response of the output gap to forward guidance announcements is
also very strong, if not stronger than that of inflation, the set of feasible specifications (in
terms of determinacy of equilibrium) seems even more limited than in the inflation-only
condition case.
Note that this sub-section showed feasible specifications only. Section 2.5 provides ad-
ditional details on the mechanics and determinacy of equilibria for this type of forward
guidance, and thereby on the efficacy of state-dependent forward guidance.
2.4.3 Guidance over the normalization path
Our third type of forward guidance provides guidance over the normalization path. For
instance, the central bank promises to follow a higher inflation target for two years once
it lifts off interest rates from zero. The main difference to previous specifications is the
trigger of forward guidance: The central bank promises accommodation once a condition
has been met, instead of promising accommodation until a pre-specified time or condition
being fulfilled. This type of forward guidance relies upon the fact that forward guidance
is entirely ineffective during the period where the zero lower bound binds – the efficacy
of forward guidance generally stems from promises made for periods beyond the zero
lower bound. In our terminology, the aforementioned example promises a temporary
increase in the inflation target (Zet < Z
n
t , with π
e > π?) for a specific duration K (until
T2 = T1 +K) once the condition, a lift-off as suggested by the regular Taylor rule, is met




Figure 2.7: Guidance on normalization




































This figure depicts the impact of guidance on normalization, where the central bank announces a more expansionary
policy rule, by raising the inflation target temporarily, once interest rates lift off from the zero lower bound. Overall,
the findings are almost equivalent to raising the inflation target as of today, c.f. figure 2.3. The promise of a higher
inflation target of 6% for two years (orange line), 4% for three years (blue line) or 3% for five years (green line) leads
to overshooting inflation, lower real interest rates (at least partly) and an improvement and overshooting of the
output gap. Compared to the ZLB baseline, nominal interest rates lift off one period earlier (and trigger the forward
guidance). All units are percentage points, with inflation and interest rates in annualized terms.
Guidance on normalization is also highly effective, with appropriate parametrization. All
three cases considered and depicted in figure 2.7 – an increase in the inflation target to 6%
for two years, to 4% for three years or to 3% for five years – provide accommodation by
17Certain specifications are inherently problematic. For instance, a promise to apply zero interest rates
after a lift-off from the ZLB, as measured by the implemented interest rate, is not feasible since we would
never leave the ZLB. Formally, there is no equilibrium for most specifications of this type.
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means of an amelioration of today’s economic conditions. The results are, by construction,
very similar to the results for date-based temporary rises in the inflation target.
2.4.4 Preliminary summary of simulation results
Various specifications of forward guidance are highly effective in providing accommodation
when needed. Date-based forward guidance with a constant interest rate seems most
effective, but also most sensitive. Inflation-target based specifications can equal their
performance, if the parameters are set accordingly. Note, however, that the results are
conditional on the deterministic solution method. In a stochastic set-up, rules with an
endogenous component or with an endogenous condition (either to trigger or end forward
guidance) may serve as a hedge against (un)favourable shocks occurring after the forward
guidance has been promised and thus yield different outcomes (in particular if different
specifications are compared to each other). Among others, see Appendix A of Boneva
et al. (2015) for a comparison of deterministic and stochastic set-ups.
2.5 State-dependent: Mechanics, determinacy and
improvement
State-dependent forward guidance is among the least effective types of forward guidance.
This section first provides an explanation by means of its mechanics and determinacy,
then shows a simple way to improve the efficacy: A promise to overshoot the condition
for a specific time.
2.5.1 Mechanics and limitations
An announcement of forward guidance always has two instant implications18
Step 1: The central bank releases an forward guidance announcement with an
explicit (date-based) or implicit (condition) duration (K1).
Step 2: The agents respond to the initial announcement (and its implied dura-
tion K1), assumed to be fully credible, and economic conditions adjust
accordingly.
These two steps are sufficient for specifications with date-based triggers, such as the
constant interest rate specification: The central bank announces forward guidance, the
agents respond. There is no feedback (or second round) and hence no further adjustment.
In specifications with endogenous triggers, such as state-dependent forward guidance,
additional steps take place.
18Note that the general equilibrium feature of DSGE models implies that these are implicit steps only.
Nevertheless, they serve well for the purpose of this section: explaining the mechanics and limitations of
state-dependent forward guidance.
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Step 3: The response of Step 2 leads to an update of the implied duration (K2)
of the (unchanged) promise of the central bank.
Step 4: The agents respond to the updated implied duration (K2).
The following example shows that these additional two steps are crucial for explaining
how and why state-dependent forward guidance can fail. If the threshold of the initial
announcement is too high (inflation above 5%, for instance), the central bank would be
forced to keep interest rates at zero for a long period (Step 1). This, in turn, would
imply a very large response of agents today (Step 2). In our exercise, the central bank
would need to keep interest rates at zero for ten periods such that inflation exceeds five
percent (K1 = 10, according to figure 2.2, second thin orange line). This strong response,
however, implies that the conditions of the announcements would already be met today
and that the central bank would not need to run forward guidance at all (K2 = 0, Step
3 conditional on Step 2). This updated implied duration of zero, however, mitigates the
response of agents of the response in the case without forward guidance (Step 4) and
thereby implies the same duration as in the beginning (K1 or 3 = 10, back to Step 1).
The implied durations K1 and K2 are thus essential for the determinacy of the equilibrium.
If the central bank announces a threshold which is too high, the implied durations of Step
1 and 3 differ (K1 > K2) and we keep running through Steps 1-4 over and over; there is no
equilibrium. The opposite, a very low threshold, aught to be feasible from a technical point
of view, but neither desirable from an economic point of view: The implied duration K1
is so low that there is no or very little stimulus for the economy (recall that any duration
lower than the duration of the zero lower bound yields no stimulus at all).
Figure 2.8: The mechanics of state-dependent forward guidance
(a) Step 1 (b) Step 2 (c) Step 3 (d) Step 4 (e) Step 1/5






























This figure illustrates the implicit steps that determine the equilibrium of state-dependent forward guidance. All
plots depict annualized inflation rates and different colors represent different inflation thresholds (horizontal lines).
The steps represent different implied durations of forward guidance (vertical lines) and different responses of agents
(solid-dotted lines). Only if the durations of (a) and (c) match, we find an equilibrium. If the central bank
announces an overly aggressive threshold (orange), implied forward guidance duration jumps (a) and economic
conditions improve (b) such that in the next implicit step, the central bank would need to run hardly any forward
guidance at all (c), which leads to an adjusted response in (d), and we are back in (a): there is no equilibrium.
Figure 2.8 illustrates this issue for three different thresholds. In plot (a), the central
bank announces three thresholds (horizontal lines) with corresponding implied durations
(vertical lines).19 This triggers the response of the agents in step 2, depicted in plot (b).
In the orange case (high threshold), the response would be so strong that its updated
implied duration falls to one (step 3, plot (c)), i.e. the central bank would not even need
to run forward guidance given this response. The durations and responses for the lower
two thresholds are much weaker (blue and green). Plot (d) depicts the fourth step, the
updated response of the agents conditional on the new implied duration. The implied
19Note that the duration of the forward guidance is one period less than the position of the vertical
line. The central bank lifts interest rates as soon as the condition is met.
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one-period forward guidance from the third step (orange) destroys any benefit from early
steps, and the central bank is ‘forced’ to run its forward guidance for the initial implied
duration (plot (e)). The implied duraation jumps from forth and back between eight and
one; technically, there is no equilibrium. For the blue and green cases the response is so
weak that the implied durations do not change; technically we have an equilibrium, which
is, however, no desirable either given the weak responses.
2.5.2 Determinacy and improving state-dependent forward guid-
ance
The previous paragraph showed that the choice of the threshold is crucial, and sensitive.
This section thus derives the feasible ranges for the inflation threshold. We derive the
ranges graphically in figure 2.9, but the results are confirmed by a numerical grid search
(results omitted).
We proceed in two steps. First, we calculate the implied duration for each threshold
that could be announced by the central bank (omitting the responses of the agents at
this stage). Equivalently, we can plot the thresholds that correspond to specific implied
durations, as in plot (a). Each shaded area corresponds to a different implied duration,
and the blue-dotted line depicts the response of the economy without forward guidance.
Plot (b) shows the responses of the agents to each of the implied duration, or threshold
respectively; the colors of the lines matches the one of the corresponding thresholds. These
responses are equivalent to those of the date-based constant-interest rate case, as in figure
2.2 (due to the promise of keeping interest rates at zero until the condition is met). The
next required item are the maximum of the responses, see the dashed lines in plot (c). If
the response exceeds the threshold range of plot (a) before the last period of the duration,
the strong response would imply a shorter updated duration in Step 3 above, a weaker
response in Step 4 and no equilibrium. In the orange case, for instance, the response
exceeds the range already in period two; see the previous paragraph for the unfavorable
outcome. Only if the maximum lies within the threshold range, we have an equilibrium.
The feasible range for each implied duration then covers values from the corresponding
maximum (lower bound) to the upper range of the threshold range. These final, feasible
ranges are depicted in plot (d).
We clearly see that the range of feasible thresholds quickly narrows for longer durations
(due to the concave shape of the inflation response in the zero-lower bound case). In
this deterministic setup, the choice of an appropriate threshold is thus not only delicate,
but its delicacy even increases with the efficacy of the state-dependent forward guidance.
One presumed problem of state-dependent forward guidance is the strong response of
the agents in the second step, or plot (b) in figure 2.9. Yet, reducing the efficacy of the
response might do little good:20 The implied duration of step one should increase with
decreasing efficacy and might thereby offset any gains from the reduction in the response.
We thus expect this finding to also hold in other, potentially larger models with additional
rigidities or stickiness.21
20For instance through lowering the sigma, according to the discussion in Levin et al. (2010).
21 Again, a stochastic setup may change this conclusion considerably or even twist the findings – see
for instance Boneva et al. (2015).
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Figure 2.9: State-dependent: Threshold regions for equilibria
(a) Thresholds (b) Responses (c) Max. response (d) Feasible ranges
This figure derives feasible ranges for the inflation threshold if the central bank announces state-dependent forward
guidance. All plots depict annualized inflation rates. Horizontal lines and areas depict different thresholds, solid-dotted
lines the response of the economy to different implied durations (on the horizontal axis). Each area in (a) corresponds
to one implied duration and is determined by the response of the baseline ZLB case at this duration. For instance, the
light green area yields an implied duration of six periods and is determined by the two dark-blue dots at six and seven.
The corresponding response of the agents to this implied forward guidance duration is depicted in (b). If the green
response exceeds the green area at any time (the dashed lines in (c) represent the maximum of the response), the
implied duration would shorten and we do not get an equilibrium (c.f. figure 2.8). The feasible range for forward
guidance (d) is thus the range from (a), corrected for the maximum response of (c) if the latter lies within the former.
A simple and effective way to improve the state-dependent forward guidance, however, is
to announce an overshooting of the conditions for several periods.22 Such overshooting lifts
the potential efficacy of state-dependent forward guidance considerably (results omitted):
to the levels of date-based equivalents or guidance over normalization. This improvement
is no surprise: If the Fed promises to keep interest rates at zero until inflation has exceeded
a specific threshold for eight periods (or increase the inflation target by x%), the response
is so strong that the conditions are met soon, if not today, and the overshooting state-
dependent announcement gets akin to a date-based promise for eight periods. Detailed
results based on utility follow in the next section.
2.6 Utility-based evaluation
This section underlines the previous results – based on impulse response functions – with
an appropriate ‘welfare’ measure: the utility of the representative household.23,24 For
each specification, we calculate the utility according to the households (discounted) utility
function, as provided in equation (2.1) (for details see section B.1.1). An approximation
of utility by a quadratic loss function – commonly used in the literature, for the derivation
see e.g. Woodford (2003, chapter 6) – is neither necessary nor consistent with the non-
22Noticeably, this had been suggested by the International Monetary Fund to the Federal Reserve
Board in their 2016 Article IV Consultation with the United States of America: “[..] the path for policy
rates should accept some modest, temporary overshooting of the Feds inflation goal to allow inflation to
approach the Feds 2 percent medium-term target from above.” Available at https://www.imf.org/en/
News/Articles/2015/09/28/04/52/mcs062216.
23Note that given the deterministic solution method, we refrain from calling this utility ‘welfare’ in the
following and stick to the term ‘utility’.
24Linear (perturbation) approaches would have provided similar impulse response functions so far,
since household know about the uncertainty but do not adjust their behavior amid the uncertainty (their
response is linear, i.e. certainty equivalence holds). This similarity, however, only holds for situations
that are close to the steady-state. If the economy is far away from the zero lower bound, perturbation
methods may lead to different results. In this section, results may additionally differ due to uncertainty.
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linear solution method. To facilitate comparison of utility levels, we show utilities relative


















Table 2.1 shows the highest utilities achievable with a certain forward guidance specifi-
cation. The left panel depicts date-based, the right panel state-dependent and guidance
over normalization. Within each panel, we show the highest utility level for different spec-
ifications. Note that this table does not provide guidance on the parameter constellation
that leads to the corresponding utility levels, and that the table only provides a ranking
of the different forward guidance specifications (the numbers have no direct economic
interpretation).
Table 2.1: Highest utility achievable
Specification that yields highest utility
Date-based forward guidance Rel. utility State-dependent Rel. utility
Constant-interest rate 2.27 Constant-interest rate, condition for inflation 1.41
Inflation target 2.23 Constant-interest rate, condition for output gap 0.16
Inflation sensitivity 0.89 Constant-interest rate, condition for both 1.41
Output-gap sensitivity 1.08
Inflation target and both sensitivities 2.27 State-dependent with overshooting Rel. utility
Constant-interest rate, condition for inflation 2.27
Inflation target, condition for inflation 2.23
Guidance on normalization Rel. utility
Inflation target, cond. on desired interest rate 2.06
Inflation target, cond. on interest rate being set 0.91
This table shows the utility of forward guidance specifications relative to the ZLB scenario: Positive numbers imply
higher utility with than without forward guidance. The numbers do have only one purpose, the ranking the
specifications, and have no (other) economic interpretation. For each forward guidance type provided, the table only
shows highest utility achievable. Guidance on normalization is shown for two triggers: Lift-off from the regular
Taylor rule (Zt), or lift-off from the interest rate set by the central bank (Rt, affected by forward guidance). Clearly,
forward guidance is beneficial in all cases, but the differences among the types are substantial.
The table broadly confirms the results derived from the impulse-response section. Date-
based forward guidance is, overall, most powerful in offsetting a negative shock leading
to the zero lower bound. Among the date-based triggered forward guidance types, the
constant-interest rate case takes the lead, closely followed by the inflation-target speci-
fication and, surprisingly, tied by the combined date-based forward guidance (a rise in
inflation-target and sensitivities). In contrast, individual results for inflation or output
gap sensitivities are rather disappointing. Communicating a temporary rise in inflation
and/or output gap sensitivities thus seems only desirable in combination with other for-
ward guidance specifications (to provide sort of a hedge against a strong overshooting).
Table 2.1 also confirms previous results for the state-dependent forward guidance and
guidance on normalization. State-dependent forward guidance with a contemporaneous
condition is limited in its efficacy, while guidance on normalization benefits from its re-
semblance to (date-based) inflation-target forward guidance and thus comes close to the
results for the date-based case. As expected, announcing an overshooting of the inflation
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condition for a specified amount of periods enhances the efficacy of state-dependent for-
ward guidance substantially: it now matches the performance of the best specifications
so far.
How sensitive are the utility results to the selection of (forward guidance) parameters,
such as the announced duration, or the temporary rise in the inflation target? Figure 2.10
provides guidance on this question. It shows the utility, colored by level (high utility levels
are yellow, low levels are blue), for three specifications of date-based forward guidance:
constant-interest rate, inflation target, and combined, i.e. a contemporaneous rise in
inflation target and sensitivities. In all three plots, the vertical axis depicts the duration
of forward guidance. For the constant-interest rate case, the horizontal axis depicts the
start of the forward guidance (pre-announced or immediate), for the other two the rise in
the inflation target. If there are additional parameters which are not plotted, such as the
sensitivities in the right plot, the plot depicts the highest utility achievable for each axis
value combination (i.e. the sensitivities may differ across the plotted values). The white
areas contains both negative utility beyond -2 and no determinacy cases. Note that the
colouring is relative within each plot and hence not fully comparable across the plots.
Figure 2.10: Sensitivity of date-based forward guidance utility
(a) Constant interest rate (b) Inflation target (c) Combined
1 2 3 4 5 6
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This figure depicts the relative utility of various date-based forward guidance types, compared to the ZLB
baseline. Yellow colored cells represent high utility, dark blue low utility. Different to table 2.1 that shows
the highest utility per type, utility might get negative in this case, i.e. forward guidance be harmful in
terms of utility. Colors are relative within each plot and not necessarily comparable across plots. To
enhance readability of the charts, specifications with very low utility levels had been removed (missing,
white).
The sensitivity charts for date-based forward guidance confirm the results from the impulse-
response section. Date-based constant-interest rate forward guidance is highly effective,
but also very sensitive with regard to the duration. Utility quickly drops if the duration
is set either too long or too short. Furthermore, pre-announced forward guidance appears
to be somewhat less effective.25 In terms of rising the inflation target, a short but steep
rise in the inflation target indeed seems favorable to a longer duration with lower inflation
target. Negative aspects of a prolonged overshooting of inflation and output gap hence
outweigh the obvious benefits of a higher output gap. Rising the sensitivities at the same
time, however, seems very favorable: It enhances the efficacy slightly (see table 2.1) while
strongly reducing the sensitivity by mitigating the persistent overshooting of inflation
and output gap. In other words, the range of close-to-optimal specifications widens and
25Potential reasons are the strong overshooting of the economy, but also the endogenous response of
the central bank to this overshooting: a rise in interest rates before forward guidance actually starts –
it sets the interest rates according to the Taylor rule until forward guidance starts – that mitigates the
overshooting.
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the error margin for a policymaker facing decisions under uncertainty narrows. The re-
sults are similar for the state-dependent forward guidance and guidance on normalization:
constant-interest rate specifications are extremely sensitive, while inflation target variants
are overall somewhat less powerful but also less sensitive.
Figure 2.11: Sensitivity of state-dependent forward guidance
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This figure depicts the relative utility of
state-dependent forward guidance, where the central
bank announces zero interest rates (a) or an
expansionary policy rule by means of a higher
inflation target (b, inflation target on horizontal axis)
as long as inflation does not exceed a certain
threshold for a specific number of periods (vertical
axis). Utility is always compared to the ZLB
baseline. Comments from figure 2.10 on negative
utility, colors and removed values also apply.
Figure 2.11 illustrates these results for the state-dependent forward guidance case (with
overshooting). The left bar, plot (a), shows that utility rises substantially if inflation is
required to overshoot between seven and nine periods (the difference in colors to figure 2.2
stems from different scales). Adding one period, however, drastically reduces the utility of
the agents. In contrast to this sharp drop, the yellowish ranges are larger for the inflation
target case: Both different periods or lower inflation targets do reduce utility, but less
sharply than in the constant-interest rate case.
2.7 Concluding remarks
The present chapter tackles the question whether forward guidance is an effective instru-
ment to counteract a large negative shock, and if, which specification of forward guidance
seems preferable. In order to assess these questions, we employ a standard DSGE model
with the standard Taylor rule representing the central bank’s policy rule (in regular times),
and solve the model non-linearly using a deterministic framework. In response to a large
negative shock, we evaluate forward guidance specifications along three dimensions: tim-
ing (immediate vs pre-announced relative to the path of normalization), specification
(commitment to zero interest rates vs a more dovish reaction function), and triggers
(calendar-based guidance vs state-contingent guidance). The effects of each combinations
are compared on the basis of impulse response functions and utility-based welfare.
We find that forward guidance is generally effective at providing policy accommodation
at the zero lower bound. In particular, calendar-based forward guidance expressed as a
constant interest rate over a given period is especially effective at increasing welfare utility.
Forward guidance can achieve the same results if the central bank convinces the markets
it will allow inflation to temporarily overshoot its target. This is akin to the effects of
a price-level target. State dependent forward guidance efficacy is limited, i.e. sensitive
to the parameters announced by the central bank. This is more than a technical point.
Intuitively, if the central bank announces a threshold to return to its traditional Taylor
rule that requires an overly aggressive monetary policy easing, it may be expected to give
up its accommodative stance too early, thereby undermining its intentions to stabilize
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the economy. This reduces the feasible set of parameter values to those that allow for
a measured, and sufficiently long, period of policy accommodation. As a result, state-
contingent forward guidance yields lower utility. Finally, forward guidance concerning the
path of interest rate normalization can be as effective as guidance extended during the
zero lower bound period.
The sensitivity of utility for different forward guidance specifications varies along the
three dimensions timing, specification and trigger. First of all, constant-interest rate path
forward guidance is always highly sensitive to the duration initially announced. One
additional period can turn a highly effective and beneficial into a harmful announcement
– always compared to the standard Taylor rule response. On the other side, forward
guidance with a temporary rise in the inflation target is less sensitive to both duration
and the rise in the target. Increasing the sensitivities for inflation and output gap at the
same time yields additional margin with respect to mis-specifications of parameters: The
range of beneficial specifications broadens considerably.
The limited efficacy of state-dependent forward guidance specifications is partly explained
by the responsiveness of the economy to the initial announcement (and the perfect fore-
sight solution method). Reducing this responsiveness, however, does not appear useful in
increasing its efficacy: The promise until would now imply a longer duration, potentially
offsetting the lower responsiveness. Another, simple yet effective way to increase the effi-
cacy of state-dependent forward guidance is overshooting. In this case, the central bank
announces that interest rates remain low not only until inflation exceeds a specific thresh-
old, but rather that inflation must exceed (overshoot) this threshold for a specific number
of periods, say one year. Such overshooting yields utility levels almost fully comparable
to those of date-based forward guidance.
All results must be considered against the deterministic framework applied in this chapter.
A stochastic setup, such as in Boneva et al. (2015), may change the results and the
interpretation thereof. In a stochastic setup, all forward guidance types that enclose an
endogenous factor – rule, trigger or duration – may provide a hedge against these shocks.
Date-based constant interest rate forward guidance, instead, might either provide too
much or too little accommodation.
Future work should focus on three issues regarding forward guidance in a closed economy.
First, any comparison of different specifications should cover a stochastic environment
and solution method. Second, credibility is crucial and requires additional work. Third,
Third, adding Quantitative Easing or other unconventional monetary policy tools, may
provide interesting insights, potentially also to enhance credibility. Last but not least,
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Villemot. 2011. Dynare: Reference Manual Version 4. Dynare Working Papers 1,
CEPREMAP.
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Forward guidance in a small open
economy: the transmission of
international shocks
Abstract
The literature on forward guidance so far has put little emphasis on open economies. This
paper contributes to this area and analyzes the extent to which forward guidance looses
its potency in an open economy – in three aspects. First, the paper analyzes the efficacy
of forward guidance in response to a large negative domestic shock, and sheds light on
the interplay of international linkages and forward guidance. Second, the paper analyzes
its impact on the transmission of international shocks, i.e. its efficacy in dampening
or offsetting spillovers from a large negative shock abroad. Third, the paper not only
analyzes forward guidance on interest rates, but also on the exchange rate: The central
bank may announce a temporary peg for the exchange rate. We use a stylized two-
country New Keynesian (DSGE) model to analyze these questions, where central banks
follow their policy rules in normal times and revert to three types of forward guidance if
interest rates are constrained by the zero lower bound: A fixed interest rate path (low
interest rates), a temporary rise in the inflation target (lower interest rates through a more
expansionary rule) or a temporary peg for the nominal exchange rate. The paper shows
that forward guidance is a powerful tool – both against domestic or foreign shocks – and
thus successfully alters the international transmission of shocks from abroad. Forward
guidance based on constant interest rates (low for long) is generally most effective, but
also most sensitive to a mis-specification of the duration. Forward guidance based on a
temporarily higher inflation target or a temporary peg for the exchange rate is much more
stable and yet still effective.
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3.1 Introduction
The recent academic literature on forward guidance has grown rapidly, with a particular
emphasis on ways to explain and mitigate the incredibly large effect that theory often
suggests. But, the majority of this research considers closed economies only, whereas con-
tributions on forward guidance in open economies are yet scarce.1 This paper contributes
to this area in analyzing the extent to which forward guidance looses its potency in an
open economy – in three steps. First, we analyze the efficacy of forward guidance in
response to a large negative domestic shock. Second, we analyze its impact on the trans-
mission of international shocks, i.e. its efficacy in dampening or offsetting spillovers from
a large negative shock abroad. Third, we analyze not only forward guidance on interest
rates, but also on the exchange rate: The central bank may announce a temporary peg
for the exchange rate. The entire analysis takes place in a stylized two-country (DSGE)
model.
The applications of forward guidance by central banks of open economies vary consid-
erably. The Swedish Riksbank or Bank of Canada, for instance, used forward guidance
on interest rates in order to provide additional monetary policy stimulus.2 Similarly, the
Bank of Japan, as a larger open economy, also relied on forward guidance (as long until
inflation exceeds a threshold) and recently even announced that it aims at controlling
the steepness and/or level of the yield curve. Taking a different but related approach,
the Norges Bank or the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, among others, publish the path
of their unconditional interest rate forecast in order to provide as much information as
possible about their usual policy rule, instead of explicitly announcing a deviation from
their usual rule. Last but not least, the Czech Central Bank and the Swiss National Bank
also applied some sort of forward guidance: Both central banks announced a lower bound
for their currencies against the Euro.3
In this chapter, we extract and analyze three stylized forward guidance types. First,
central banks may credibly announce low interest rates for an extended period, by means
of a constant interest rate path. Second, central banks may announce lower interest rates
than usual and follow a more expansionary policy rule with a higher inflation target for an
extended period. These first two cases are equivalents to the closed economy case in the
second chapter, but simplified given the additional complexity of the open economy model:
Forward guidance always starts today and we consider calendar-based triggers only (no
state-dependent triggers).4 Third and last, the central bank may announce a temporary
peg for the nominal exchange rate. Technically, we implement such via a modified interest
rate rule that responds to exchange rate deviations.
1The open economy literature often focuses on different issues regarding the zero lower bound in
open economies that may drag attention away from forward guidance of interest rates, not least induced
by the greater complexity of open economy models with respect to additional variables, equations or
spillovers. The presence of the zero lower bound itself, for instance, leads to different spillovers between
the economies and thereby represents an entire research field per se. Another example is (the ordering
of) exchange rate regimes at the zero lower bound.
2See Svensson (2015) or Woodford (2013) for examples.
3Clearly, many of the aforementioned (forward guidance) statements accompanied or complemented
other unconventional monetary policies, particularly quantitative easing.
4In a non-stochastic environment, these additional triggers provide little additional insight, see the
conclusion of the second chapter for a detailed discussion.
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Central banks may choose to apply forward guidance in two cases. First, the small open
economy is hit by a large negative domestic shock and interest rates are bound by the zero
lower bound. Is forward guidance an effective tool to provide additional monetary policy
accommodation in such case? This case is closely linked to the analysis for the closed
economy in the second chapter and highlights the feedback from international linkages to
domestic forward guidance. Second, the foreign economy is hit by a large negative shock
and foreign interest rates are bound by the zero lower bound. What is the international
transmission of this shock, or spillovers to the domestic economy, and to what extent
can domestic forward guidance affect or offset such? Furthermore, do results change
if the foreign central bank itself runs forward guidance amid restricted interest rates?
Throughout the chapter, we measure the effect of forward guidance through impulse
response functions of key variables of interest: Output gap, inflation, exchange rates and
interest rates.
The model is a standard stylized micro-founded new open economy DSGE model for two
economies. Model frictions include price-adjustment costs for firms à la Rotemberg (1982)
or incomplete pass-through at the CPI level due to home bias. A relative size parameter
allows for both the small and large open economy case, we analyze the former unless stated
otherwise. In normal times, both central banks set interest rates according to a Taylor rule,
at the zero lower bound the central banks may revert to (fully credible) forward guidance.
The method to solve the model and derive impulse response functions is identical to
that of the closed economy case in the second chapter, providing full non-linearity with
respect to the zero lower bound and arbitrary forward guidance formulations, with the
major back-draw of a non-stochastic solution. Specifically, we solve the model with the
perfect-foresight method, assuming that the economy returns to the (good) steady-state
and assuming that certainty equivalence holds.
The chapter shows that forward guidance is effective in both cases, whether the small open
economy suffers from a domestic shock or faces negative spillovers from abroad. One major
channel for its efficacy is the exchange rate: Lower interest rates (ceteris paribus) lead to
a depreciation or mitigate the appreciation of the domestic currency, and thereby drag
world demand to the domestic economy. Domestic output (gap) and inflation in turn
both rise. In the first case, a domestic shock, forward guidance specifically offsets the
initial appreciation of the domestic currency that may occur once the zero lower bound
binds, induced by a ‘perverse response’ of relative prices. Yet, the international risk
sharing condition leads to a rather muted response of consumption and final good output
to lower interest rates in all cases, a finding in contrast to the closed economy case. In
consequence, the question of whether forward guidance is more or less effective in an open
economy than in the closed economy remains subject to further research. The second case
shows that forward guidance is also successful in altering the international transmission of
foreign shocks, such that spillovers to the domestic economy are less pronounced (or even
positive for long durations). Spillovers get worse with forward guidance of the foreign
central bank, but remain comparable in qualitative terms.
Among the three forward guidance types, the promise of low interest rates is the most
effective but also most sensitive type, in line with findings from the closed economy
case. A temporarily higher inflation target and the temporary peg are somewhat less
effective, but provide sort of a hedge against an excessive overshooting of output gap and
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inflation, a feature which might be particularly desirable in a stochastic environment.5
The implementation of the temporary peg reveals questionable effects on interest rates,
for specific periods towards the end of forward guidance, an explicit modeling of foreign
exchange interventions seems due in this respect. At present, these results should be
taken with a grain of salt.
The chapter is structured as following. Section 3.2 reviews the literature on forward
guidance or more generally monetary policy at the zero lower bound in open economies.
Section 3.3 introduces the baseline model, the different forward guidance specifications
and the solution model. Section 3.4 presents the simulation results based on impulse
response functions. Section 3.5 concludes and outlines further potential research.
3.2 Related literature
The introduction highlighted that the most directly relevant literature – theoretical con-
tributions on interest-rate based forward guidance or temporary exchange rate pegs – is
somewhat scarce. This literature review thus extends the scope to the more general ques-
tion of (optimal) monetary policy at the zero lower bound in an open economy and, given
the international dimension of the model and research question, also briefly introduces the
question of the (optimal) exchange rate regime at the zero lower bound. Note that due to
the wider complexity of the open economy models, various papers below may ignore the
zero lower bound or refer to simpler models than fully-fledged DSGE models. But unless
stated otherwise, papers do cover the zero lower bound.
Spillovers at the zero lower bound
First and foremost, recent literature shows that the spillovers of foreign shocks to the
domestic economy may alter with the zero lower bound. Bodenstein et al. (2010) for
instance show (in a two-country DSGE model) that at the zero lower bound, ‘the effects
of foreign demand shocks on the home country are greatly amplified’, even for less open
economies. In addition, foreign shocks may extend the duration of the zero lower bound.6
Bäurle and Kaufmann (2014) get similar results, the response of the exchange rate and
changes in prices are stronger under the zero lower bound. Cook and Devereux (2013,
2014) and Bhattarai and Egorov (2016) show that one potential key feature (for these
dynamics) is home bias: For certain degrees of home bias, relative prices can respond
perversely in response to demand shocks, lead to an (over-) appreciation of the home
terms of trade and exacerbate the slump in the home country. Obviously, this has a
considerable impact on (optimal) monetary policy.7
In a similar vein, Haberis and Lipinska (2012) show that changes to foreign monetary
policy, or foreign central bank preferences in general, may affect (i.e. spill over to) domestic
monetary policy. A more stimulatory foreign policy worsens the home policymakers’ trade-
5Please refer to the second chapter for a thorough discussion on this topic.
6The opposite also holds true: Positive foreign shocks may lead to an ‘early exit’ of the zero lower
bound.
7De Paoli (2009) also analyzes optimal monetary policy for a small open economy and considers the
impact of the economy’s openness, though without the zero lower bound.
70
Chapter 3. Forward guidance (open economy) 3.2. Related literature
off between stabilizing inflation and the output gap, if home and foreign goods are close
substitutes.8 This reflects the fact that looser foreign policy leads to a relatively more
appreciated home real exchange rates. Last but not least, (unconventional) monetary
policy abroad may itself lead to spillovers. Alpanda and Kabaca (2015) for instance show
that large scaled asset purchases of one country lead to spillovers to the other country –
the compression of long-term yields stimulates economic activity in both countries – and
that these spillovers are even stronger than conventional monetary policy shocks with the
same impact on (domestic) output.9
In this chapter, we briefly touch and confirm the finding of changes in the spillovers at
the zero lower bound in the baseline scenario, but do not deepen the analysis further. We
also analyse the spillovers of unconventional monetary policy (forward guidance) of the
foreign central bank.
Responses of the (domestic) central bank
Turning to responses of the domestic central bank to such spillovers (or domestic shocks),
a first question is that of the exchange rate regime. The literature generally agrees that
without a zero lower bound, flexible exchange rates are preferable to fixed exchange rates.
In contrast, as Cook and Devereux (2014) point out, a currency area can be better at the
zero lower bound than flexible exchange rates, if there are no additional tools available for
the central bank. The reason behind is the aforementioned ‘perverse’ response of relative
prices to a negative shock and the appreciation of the terms of trade. We briefly confirm
this finding by applying a permanent exchange rate peg via interest rates.
Given de-jure flexible exchange rates, we enter the vast literature on ‘usual’ monetary pol-
icy. In normal times, monetary policy is often represented by interest rate based policies,
but central banks more and more commonly extended this toolkit with unconventional
monetary policies since the great financial crisis: Among others, these include (large-
scaled) asset purchases, forward guidance on interest rates or a temporary management
of exchange rates (i.e. interventions on foreign exchange markets). First contributions
of the literature on such (unconventional) policies at the zero lower back may be traced
back to the Japanese experience. Svensson (1999, 2001, 2003, 2004) for instance suggests
a combination of policy accommodation and a temporary exchange rate management –
also denoted as ‘the fool-proof way’.10,11 Policy accommodation in the fool-proof way is
8In a similar spirit, Lipińska et al. (2011) show that the pricing of imports, local or producer currency
pricing, further affects this ‘spillover’ to domestic stabilization trade-off.
9From an empirical point of view, the results from the first chapter show that, for instance, Swiss asset
prices indeed react to foreign unconventional monetary policies (to be precise, even the announcement of
a policy is sufficient): the Swiss franc generally appreciates in response to an expansionary announcement
and Swiss bond yields decrease. The domestic economy, in turn, may respond to these (financial) spillovers
– e.g. the appreciation may lead to lower exports and thereby output – and trigger changes to domestic
policy.
10Other contributions in this regard include Krugman (1998), Bernanke (2000), Posen (1998), Mc-
Callum (2000) or Meltzer (1999b,a), arguing for increases in the inflation target (recently renewed by
Blanchard et al. (2010)), policy and/or targeting rules that carry along a commitment to hold interest
rates lower than usual, depreciation of exchange rates, exploiting portfolio balance effects, or combinations
thereof.
11Svensson’s ‘foolproof way’ formally consists of three elements that shall guarantee an exit from the
liquidity trap: commitment for a higher future price level, concrete action that demonstrates the central
bank’s commitment (devaluation of the currency) and a temporary exchange rate peg.
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achieved through price level targeting, where expectations of a higher future price level
lead to increased inflation expectations, lower long real interest rates and a real depreci-
ation of the domestic currency, thereby to a ‘jump-start’ for the economy.12
Interest-rate based policies / responses
The finding that price-level targeting is an effective way to mitigate the impact of a large
negative shock has been confirmed by a variety of other authors. Coenen and Wieland
(2004) provide full support, ‘the central bank may improve performance substantially by
devaluing the exchange rate and switching to an exchange-rate peg or by committing to
a price-level target path and interest-rate rule that will close the price gap in the future.’
However, they also stress the ‘lack of immediate verifiability’ in practice that will ham-
per credibility and reduce effectiveness. Iwamara et al. (2005) show (combining optimal
rules with optimal monetary policy) that optimal monetary policy under commitment
(i.e. assuming full credibility) can be implemented via a inflation targeting framework,
augmented with a history dependent inflation target.13 Nakajima (2008) shows that the
paths for inflation, output gap and interest rates under optimal monetary policy are sim-
ilar to those achieved by Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) for the closed economy (or the
second chapter). Interestingly, the authors find that contrary to aforementioned results
from Svensson, the nominal exchange rate of the country in a liquidity trap appreciates
under optimal policy.14 Bhattarai and Egorov (2016) also show that optimal monetary
policy under commitment significantly outperforms its counterpart discretion. The solu-
tion under discretion is a function of an inflation target, without history dependence, and
leads to a so-called overvaluation bias: The real exchange rate is ‘relatively more appre-
ciated’. In contrast, optimal monetary policy under commitment can be represented by
a time-varying price-level target.15,16
12As a neat extension, Jeanne and Svensson (2007) introduce balance sheet concerns of the central
bank as one tool to enhance the (crucial but questionable) credibility assumption of the foolproof-way
approach.
13The authors then compare this finding to the conduct of monetary policy in Japan in the early zeros
and find that ‘the BOJ rule lacks history dependence in the sense that the BOJ had no intention of
revising the target level of inflation in spite of the occurrence of various additional shocks to the Japanese
economy’ and thus ‘failed to have sufficient influence on the markets expectations about the future course
of monetary policy’. In addition, the authors state that ‘findings suggests that the Japanese government
deviated from Ricardian fiscal policy toward fiscal tightening.’
14The author adds a caveat though: The exchange rate appreciates except possibly at the initial date.
Additionally, the author partly questions the results from Svensson (2004) in criticizing one specific
assumption of the latter: That productivity is unexpectedly high at period zero, but normal afterwards.
The author concludes that if ‘the shock lasts for more than one period so that the expected growth rate
of productivity is negative’, then ‘the currency would appreciate [..] under optimal policy commitment’.
15More precisely, the authors state that “under optimal policy under commitment, the central bank
promises a more depreciated real exchange rate” and “is able to promise low real interest rates and a
higher output gap in future, which helps mitigate the extent of the negative output gap during the initial
periods”. The authors also put a large emphasis on the importance of the elasticity of substitution on
the outcome and show that the liquidity trap (and adverse effects) gets worse, the lower the elasticity of
substitution of between domestic and foreign goods. Last but not least, the authors also consider optimal
fiscal policy.
16Contributions on optimal monetary policy without the zero lower bound include, for instance, Dib
et al. (2008), where ‘optimal price level targeting regime substantially reduces the welfare cost of business
cycle fluctuations’ (compared to the historical inflation targeting rule), or De Paoli (2009), where optimal
monetary policy in a small open economy ‘can be written as a function of domestic inflation, output gap
and real exchange rate’. De Paoli (2009) also addresses the importance of the elasticity of substitution:
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Given a counterpart in the foreign economy, various contributions particularly analyze
the aspect of cooperation. Nakajima (2008) puts an emphasis on coordination and world
welfare and shows that the aforementioned findings require (precisely: assume) active
policy coordination across countries. Without the zero lower bound, in contrast, the
optimal inflation targeting rule has exactly the same form as in a closed economy (and
thus no international dependence). Fujiwara et al. (2013) confirm previous findings that
history dependence is an essential feature of optimal monetary policy and that price-
level targeting per se is also beneficial, and show that this holds even if applied by one
of the two countries only. Any cooperation of the two central banks in determining
optimal monetary policy provides additional benefit. Fujiwara et al. (2015) deepen this
research question and show that (optimal) monetary policy under cooperation exhibits
‘an incentive feasibility problem’. In other words, policymakers might have an incentive
to deviate from cooperation under certain circumstances. A similar result occurs if the
countries differ in size.17 Last but not least, Cook and Devereux (2013) also achieve a clear
result for optimal monetary policy: Commitment beats discretion by far, independent of
the currency regime. Under commitment, optimal monetary policy can re-establish the
general result on exchange rate regimes that flexible exchange rates are generally more
beneficial than a currency union.18,19
History dependence and commitment (or credibility) are thus essential for an effective
monetary policy at the zero lower bound and particularly reduce the appreciation ‘bias’
of the exchange rate.20 Coordination is, in general, also seen as beneficial but but of lower
importance. In contrast to most of the aforementioned references, we consider explicit
deviations from a rule. In order to do so, we follow most papers in assuming that the
announcements are fully credible. Since central banks usually follow their Taylor rules, we
do not model any form of cooperation, though implicitly cover cooperation by evaluating
contemporaneous forward guidance at home and abroad.21 To the best of our knowledge,
the (theoretical) coverage of such explicit forward guidance in a (small) open economy
is very limited. Garcia-Cicco (2011) seems the notable exception. The author analyzes
balance sheet and interest rate policies in a small open economy model and shows that
maintaining the policy rate at zero for a prolonged period can be greatly expansionary,
particularly after contractionary shocks (at the zero lower bound).22 Again, (a lack in)
When domestic and foreign goods are close substitutes for each other, the optimal policy rule implies
lower real exchange rate volatility than a domestic inflation targeting regime. The reverse is true when
the elasticity of substitution between goods is low.
17The authors thus analyze (and suggest) a sustainable cooperation regime, history dependent, that
encloses ‘a cross-country, state-contingent contract between policymakers’.
18The authors sometimes refer to ‘forward guidance’. Yet, their usage is somewhat misleading compared
to this chapter: The authors refers to optimal monetary policy under commitment, while we refer to an
explicit deviation of a given rule.
19A noteworthy contribution without the zero lower bound is Fujiwara and Wang (2016) who focus
on the pricing of goods (local vs producer currency) and cooperation and show that cooperation always
leads to welfare gains, but that those gains are not very large.
20Differences in models and assumptions may however affect the findings, even lead to opposite findings.
See, for instance, the discussion of the findings regarding the appreciation bias in Nakajima (2008) (vs
the depreciation as in Svensson (2004)).
21While central banks certainly communicate with each other in practice, they seem to rarely coop-
erate in determining their actual monetary policy rate (or, as another example, the pace or their asset
purchases).
22The author implements these policies via three ad-hoc frictions: a liquidity premium, deviations from
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credibility can severely undermine these effects. Similar to the closed economy case, the
effect primarily relies on higher expected price levels. Our first type of forward guidance
is thus similar to the approach of Garcia-Cicco (2011), but differs e.g. in the approaches
considered (forward guidance through the inflation target or temporary exchange rate
pegs) or the structure and solution methods of the model (non-linear, allowing for dif-
ferent relative size of the economies, perfect foresight). Related but yet different in the
approach, Svensson (2015) and Woodford (2013) provide narrative overviews for various
examples of implicit and explicit forward guidance applied by the Swedish Riskbank,
Bank of Canada, Reserve Bank of New Zealand or the Federal Reserve Board. In do-
ing so, the authors neatly illustrate the problems regarding credibility measured by the
distance of the projected interest rate path from markets’ expectations or by intraday
market responses.23
Exchange-rate based policies / responses
Turning towards the interaction of exchange rates and monetary policy, a first question
is related to aforementioned policy rules: Should the central bank respond to exchange
rate movements while setting interest rates, i.e. add the exchange rate to its policy
rule? Another question addresses the implementation of the (temporary) exchange rate
management if the the central bank decides to do so, as proposed by Svensson (2004) or
discussed in McCallum (2000).
Regarding the former, adding the exchange rate to the policy rule has one convenient
implication: If the corresponding parameter (i.e. the penalty on any deviation of the
variable from its target) is large enough, it will lead to an exchange rate peg. Any
(forward) guidance on this exchange rate parameter, for instance a temporary increase,
would also allow for a temporary peg. Among others, Wang (2010) addresses the general
question whether the central bank should add the exchange rate to the policy rule or
not, while Benigno et al. (2007) and Corsetti et al. (2011) target the link of policy rules
and exchange rate pegs.24 This is the technique we apply in this chapter, for the sake of
simplicity.25
The second approach to implement a (temporary) management of exchange rates is to
explicitly model foreign exchange interventions, a task a variety of papers addressed re-
cently for (DSGE) models. A caveat is due upfront, however: Most of the following
papers do not model the zero lower bound explicitly. The common and obvious way to
the uncovered interest rate parity and a premium in the term structure of interest rates.
23Among empirical contributions – forward guidance is hard to isolate from other announcements,
such as quantitative easing – we might mention that of Okina and Shiratsuka (2004), discussing the
effectiveness of the Bank of Japan’s forward guidance from March 1998 to February 2003, primarily by
analyzing the yield curve. The policy-duration effect is found to be highly effective in stabilizing market
expectation for the path of short-term interest rates, but fails to reverse deflationary expectations in
financial markets.
24Wang (2010) e.g. analyzes the benefit of adding the exchange rate to the policy rule on welfare
(additionally, the author evaluates the benefits from cooperation). Overall, the findings suggest that the
monetary authority should not seek to vigorously stabilize exchange rate fluctuations. The model does
not detect relevant welfare gains from international monetary cooperation.
25Note that the uncovered interest rate parity – commonly used in small models – will lead to equal
interest rates across borders during an (temporary) exchange rate peg applied through the policy rule.
Clearly, this approach has the disadvantage of not being able to model forward guidance on interest rates
and exchange rates contemporaneously (for the same periods).
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model such interventions are foreign exchange reserves (or international bond reserves).
Imperfect substitution across money, domestic and/or foreign bonds usually creates the
wedge such that (even) sterilized interventions can be effective. Escudé (2013), Castillo
(2014) or Benes et al. (2015) analyze the merits of having two policy rules, one setting
interest rates, the other targeting exchange rates (in some form) via foreign exchange
interventions. Escudé (2013) e.g. shows that the losses of the central bank are system-
atically lower if both rules are used simultaneously. Castillo (2014) adds the caveat that
the ‘central bank should coordinate the timing on and monetary policy stance on its two
instruments in order to simultaneously achieve both goals; otherwise it could send op-
posite signals to economic agents, and endanger the achievement of one of its targets,
particularly, its inflation target’. Benes et al. (2015) analyze how interventions affect the
economy through portfolio balance sheet effects in the financial sector and show that they
can help to insulate the economy against certain shocks.26
The following papers analyze optimal interventions (and monetary policy). Canzoneri
and Cumby (2014) show that optimal monetary policy with interventions is rather com-
plex: Leaning against the wind can be less beneficial than traditional inflation targeting
(via a Taylor rule), and foreign exchange interventions in an inflation targeting regime
may outperform sterilized interventions.27 Optimal monetary policy in Cavallino (2016)
(also) encloses both foreign exchange interventions and (regular) monetary policy; in other
words, foreign exchange interventions shall ‘lean against the wind’ and are not a substi-
tute of but complement (regular) monetary policy. Fanelli and Straub (2016) also show
that leaning against the wind interventions are optimal against global liquidity shocks,
and that they should be small and frequent. In addition, the authors show that ‘forward
guidance’ of future interventions (through smoothing interventions) is beneficial. Last but
not least, simple coordination rules (among central banks) may avoid over-accumulation
of reserves (in a world with emerging markets engaging in currency wars) and depressed
world interest rates.
In a similar vein, Amador et al. (2017) develop a simple two-period and two-country
model with the zero lower bound to provide a simple way to measure costs associated with
exchange rate policies. Specifically, the authors analyze how a central bank can pursue an
exchange rate objective at the zero lower bound with limits to arbitrage in international
capital markets. At the zero lower bound, ‘all changes in external conditions that increase
inflows of capital toward the country are detrimental, while policies like negative nominal
interest rates or capital controls can reduce the costs [..]’.28 Ghosh et al. (2016) also use a
small, non-DSGE model – modelling foreign exchange interventions through the (foreign)
reserves in the balance of payments – and show that interventions can be optimal for a
sudden surge in capital inflows that negatively affect the domestic economy. This finding
holds even under an inflation targeting regime. More generally, ‘if two policy instruments
26However, the authors stress the fact that ‘foreign exchange interventions may also hinder necessary
exchange rate adjustments, e.g. in the presence of terms of trade shocks’.
27The central bank does not necessarily sterilize interventions via open market operations of the same
amount on domestic bond markets, it may also conduct open market operations such that interest rates
follow the path suggested by the policy (Taylor) rule. The latter is what the authors refer to as an
inflation targeting regime.
28The authors underline their theoretical findings with empirical findings that show that when interest
rates are close to zero, violations in interest parity are more likely, and those violations are associated
with reserve accumulation by Central Banks’.
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are available, then they should be used in tandem to achieve both price-stability and
exchange-rate objectives’.29
Overall, a temporary management of the exchange rate through foreign exchange inter-
ventions seems to provide additional benefit, at least from a theoretical point of view.30
Similar to the interest-rate forward guidance case, precise equivalents for the exchange
rate management part are scarce: The recent (theoretical) literature often focuses on
permanent pegs or optimal interventions (without the zero lower bound), whereas we are
interested in an explicit deviation from the general (floating) regime. Fanelli and Straub
(2016)’s approach of analyzing ‘forward guidance’ on foreign exchange interventions (via
intervention smoothing) is probably one of the closer recent contributions, though differ-
ences are manifold, such as the implementation of foreign exchange interventions (we take
the basic policy rule approach) or the pre-announcement of the interventions (we specify
a fixed number of periods instead of a smoothing process). Clearly, Franta et al. (2014)
also discuss related issues (a pre-announced floor) from a narrative and partly theoretical
approach.
Literature wrap-up
In total, there is much less specific literature than in the closed economy case that is
(directly) related to our research question, the fool-proof way of Svensson (2004) may still
come closest and the work from Garcia-Cicco (2011) is very similar in the interest-rate
forward guidance approach. Surely, all literature analyzing optimal monetary policy or
interventions is also close, though we aim at analyzing an explicit deviation from a given
rule. The main back-draw of our approach relative to the idea of Svensson (2004) is that we
cannot analyse forward guidance on interest rates and exchange rates contemporaneously,
i.e. for the same periods.31 Our advantage is that we apply and solve a non-linear DSGE
model. For the sake of completeness, we also do not model any quantitative easing
(though it would be similar to interventions in various aspects), fiscal policy or balance
sheet concerns.32
29For the sake of completeness, the authors also stress that the interventions should be two-way.
30For empirical contributions on foreign exchange interventions, see e.g. Fratzscher et al. (2015),
Dabrowski et al. (2015), Forbes and Klein (2015), Blanchard et al. (2015), Fatum and Yamamoto (2012),
Fatum (2010), or Fatum and Hutchison (2010). We also like to mention two particular cases in this regard,
both suffering from interest rates being constrained by the zero lower bound and from an appreciation of
the home exchange rate: the Czech or Swiss case. See e.g. Franta et al. (2014) or Alichi et al. (2015) for
the former or various speeches from the Swiss National Bank for the latter.
31We could, however, analyze the switch from one to another at a specific period.
32We nevertheless may highlight some recent contributions in this regard (not least because some of
aforementioned papers discuss these topics). For quantitative easing, see e.g. Garcia-Cicco (2011) or
Alpanda and Kabaca (2015). Typically, foreign exchange interventions are often applied via foreign
bonds, while asset purchase programs would primarily target domestic bonds. Interestingly, Alpanda
and Kabaca (2015) for instance show that spillovers are larger for asset purchase programs than for
conventional monetary policy. For fiscal policy, see e.g. Iwamara et al. (2005), Cook and Devereux (2011)
(optimal fiscal policy at the zero lower bound), Corsetti et al. (2011) (fiscal policy and currency pegs),
Cook and Devereux (2013) (optimal fiscal and monetary policy at the zero lower bound), Müller et al.
(2015) (fiscal policy coordination in currency unions), Gomes et al. (2015) (fiscal policy and cooperation
at the zero lower bound), or Bhattarai and Egorov (2016) (interaction of optimal monetary policy and
fiscal policy).
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3.3 Methodology
In this section, we briefly outline the model, the solution method, and the types of forward
guidance considered in this chapter.
3.3.1 Model and calibration
Our baseline model is a standard two-country DSGE model with quadratic price adjust-
ment costs à la Rotemberg (1996) and three production sectors operating under perfect
competition (final good producers and importers/retailers) or monopolistic competition
(intermediary good producers).33 Intermediary good producers price their goods in their
currency (producer currency pricing, PCP), can re-optimize prices in each period but face
prices adjustment costs. The law of one price holds at the intermediary good level, but
home bias at the final good level leads to deviations from the law of one price, captured
by the real exchange rate. The production function for intermediary goods is linear with
labor as the only input, technology is known and equal across individual firms. Capital
markets are perfect, both countries can access both bond markets (while governments do
not issue bonds). Governments follow a simple one-period budget rule with government
expenditures (exogenous fraction of domestic final good output), wage taxes and lump-
sum transfers. Finally, the model incorporates a parameter for the relative size of the
two economies – inspired by De Paoli (2009), among others – and is thus able to simu-
late anything between the small open economy and a large open economy case (with two
symmetric countries). Unless stated otherwise, the small open economy is the baseline.
The complete model, equilibrium conditions and steady-state values are available in the
appendix C.1. At this place, we only highlight selected equations.
Price adjustment costs. Intermediary good producers are free to update prices every
period, but face price adjustment costs whenever they do so. The adjustment costs are
a function of the change in prices, a cost parameter γ and, following Ascari and Rossi






that allows for different indexations,











Optimal price setting. With symmetric technology, all intermediary good producers re-
optimize to the same price. The Rotemberg (1996) price adjustment costs thus yield the
following optimal price setting equation for prices of local intermediary goods ph,t.
34
0 = (1− ε)ph,t
pt





















33The three former types are often modeled by the households directly, through CES utility functions
and expenditure minimization. In our case, firms maximize profits and minimize expenditures on inputs
under perfect competition (leading to zero profits). The result, however, is equivalent.
34The Calvo framework, instead, faces a recursive formulation for the price index, often accompanied
by two auxiliary equations.
77
3.3. Methodology Chapter 3. Forward guidance (open economy)
Home bias. Final good producers combine domestic and foreign inputs xh,t and xf,t to a
final good yt, purchased by the household at price pt. The composition of the two inputs
follows a CES production function where the elasticity of substitution v consists of two
parameters and conforms two assumptions:35 First, it incorporates a degree of openness
(α), that leads to home bias if α < 1. Second, the foreign country only consumes foreign
goods if n→ 0, but the smaller economy always consumes foreign goods. The definitions
that satifsy these requirements are v ≡ 1−(1−n)α for the domestic economy and v? ≡ nα
















Gross domestic product. Price adjustment costs drive a wedge between domestic output
and gross domestic product, as in the closed economy case. In addition to the price
adjustment costs, the (nominal) gross domestic product (GDP) ỹt in an open economy is
also a function of exports and imports. Note that we do not model investments in this
model.






International risk sharing and uncovered interest rate parity. The Euler equations for the
two households yield two common expressions, an international risk sharing condition and








t Rt = ∆et+1R
?
t
The model is calibrated using standard parameters, for details and references see appendix
C.3. Inter-temporal substitution σ is set to two, home bias α set to 0.4 and the discount
factor β set to 0.9975, implying a real interest rate of roughly 1% in annualized terms.
The intratemporal elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods θ is set
to 3 and that between intermediary goods ε to 6. Price adjustment cost parameter γ is
set to 100, the inverse elasticity of labor supply ν is 0.2 and monetary policy parameters
follow standard Taylor rule parameters: φπ and φx are set to standard values 1.5 and 0.5.
Interest rate inertia, although technically available, is set to zero.
3.3.2 Monetary policy and forward guidance
We use two different variables for the central bank’s interest rates. Zt denotes the desired
interest rate, which may get negative (or smaller than one, using gross interest rates). This
can either be the interest rate implied by the regular Taylor rule (Znt ), an expansionary
alternative, stemming from any particular type of forward guidance (Zet ). Rt instead
denotes the realized interest rate, the interest rate that the central bank can achieve on
35See, for instance, De Paoli (2009).
78
Chapter 3. Forward guidance (open economy) 3.3. Methodology
money markets respecting the zero lower bound.36
Rt = max {1, Zt}
The normal policy rule Znt is a common Taylor rule, responding to inflation and the output
gap based on the gross domestic product ỹt. The Taylor rule parameters φπ and φx are
set to standard values 1.5 and 0.5, inertia ρr is set to zero unless specified otherwise.











Forward guidance, represented by the expansionary rule Zet , can take three different spec-
ifications, including the distinction between interest-rate or exchange-rate based (tem-
porary peg) forward guidance. First, the promise of low interest rates corresponds to a
constant interest rate path, denoted as c below (technically, the central bank could an-
nounce an arbitrary interest rate path IRPt). Second, the promise of lower interest rates
than usual refers to the Taylor rule, but raises the inflation target (πe > π?) temporarily
in order to provide additional stimulus given equal economic conditions. Third, we impose
that the central bank implements a temporary exchange rate peg via a policy rule based
on exchange rate deviations (instead of modeling interventions separately).37
Zet =

c (IRP t) constant interest rate path
Znt with π
e > π? higher inflation target
Znt with ∆et instead of (πt, ỹt) temporary peg
Specifically, the interest-rate rule for the temporary peg case gets (∆eet could again be










Finally, the central bank applies the corresponding forward guidance rule from today t
to a credible date T . In difference to the closed economy case of the second chapter, we
assume that forward guidance always starts today.
Zt =
{
Zet for t ∈ {t, . . . , T}
Znt otherwise
}
For all rules, we assume that the information set of the central bank and the public are
identical and common knowledge.
36We are fully aware that the literature distinguishes between the zero and effective lower bound and
intensifies the research on the latter. For the sake of readability, we nevertheless omit this distinction and
argue that the precise threshold should not matter for the dynamics of forward guidance. If anything, if
the effective lower bound was known, we could conveniently reduce the zero lower bound to a lower value
(below one for gross rates).
37Technically, this implies that the zero lower bound does not hold as long as a temporary peg lasts,
but continues to hold afterwards. The parameter for this rule is set high enough to penalize (and prevent)
any deviation from the peg.
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3.3.3 Solution method
The solution method for the model is identical to that of the closed economy case in
the second chapter: the perfect foresight (PF) approach, using Dynare (Adjemian et al.,
2011). This approach assumes that the economy returns to its steady-state in finite time,
and that agents replace future expected shocks with their expected value, so that certainty
equivalence applies. As a result, the perfect foresight method numerically solves a finite set
of equations using Newton methods. The main advantages are again an accommodation
of the non-linear zero lower bound constraint and the design of non-linear policy rules,
and being able to solve the full non-linear model. This allows us to study solution paths
that are away from steady state, following a lengthy period at the zero lower bound,
for instance. The main draw-back from this method is the inability to account for the
uncertainty over future shocks (a fully stochastic environment). See the second chapter
for a discussion of alternatives.
The baseline scenario in the subsequent analysis is a large adverse demand shock for the
first case (domestic shock), pushing the economy to the ZLB for four quarters (without
forward guidance), and a large adverse expenditure shock abroad for the second case
(foreign shock).
3.4 Simulation results
As outlined in the introduction, the (simulation) analysis is split into two parts, providing
answers to the following questions
1. Is forward guidance an effective tool for a small open economy if the domestic
economy is hit by a large negative shock and domestic interest rates are bound at
zero?
2. How does forward guidance affect (or offset) the international transmission of a
shock to the foreign economy?
In both parts, the chapter assesses the effects of forward guidance by comparing impulse
response functions of different forward guidance policies on key variables of interest: In-
flation, output gap, interest and exchange rates. The first few charts depict a somewhat
broader set of variables to highlight the impact in more detail, but subsequent charts
focus on the aforementioned four variables.
3.4.1 Is forward guidance an effective tool for a small open econ-
omy?
This first part addresses the efficacy of forward guidance to counter a domestic liquidity
trap. A large negative demand shock hits the small open economy and drives interest
rates down to zero or, if unconstrained, into negative territory.38 The foreign economy,
38Technically, this corresponds to a shock to the discount factor of dt, calibrated such that interest
rates remain at the zero lower bound for four periods.
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also referred to as the rest of the world, remains unaffected by both the shock and the
response of the small open economy. The domestic central bank may then announce
forward guidance in an attempt to counter this shock. A comparison to the closed economy
case highlights the implications of having an open economy, i.e. the impact international
linkages may have on forward guidance.
The effect of the zero lower bound
Figure 3.1 illustrates the effect of the shock and the zero lower bound in the domestic
economy, without forward guidance. The shock to the discount factor leads to a strong
decrease in consumption (via the Euler equation), output of final goods and inflation.
Without the zero lower bound (solid line with empty dots), this forces the central bank
to slash interest rates deeply into negative territory, down to more than minus two per-
centage points, inducing a depreciation in the exchange rate. In turn, domestic terms
of trade also depreciate and net exports (exports minus imports) increase, supporting
domestic aggregate production (gross domestic product). In other words, the response
of the domestic central bank drags world output to the domestic economy through the
exchange rate channel. The linear production function finally leads to additional hours
worked.
Figure 3.1: The domestic liqudity trap



























































































The figure depicts the response of a small open economy to a large negative (domestic) demand shock.
Foreign variables are omitted. Colors represent variables, patterns specifications: Lines with empty dots
depict the situation without the zero lower bound, lines with filled dots the case with the zero lower bound
and, for comparison, thin dotted lines the case with a permanent peg for the nominal exchange rate. The
values are deviations from the steady-state in percent for output, exchange rates, terms of trade,
consumption and labor, and annualized rates for interest and inflation (the model uses gross rates).
Wherever applicable, values are measured per-capita to account for the different sizes of the economy.
The presence of the zero lower bound (solid line with filled dots) restricts the interest
rates to dive into negative territory and leads to ceteris paribus higher real interest rates,
similar to the closed economy case. In combination with a similar impact on inflation,
the depreciation of the (real) exchange rate turns into a temporary appreciation, which
confirms recent findings from the literature.39 The lack in policy accommodation and
39According to the literature, different values for the home bias α should lead to different findings at
this place, see section 3.2 for a discussion and references.
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the appreciation of the real exchange rate leads to a more pronounced drop in inflation
rates (more than minus six percentage points) and a rather negative contribution from net
exports: The appreciation now rather dispels world demand from the domestic economy.
In turn, gross domestic product drops in the first periods, the output gap turns negative,
and hours worked initially decrease. Note that the desired interest rates Zt are now deeply
negative, compared to the case without the zero lower bound (in the case without the
zero lower bound, the blue line is fully covered by the red line), further illustrating the
negative impact of the zero lower bound on the domestic economy.
The muted response of consumption to the presence of the zero lower bound, and to various
applications of forward guidance below, seems somewhat at odds with intuition. Changes
in interest rates should generally lead to changes in the intertemporal consumption profile.
However, the international risk sharing condition from section 3.3.1 – a new condition
compared to the closed economy case – provides an additional, tight band for consumption.
Foreign consumption is basically exogenous in the small open economy case, domestic
consumption thus may only change with the (exogenous) discount factor and the real
exchange rate. Unless the intertemporal elasticity of substitution σ is very high, the
impact of the real exchange rate on consumption via this condition is rather limited.40
Running a fixed exchange rate regime at the zero lower bound (thin dotted line) can
indeed be beneficial, in line with the literature. The domestic central bank is forced to
keep interest rates at the levels from abroad, which remain unaffected from the shock to
the small open economy, and nominal exchange rates in turn remain identical. The real
exchange rate, however, depreciates considerably amid inflation differentials and leads to
a similar (positive) outcome as in the case without the zero lower bound. Noteworthy is
the much more persistent impact on the real exchange rate.
The efficacy of forward guidance in a liquidity trap
Shall the domestic central bank counter such a negative shock through forward guidance
if the economy is constrained by the zero lower bound? We henceforth analyze the three
types of forward guidance defined in section 3.3.2 and compare it to the zero lower bound
case (always the solid line with filled-dots): (i) constant-interest rates, (ii) higher inflation-
target and (iii) a temporary peg for the nominal exchange rate. Different patterns of the
lines now imply different forward guidance specifications or durations.
A promise to keep interest rates at zero for an extended period, illustrated by figure 3.2, is
indeed effective in stimulating the domestic economy. The initial appreciation of the real
exchange rate disappears and real interest rates drop compared to the zero lower bound
case. Finally, consumption slightly rises from its low levels. The depreciation again drags
external demand to the domestic economy and at least partly offsets the initial drop in the
gross domestic product, and pressure on prices decreases. This stimulus, however, quickly
turns into an excessive overshooting of the economy with longer durations. Already a
promise of two years leads to implausibly large effects (prices do no longer drop any-
more). Yet, even the largest stimulus cannot offset the most direct impact of the shock:
the drop in consumption. As in the baseline scenario, hours worked increase with the
gross domestic product.
40A different σ will lead also to different real exchange rate responses; the overall impact of a higher
value of σ on consumption thus remains unclear.
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Figure 3.2: Constant interest-rate fwd guidance in a domestic liquidity trap



























































































The figure depicts the effect of constant-interest rate forward guidance of a small open economy in
response to a large negative (domestic) demand shock. The central bank promises to keep interest rates at
zero for several periods (up to nine periods). For a description of the variables and units see figure 3.1.
The solid-dotted line represents the baseline scenario where the zero lower bound binds but no forward
guidance is applied. The dotted lines represent different durations of the constant-interest rate forward
guidance, the dashed line highlights forward guidance for seven periods.
The effect of a promise to raise the inflation target temporarily by approximately 2%
is, as shown in figure 3.3 for the core variable set, overall somewhat less effective but
more stable in terms of overshooting. If conditions improve too strongly, the central bank
may even rise interest rates before the zero lower bound ‘ends’, the so-called endogenous
channel of the second chapter. As in the constant interest rate case, it decreases the real
interest rates and repeals the initial appreciation of the real exchange rate, with according
effects on all variables.
Finally, the central bank may announce a temporary peg of nominal exchange rates via the
interest rates, illustrated in figure 3.4. The peg restricts changes to the nominal exchange
rate to zero for eight to sixteen periods, starting today, and thereby equals domestic to
foreign interest rates, with the notable exception of the last period of the peg where interest
rate sharply drop, at odds with intuition. This drop in the interest rate seems to be a
Figure 3.3: Inflation-target fwd guidance in a domestic liquidity trap














































The figure depicts the effect of an inflation target forward guidance of a small open economy in response to
a large negative (domestic) demand shock. The inflation target is raised by approximately two percentage
points for six to nine periods. For a description of the variables and units see figure 3.1. The solid-dotted
line represents the baseline scenario where the zero lower bound binds but no forward guidance is applied.
The dotted lines represent different durations of the inflation-target rate forward guidance, the dashed line
highlights forward guidance for seven periods.
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consequence of the construction of the peg (via interest rates) and cannot be avoided in
this set up.41 The set of restrictions implied by the construction of the peg, a temporary
nominal exchange rate peg and the Taylor rule with the zero lower bound afterwards,
seems to be too strict to be consistent with the structure of the model, particularly the
relationship between the exchange rate and the interest rate. Modeling foreign exchange
interventions might greatly help in this regard, providing a second instrument for the
central bank. Notably, the drop decreases with longer durations – the need for post-peg
adjustments seems to decrease (with the shock fading out) – and the responses get more
and more similar to the permanent peg from figure 3.1. Furthermore, agents anticipate
this one-off drop and smooth out their behavior accordingly.
Figure 3.4: A temporary peg in a domestic liquidity trap














































The figure depicts the effect of a temporary exchange rate peg in response to a large negative (domestic)
demand shock. The nominal exchange rate is kept at its current level for eight to sixteen periods, starting
today, and interest rates are set accordingly during the peg. See text for a discussion of the one-off drop in
interest rates once the peg ends. For a description of the variables and units see figure 3.1. The filled-dotted
line represents the baseline scenario where the zero lower bound binds but no peg is applied. The dotted
lines represent different durations of the peg, the empty-dotted line highlights a peg for then periods.
Taking the results as given (and with a grain of salt), the real exchange rate depreciates
due to lower domestic inflation. This leads to well-known and positive results for terms
of trade, net exports and domestic GDP. Overall, a pre-announced temporary peg (via
interest rates) thus successfully ameliorates the recession.
The relevance of international linkages
In essence, the results for the open economy are comparable to the closed economy case
in the second chapter. Forward guidance on interest rates yields highly desired monetary
stimulus, pushing up domestic production and inflation. Major differences arise in two
aspects: external demand via exchange rates, and consumption.
First, the impact of the exchange rate – and thereby external demand – is two-faced.
Generally, a depreciation of the exchange rate, either induced by the negative shock itself
or by forward guidance, drags demand from abroad to the domestic economy, with positive
effects on domestic production. However, the zero lower bound may lead to an (initial)
appreciation if the central bank refrains from forward guidance, with negative effects on
domestic variables. With the zero lower bound case as the baseline in reality, it is well
conceivable that such an appreciation may occur occasionally in open economies.
41Today’s interest rates are set such that today’s change in the nominal exchange rate is zero (imple-
mentation of the peg), but today’s interest rates also directly affect tomorrow’s exchange rate via the
uncovered interest rate parity. Tomorrow’s interest rates, in turn, are set by the Taylor rule (the peg is
over) and the zero lower bound binds again. Note that for the duration of the peg, we temporarily allow
for negative interest rates.
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Second, consumption overall responds much less to forward guidance than in the closed
economy case, presumably due to the international risk sharing condition (which is, in
turn, affected by the assumption of complete international markets). Positive effects of
forward guidance thus primarily stem from domestic production, or GDP, and muted
disinflation.
3.4.2 How does forward guidance affect the international trans-
mission of shocks?
This second part addresses how domestic forward guidance affects the international trans-
mission of foreign shocks. A large negative expenditure shock hits the foreign economy
and drives foreign interest rates down to zero or, if unconstrained, into negative territory.42
The negative shock abroad, and the response of the foreign central bank thereto, leads to
spillovers to the small open economy which the domestic central bank may counter with
forward guidance, if desired.
The international transmission of shocks
The negative expenditure shock affects the foreign economy noticeably, as shown by figure
3.5. Aggregate demand, or gross domestic product, sharply drops and the central bank
responds with a deep cut in interest rates, to zero or below depending on whether the zero
lower bound binds. Interest rates remain at or below zero for approximately four periods.
Consumption and final good output rise amid lower interest rates, whereas hours worked
drops considerably with lower production. Lower interest rates lead to a depreciation of
the foreign exchange rate and terms of trade (variables omitted in the chart), despite an
increase in inflation, but these responses are virtually irrelevant for the de-facto closed
foreign economy. The zero lower bound exacerbates the negative impact on output and
hours worked, and mitigates the rise in consumption and final good production.
Figure 3.5: The expenditure shock abroad















































The figure depicts the response of the foreign economy (rest of the world) to a large negative expenditure
shock abroad. For a description of the variables and units see figure 3.1. Solid lines with empty (filled)
dots represent the case without (with) the zero lower bound.
Figure 3.6 shows how the expenditure shock abroad leads to pronounced, negative spillovers
to the domestic small open economy, irrespective of whether the zero lower bound holds
(filled dots) or not (empty dots). First and foremost, the appreciation of the domestic cur-
rency amid low interest rates abroad leads to a drop in external demand, gross domestic
42Technically, this corresponds to a shock to the foreign aggregate demand ỹ?t , specified in equation
(C.37), calibrated such that interest rates remain at the zero lower bound for four periods.
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product and (initially) in CPI inflation. Producer prices, instead, increase slightly. The
domestic central bank responds according to the policy rule and reduces interest rates
also to zero or, if unconstrained, into negative territory. Consumption profits from both
low interest rates and consumption abroad and rises considerably. Overall, the spillovers
appear rather harmful to the domestic economy. Interestingly, the zero lower bound –
binding in both economies – mitigates the spillovers somewhat; relatively higher interest
rates abroad lead to a less pronounced appreciation of the domestic currency. Fixed ex-
change rates are, in this case, akin to domestic constant interest rate forward guidance
(mirroring interest rates abroad), which is covered by the following forward guidance
analysis and hence omitted in this chart.
Figure 3.6: The international transmission of the foreign shock



























































































The figure depicts the response of a small open economy to a large negative expenditure shock abroad. For
a description of the variables and units see figure 3.1. Colors represent variables, patterns different cases.
Empty-dotted lines represent the case without the zero lower bound, solid-dotted lines the case with a zero
lower bound and, for comparison, thin dotted lines the case with fixed exchange rates.
So far, the foreign central bank merely followed its policy rule, constrained by the zero
lower bound or not, and refrained from using forward guidance. In reality, however,
various central banks of large (foreign) economies resorted to forward guidance themselves.
How do spillovers to the small open economy change if the foreign central bank decides
to run (calendar-based) constant-interest rate forward guidance? Figure 3.7 shows that
spillovers to the domestic economy worsen considerably.
The promise of low interest rates abroad leads to an amelioration of economic conditions
abroad (charts omitted); as expected for a de-facto closed economy. With sufficiently
long forward guidance, the drop in the output gap due to the expenditure shock decreases
and inflation rises, and even overshoots for longer forward guidance durations. This
response has two opposite effects on the domestic, small open economy: On the one
hand, exports of the small open economy profit from higher demand abroad, providing
additional demand for domestic goods. On the other hand, ceteris paribus lower interest
rates abroad lead to a (much more) pronounced appreciation of the domestic currency
and terms of trade, with well-known effects by now: Exports drop while imports rise,
leading to an overall negative contribution of demand from abroad, lower domestic GDP
and an initial disinflation. Overall, spillovers remain similar in their pattern, but get
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Figure 3.7: Exacerbating the spillovers: Foreign forward guidance














































The figure depicts the spillovers of constant interest-rate forward guidance abroad – in response to a large
negative expenditure shock abroad - to the domestic, small open economy. For a description of the
variables and units see figure 3.1. Filled dots represent the case with the zero lower bound but no forward
guidance. The dotted lines represent different durations of the constant interest-rate forward guidance
abroad, the line with the empty-dots highlights foreign forward guidance for seven periods.
considerably worse with foreign forward guidance.
Given qualitatively comparable spillovers, we henceforth continue with the no forward
guidance case to reduce complexity of charts and results.
How does forward guidance affect the international transmission of the shock?
The central bank of the small open economy responds to these spillovers and reverts to
the three forward guidance types specified in section 3.3.2. The first row in figure 3.8
depicts the impact of constant interest-rate forward guidance, the second row the impact
of lower than usual interest rates – applied through a temporarily higher inflation rate.
Figure 3.9 instead analyses the impact of a pre-announced temporary peg of the domestic
currency. In all cases, lines with filled dots represent the regular policy case, lines with
empty dots the case of seven periods and dotted lines other forward guidance durations.
The results are overall comparable to those of the previous part. Forward guidance based
on a constant-interest rate promise is both the most powerful but also most sensitive
type. A few periods of zero interest rates are already able to offset the appreciation
of the exchange rate and (at least partly) the drop in domestic output, seven periods
(line with empty dots) lead to a pronounced depreciation of the domestic currency and a
considerable overshooting of domestic production and inflation.
Raising the inflation target temporarily is again somewhat less effective but much more
stable due to the endogenous response of interest rates to economic conditions. Raising the
inflation target for a few periods already improves economic conditions such that interest
rates are positive and higher than in the case without forward guidance. The longer the
forward guidance, the earlier and higher interest rates rise. This type of forward guidance
thus (again) provides a cap on the overshooting of output gap and inflation, but does not
fully prevent the domestic currency from an appreciation.43 Overall, this type of forward
guidance remains effective and provides a hedge against an implausible overshooting of
output gap and inflation.
Last but not least, the domestic central bank promises to keep nominal exchange rates
43Different changes in the inflation target might change these results, as they imply even lower or
relatively higher interest rates. On the other hand, economic conditions should respond also differently
amid different interest rates. The net effect of different rises in the inflation target remains thus unclear.
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The figure depicts the effect of interest-based forward guidance of a small open economy in response to a
negative expenditure shock abroad. The central bank promises to temporarily keep interest rates at zero (first
row) or to temporarily raise the inflation target by approximately 4% (second row). For a description of the
variables and units see figure 3.1. The lines with filled dots represent the baseline scenario without forward
guidance, dotted lines represent different durations of forward guidance and the line with empty dots
highlights forward guidance for seven periods.
unchanged for an extended period in response to the spillovers from abroad. Figure 3.9
depicts the outcome on core variables. Due to the implementation of the peg through
interest rates, the domestic central bank mirrors interest rates from abroad while the tem-
porary peg lasts.44 Foremost, ceteris paribus lower interest rates lead to a less pronounced
appreciation of the domestic currency (though never completely offset the appreciation)
with positive effects on output and (initial) CPI inflation. The mirroring of foreign interest
rates also provides sort of a hedge against overshooting of domestic economic conditions
for longer durations, as domestic interest rates will simply mirror the normalization of
interest rates abroad after four periods (the duration the zero lower bound binds abroad).
Figure 3.9: A temporary peg and the international transmission of shocks














































The figure depicts the effect of a temporary peg in response to a negative expenditure shock abroad. The
central bank promises to keep nominal exchange rates unchanged for an extended period. For a description
of the variables and units see figure 3.1. The lines with filled dots represents the baseline without any peg
(but the zero lower bound), the dotted lines different durations of the peg, and the lines with empty dots
highlights a temporary peg for seven periods.
Overall, the message regarding forward guidance and the international transmission of
44See the discussion of figure 3.4 regarding the drop in interest rates towards the end of the temporary
peg. Foreign interest rates are bound by the zero lower bound for four periods and then gradually rise.
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shocks is clear: Forward guidance considerably affects the international transmission of
the foreign shock and is able to ameliorate economic conditions at home, if the duration
of forward guidance is chosen appropriately. First and foremost, domestic forward guid-
ance in any of the three types leads to (ceteris paribus) lower interest rates than in the
case without forward guidance and thereby reduces, offsets or even overcompensates the
appreciation of the domestic currency. This, in turn, reduces the negative impact of the
appreciation on domestic output gap through a drop in external demand and mitigates
or offsets the initial drop in CPI inflation.
3.5 Concluding remarks
This chapter evaluates the effectiveness of forward guidance in an open economy, in re-
sponse to either a large negative shock at home or abroad. The central bank of the
domestic economy may revert to three different types of forward guidance, two related
to interest rates, one to the (nominal) exchange rate. To conduct this analysis, we use
a stylized two-country DSGE model and adjust the relative size of the economies such
that the domestic economy resembles a small open economy, and measure the impact of
forward guidance by means of impulse response functions.
Forward guidance shows to be effective in both cases, either providing additional stimulus
if domestic interest rates are bound by the zero lower bound, or by offsetting spillovers
from the negative shock abroad. Among the three forward guidance types, low for longer
interest rates (a promise of zero interest rates for an extended period) is always the most
effective, but also most sensitive choice. A promise of lower interest rates, applied through
a more expansionary policy rule, is somewhat less effective – despite providing substantial
stimulus – but also much more stable in terms of overshooting of economic conditions.
This is a consequence of the endogenous response of interest rates; they are lower given
equal conditions. The third type, a temporary exchange rate peg modeled via a modified
policy rule, is qualitatively similar to the lower for longer type: somewhat less effective,
but more stable. The implementation of this type however leads to implausible interest
rate behavior for specific periods, strongly suggesting an explicit modeling of interventions
in order to provide a second instrument. The results for forward guidance with constant
interest rates are also consistent with those of Garcia-Cicco (2011).45
One major channel for the efficacy of forward guidance in an open economy is the exchange
rate, besides the ‘traditional’ interest rate channel as in closed economies (and thereby
inflation expectations): Ceteris paribus lower interest rates lead to a depreciation of, or
mitigate the appreciation of the domestic currency and thereby drag world demand to
the domestic economy. Domestic output gap and inflation in turn both rise. In the first
case of this chapter, forward guidance specifically offsets the initial appreciation of the
domestic currency that may occur once the zero lower bound binds, induced by a ‘perverse
response’ of relative prices. On the other hand, the international risk sharing condition
implied by complete international capital markets leads to a rather muted response of
45Garcia-Cicco (2011) states (e.g. page 77) that “keeping the rate at zero for a longer period significantly
reduces the problem originated by the zero bound, and if kept fixed long enough, it can even improve
the responses obtained when the policy rate is allowed to be negative.” The author also stresses the
importance of credibility, discussed below.
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consumption and final good output to lower interest rates in all cases, a finding that
constrasts somewhat with those for closed economies. In consequence, the question of
whether forward guidance is more or less effective in an open economy than in the closed
economy remains subject to further research.
As in the closed economy case of the second chapter, all results must be considered against
the deterministic framework applied in this chapter. A stochastic setup may change the
results and the interpretation thereof, not least the comparison of the three forward guid-
ance types: In a stochastic setup, all forward guidance types that enclose an endogenous
factor may provide a hedge against these shocks. Forward guidance based on constant
interest rates, instead, might either provide too much or too little accommodation.
Future work on forward guidance in an open economy should include the following issues.
First, any comparison of different specifications should cover a stochastic environment and
solution method. Second, the implementation of the temporary exchange rate peg strongly
calls for an explicit modeling of foreign exchange interventions to avoid implausible interest
rate behavior. Third, uncertainty or a lack of credibility about the end of the temporary
peg seems due to reduce the potential speculative aspect of such a pre-announced end for
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List of Unconventional Monetary
Policies Announcements
This appendix provides the announcements of unconventional monetary policies of the
four central banks for chapter 1, referred to as events. Table A.1 provides the events for
the Federal Reserve Board and the European Central Bank, table A.2 for the Bank of
England and Bank of Japan.
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Table A.1: Fed and ECB UMP programmes
Start End Programme Description
Federal Reserve Board
25.11.2008 31.03.2010 Large-scale asset purchases (LSAP 1) Purchases of MBS, agency-related securities
and longer-term Treasury securities up to a
total of $1.75 trillion
10.08.2010 30.06.2011 Large-scale asset purchases (LSAP 2) Additional purchases of longer-term
Treasury securities of $600 billion and
reinvestment of principal repayments of
LSAP1 purchases into longer-term Treasury
securities
09.08.2011 31.12.2012 Maturity extension programme (MEP,
Operation Twist) and calendar-based
Forward Guidance (FG)
Extension of the average maturity of FOMC
holdings of securities and calendar-based
forward guidance on policy rate path
13.09.2012 17.12.2013 Large-scale asset purchases (LSAP 3)
and threshold-based FG
Open-ended purchases of agency
mortgage-backed securities and longer-term
Treasury securities at a pace of $40 billion
and $45 billion, respectively, and
threshold-based forward guidance on policy
rate path
18.12.2013 31.10.2014 Tapering and threshold-based FG Step-wise phasing-out of asset purchases
(reduction of purchases by $10bn per
month)
European Central Bank
27.03.2008 01.04.2010 Extension of liquidity provision Allocation of liquidity through fixed-rate,
full-allotment tender and broadening of
eligible collateral basket
07.05.2009 30.06.2010 Covered bond purchase programme
(CBPP 1)
Purchases of EUR 60 billion of covered
bonds
10.05.2010 06.09.2012 Securities market programme (SMP) Sterilized purchases of sovereign debt
securities
10.05.2010 running Extension of liquidity provision Re-establishment of liquidity allocation
through fixed-rate, full-allotment tender
04.08.2011 01.03.2012 Extension of liquidity provision Extension of maturity of liquidity provision
operations (6m, 1y and 3y)
06.10.2011 31.10.2012 Covered bond purchase programme
(CBPP 2)
Additional purchases of EUR 40 billion of
covered bonds
06.09.2012 running Outright monetary transactions
(OMT)
Unlimited purchases of sovereign debt
securities
05.06.2014 running ”Draghi Swarm” Package of expansionary measures,
including 4y liquidity operation and
preparation for the purchase of asset-backed
securities (ABSPP) and other covered
bonds (CBPP3)
22.01.2015 running Public sector purchase programme
(PSPP)
Purchases of public sector securities
amounting to a total of EUR 60 billion per
month, including ABSPP and CBPP3
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Table A.2: BoE and BoJ UMP programmes
Start End Programme Description
Bank of England
19.01.2009 10.06.2011 Asset purchase programme (QE1) Purchases of private sector assets and
public sector bonds of 225 billion
06.10.2011 03.07.2013 Asset purchase programme (QE2) Additional purchases of private sector assets
and public sector bonds of 150 billion
13.07.2012 running Funding for lending (FLS) Scheme incentivizing bank lending to
households and businesses
04.07.2013 running Forward Guidance Threshold-based forward guidance on the
policy rate path
Bank of Japan
02.12.2008 31.03.2010 Liquidity provision: Special fund
supplying operations (SFSO)
Expansion of the range of corporate debt as
eligible collateral in liquidity operations
19.12.2008 31.12.2009 Asset purchase programme Annual purchases of government bonds and
commercial papers/corporate bonds of
Y21.6 trillion and Y3 trillion, respectively
01.04.2010 29.10.2012 Liquidity provision (FRO - replacing
SFSO)
Fixed-rate allotment of liquidity in 3m and
6m operations amounting to Y30 trillion
05.10.2010 03.04.2013 Asset purchase programme
(Comprehensive monetary easing -
CME)
Purchase of government securities,
commercial paper (CP), corporate bonds,
exchange-traded funds (ETFs), and Japan
real estate investment trusts (J-REITs), up
to a total amount of Y101 trillion
21.05.2011 running Growth supporting funding facility
(GSFF)
Scheme to support to fund-provisioning by
private financial institutions
30.10.2012 running Stimulating bank lending facility
(SBLF)
A fund-providing scheme to stimulate bank
lending
04.04.2013 running Quantitative and qualitative monetary
easing (QQME) and calendar-based
FG
Purchases of JGBs, ETFs and J-REITs
with the goal of increasing the monetary
base by approximately Y80 trillion annually
and intending to meet the 2 percent price
stability target over 2 years
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Appendix B
Baseline model for a closed economy
The closed economy model is a stylized DSGE model with quadratic price adjustment costs
à la Rotemberg (1996). The model features a representative household that decides upon
consumption, labour and inter-temporal bonds issued by the government. We exclude
investment, capital accumulation, or habit formation.
The economy contains two types of firms. Final good producers transform intermediary
goods into the final good according to a CES production function. Profits are zero due to
perfect compentition. Intermediary good producers transform labour, as the only input,
to intermediary goods according to known and symmetric technology. They operate under
monopolistic competition facing quadratic price adjustment costs, profits are distributed
to the owner: the household. Factor markets are perfectly competitive. The government
plays a limited role only: It runs a balanced budget with lump-sum transfers adjusted to
the issuance of new bonds and (exogenous fraction of output) government purchases.
The differences of Rotemberg and Calvo models are, for our case, twofold. First, upon lin-
earization (around a zero inflation steady state), the Rotemberg framework is equivalent
to the Calvo (1983) pricing framework, yet does not exhibit endogenous state variables
like price dispersion. This is convenient in our non-linear model; in Calvo set-ups, disper-
sion usually disappears upon linearization. Second, aggregate output generally does not
correspond to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the Rotemberg framework, due to the
(aggregate) price adjustment costs.
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B.1 Baseline model
B.1.1 Households
The representative household draws (dis-) utility for consumption and labour. The one-








where ϕ is a scaling term to ensure a specific steady-state hours level. The household
consumes ct, buys new real bonds bt, receives real labour income (after taxes) wt(1−τw,t)ht,
receives pay-off from bonds from t− 1, in real terms Rt−1bt−1/(πt), and receives transfers
from the government Tt and profits through Πt. This yields the following real budget
constraint (in terms of pt)
ct + bt = wt(1− τw,t)ht +
Rt−1bt−1
πt
+ Tt + Πt



















s.t. ct + bt = wt(1− τw,t)ht +
Rt−1bt−1
πt
+ Tt + Πt
The first order conditions of this optimization problem are (λt is the Lagrangian multiplier
for the budget constraint)
dtc
−σ
t = λt (B.1)
ϕdth
ν








ct + bt = wt(1− τw,t)ht +
Rt−1bt−1
πt
+ Tt + Πt (B.4)
B.1.2 Final good producers
Final good producers choose their inputs, intermediate goods yt(j), in order to maxi-
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and profits Πt ≡ ptyt −
∫ 1
0
pt(j)yt(j)dj). The first order condition of this maximization

















B.1.3 Intermediate good producers
The intermediary good producers use labour as (the only) input and produce their inter-
mediary good variety yt(j) with a linear production function. Productivity at is common
to all producers
yt(j) = atht(j) (B.8)
The producers determine their optimal quantity (or the optimal price that leads to this
quantity) in two steps: First, they minimize costs given a certain level of production, i.e.
derive the optimal level of labour input, then maximize profits by choosing the appropriate
price. Note that we assume complete labour markets, thus wages are equal for all firms
(wt(j) = wt), and that firms take aggregate variables (such as prices or output) as given.
In the following, we already propose market clearing for the intermediary good.
Step 1: Cost minimization (real marginal costs)
First, intermediaries minimize nominal costs wtptht(j) such that the production/supply
(B.8) of the intermediary good producer satisfies demand (B.6) from the final good pro-
ducers. Formally, intermediary good producers minimize
min
ht(j)






The corresponding Lagrangian adds a multiplier ψt(j) to the restriction, which represents
nominal marginal costs. The two first order conditions of this maximization problem are
∂L
∂ht(j)
: 0 = wtpt − ψt(j)at
∂L
∂ψt(j)






With equal wages and technology across firms, so are nominal marginal costs (ψt(j) =
ψt). In the following, we replace nominal with a definition for real marginal costs mct.
Although we will see that optimal prices are equal across firms, c.f. step 2, they are not
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Step 2: Profit maximization (optimal price setting)
Second, the intermediaries maximize profits. In this model, the firms face quadratic real











The firms receive nominal revenues pt(j)yt(j), face nominal total costs ptmctyt(j) and
(total) nominal adjustment costs κt(j)ptyt. (Nominal) profits of firm j then are
Πt(j) = pt(j)yt(j)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Earnings



















where the firms, owned by the household, use the (stochastic) nominal discount factor

























































The (marginal) demand with respect to a particular price pt(j) is, from equation (B.6)
∂yt(j)
∂pt(j)
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and the first order condition above turns into an equation where the only firm-specific
variable is the (optimal) price pt(j), and hence all optimal prices will be equal.
1 Using









Using the partial demand expression above, replacing all pt(j) with pt, cancelling out all
possible price terms, dividing by yt and using the definition for inflation (πt ≡ ptpt−1 ) yields















































































B.1.4 Government and central bank
Government expenditures are (assumed) a (stochastic) fraction ηt of aggregate output yt
gt ≡ ηtyt (B.14)
We assume a government that runs a balanced (real terms) budget each period. It faces
real expenditures gt, proportionally linked to aggregate output yt, receives (real) labour
income taxes τw,thtwt, pays back its old bonds with interests Rt−1dt−1/πt, and issues new















The central bank follows a standard Taylor rule for its desired interest rate Zt, considering
inflation and output gap based on Gross Domestic Product.2 Once we apply forward
1Note that this is the main implication and thus difference of the Rotemberg (1982) model: all firms
adjust, and all firms adjust to their optimal level.
2The latter differs from final good production yt in the Rotemberg model, and will be defined further
below.
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guidance, we relax this interest rate setting behavior. The interest rate set by the central













Rt = max{1, Zt} (B.17)
B.1.5 Gross domestic product
In the Rotemberg set-up, aggregate output yt does not correspond to the Gross Domestic
Product (GDP): The (aggregate) price adjustment costs create a ‘wedge’ between output
and GDP. We thus define GDP as
ỹt ≡ ct + gt = (1− κt)yt (B.18)
Note that our model does nit inherit investments and, since it is a closed economy, there
are no exports or imports either.
B.1.6 Aggregation and market clearing
Market clearing
We have four markets to clear: (a continuum of) intermediary good markets, the final
good market, the labour market, and the bond market.
• We already used the market clearing condition for the intermediary good to derive
the optimal price setting equation (B.13) and individual labour demand (B.10).





• Bond markets clear if government issued bonds equal household’s bonds (there is
no foreign country to exchange bonds with)
bt = dt (B.19)
• Final good market clears if production equals the (aggregate) consumption of the
household and government, and aggregated (real) adjustment costs
yt ≥ ct + gt +
∫ 1
0











Using the intermediary good producers’ production function (B.10) (and equal prices
pt(j) = pt), we get the aggregate labour demand from the labour market clearing condi-
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tion3












Final good market clearing can be rewritten, using equal prices and the definition for
inflation, to get the aggregate resource constraint
yt = ct + gt +
γ
2
(πt − 1)2 yt = ct + ηtyt + κtyt (B.21)
which can be re-written as
ct = yt (1− ηt − κt)
Aggregate resource constraint / budget constraints
According to Walras’ law, we know that one (market clearing) condition is redundant. In
our case, this corresponds to the aggregate resource constraint (B.21) derived above. We
derive this condition alternatively, by using the budget constraints of the household and
the government, profits and taxes.


















= yt −mctyt − κtyt
Take the budget constraint of the household (B.4), plug in aggregate real profits and
the government budget constraint (solved for transfers Tt), use aggregate labour demand
(B.20) and real marginal costs (B.9) to get the alternative (and identical) aggregate re-
source constraint
ct + bt = wt(1− τw,t)ht +
Rt−1bt−1
πt
+ Tt + Πt









+ (yt −mctyt − κtyt)
ct = wtht − gt + yt −mctyt − κtyt
ct = gt + yt − κtyt (B.22)
B.1.7 Equilibrium conditions
From the household, we have three optimality conditions left, (B.1), (B.2), and (B.3),
while the budget constraint (B.4) entered the aggregate resource constraint (B.22). The
3Note that in the Calvo set-up, this equation does not hold anymore, as price dispersion leads to
inefficiency. In the Calvo setup, we (often) get three equations for optimal pricing; one recursive formula
and two ‘auxiliary’ equations. In the Rotemberg set-up, we only require pricing equation (B.13). The
Rotemberg ‘friction’, price adjustment costs, will become apparent below in the distinction of yt and ỹt.
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optimality conditions from the final good producing firm, demand for intermediary goods
(B.6) and the price index (B.7), entered other equations and thus do not longer represent
equilibrium conditions. From the intermediary good producing firm, we have marginal
costs (B.9), aggregate labour demand (B.10), and optimal price setting (B.13). From the
government, we still require the definitions of government expenditures (B.14), while we
used its budget constraint (B.15) to derive the aggregate resource constraint (B.22). The
central bank provides the Taylor rule and the (zero) lower bound equation, (B.16) and
(B.17) The aggregation led to the aggregate resource constraint (B.22), the definition of
Gross Domestic Product (B.18) and (the definition for) aggregate price adjustment costs
(B.11) (which have shown to be equal across firms).
In sum, we have the following 12 equations and 12 (endogenous) variables.
• Households equations (B.1), (B.2), (B.3)
Final firm none
Intermediary firm (B.10), (B.9), (B.13)
Government (B.14)
Definition of price adjustment costs (B.11)
Taylor rule and ZLB (B.16), (B.17)
Definition of GDP (B.18)
Aggregate resource constraint (B.22)
• Endogenous variables ct, ht, λt, Rt, Zt, wt, πt mct, κt, yt, gt, ỹt
• Exogenous variables dt+1, ηt, at, τw,t
In addition, we need to specify a process for each exogenous variable. Productivity enters
the production function linearly. Hence, we need to ensure that production cannot get
zero due to productivity. Similarly for the stochastic discount shock (one in steady state














with variance parameters σa, σd, ση, and στ .
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B.2 Steady state
The Taylor rule (B.16) requires – assuming that we are in the ‘good’ steady state (R = Z)
– that inflation returns to its steady state value (inflation target) π = π? such that the
rule holds.






κ = γ/2 (π? − 1)2 (B.28)








(π? − 1)π? (1− βd) (B.29)
w = mc a (B.30)









= 1− η − κ ỹ
y
= 1− κ















→ yν+σ = a
νw(1− τw)
ϕ (1− η − κ)σ








Given y, we can derive the other variables using the ratios again
h = y/a (B.32)
g = η y (B.33)
c = y(1− η − κ) (B.34)
ỹ = c+ g = y(1− κ) (B.35)
The preference parameter ϕ on labour is often implemented (and set) to scale down





= h = y/a =
[
aνw(1− τw)
ϕ (1− η − κ)σ
] 1
ν+σ
/a → ϕ =
[a
3
]ν+σ (1− η − κ)σ
aνw(1− τw)
(B.36)
Last but not least, the steady-state value for the Lagrangian multiplier gets
λ = c−σ (B.37)
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B.3 Calibration
We calibrate the model as following. Certain parameters may matter substantially for
forward guidance, such as the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, and we provide
somewhat more detail on these choices. Others, in contrast, matter less and we rely on
standard parameters.
• Intertemporal elasticity of substitution
We implicitly use log-utility and set the (inverse) intertemporal elasticity of substi-
tution to σ = 1. In doing so, we follow Braun et al. (2013) or Fernández-Villaverde
et al. (2015). Note that Levin et al. (2010) and Nakov (2008) analysis a wide range
of values for σ, Nakov e.g. considers values from 1/6 to 6. Generally, a lower σ
generally reduces the responsiveness of forward guidance.
• (Inverse) elasticity of labor supply
The value for the (inverse) elasticity of labor supply ν often ranges from 0.1 to 1.
We set ν = 0.2 and are thus quite close to Braun et al. (2013).
• Discount factor
The discount factor β determines the steady-state level of the real interest rate. We
set it to β = 0.994, such that real interest rate equals roughly 2.5% in annualized
terms.
• Elasticity of substitution between intermediary goods
The range of values for the elasticity of substitution values often varies between six
and ten. We set this value to ε = 6.
• Price adjustment costs
We set the price adjustment parameter to a hundred, γ = 100
• Government expenditure share and taxes
We set both taxes and government consumption share to 20%, η = 0.2 and τw = 0.2
• Monetary policy parameters
We set the Taylor rule coefficients to standard values: φπ = 1.5 and φπ = 0.5. In
the baseline simulations, we set inertia to zero, i.e. ρr = 0. The inflation target is
set to 2% in annualized terms, i.e. π? = 1.005 (gross inflation)
• Steady-state hours worked
We set the weight on labour disutility ϕ such that the steady-state hours equal
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Baseline model for an open economy
The two economies are symmetric in terms of most functions, preferences and parameters.
We denote foreign variables with a ? and, wherever applicable, domestic goods (also
inflation) with a h and foreign goods with a f . This yields, for instance, p?h as the foreign
price (in foreign currency) for domestically produced goods. For the sake of readability,
we provide the derivation of the equations for the domestic economy, but only the final
equations for the foreign economy.
Note, foremost, that the economies are similar in most things, but may possess differ-
ent population sizes n, following, for instance, De Paoli (2009). Technically, n is the
fraction of [0, 1] that lives in the domestic economy, and (1 − n) the fraction that lives
in the foreign economy. A single household gets the suffix (j), aggregate variables are
corresponding variables without. This size variable creates a ‘wedge’ between aggregate,
per-capita and individual variables; aggregation will matter considerably, but allows us to
contemporaneously asses the small open economy (n → 0) and the large open economy
case (n ≈ 1/2).
The economy consists of three types of firms: final good producer(s), retailed/imported
good producer(s) and intermediary good producers. The first two operate under per-
fect competition and thus could easily be replaced by a corresponding CES consumption
bundle function for the household. The intermediary good producers operate under mo-
nopolistic competition. The law of one price holds at the individual level. In other words,
the producer chooses one price and both the domestic and foreign buyer pay in the pro-
ducers’ currency, without any price discrimination – also referred to as producer currency
pricing (PCP). Home bias in the composition of the final good, however, implies that
the law of one price only holds at a lower level: for individual intermediary goods and
retailed or imported good bundles. At the final good level, home bias implies that the
pass-through is incomplete, deviations thereof are captured by the real exchange rate.
The production function of the intermediary good producers is linear, with common and
known technology and labour as the only input. There is no capital and thus no invest-
ment in this model. Different to the majority of DSGE models, the (intermediary) good
producers face price adjustment costs á la Rotemberg (1982) and no pricing lottery à
la Calvo (1983). The price adjustment costs are, however, indexed to past and steady-
state or target inflation, following Ascari and Rossi (2012), in order to provide a better
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comparison with any Calvo model (at least from a theoretical point of view).1
Ricardian equivalence holds, the government’s role is thus very limited. Lump-sum trans-
fers offset wage taxes and government expenditures in each period, the government is not
allowed to issue bonds. This simplifies the bond handling considerably without loosing
too much intuition. In the baseline model, the central bank follows a standard Taylor
rule.
1The authors conclude that, despite common understanding, the two modeling approaches face con-
siderable differences if steady-state inflation is not zero. With full indexation, however, “the two models
are again equivalent as in the case of no trend inflation”.
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C.1 Baseline model
C.1.1 Definitions and aggregates
In this introductory section, we define several variables that will simplify the formal
language below (and, formally, also replace the variables they are based upon). A first
set of variables concerns inflation variables that will replace (changes in) price variables.














Another variable the real exchange rate qt that relates the nominal exchange rate et with







In standard models with unity size of economies, aggregated, per-capita and individual
variables are (mostly) identical, at least under symmetry. In our case, however, the size
of the economies may differ from one (determined by the parameter for the relative size









ct(j)dj = (1− n)ct(j) (C.3)
where the second step follows by symmetry. Obviously, aggregates approach zero for the
small open economy case (n→ 0), which complicates the interpretation and comparison














c?t (j)dj = c
?
t (j) (C.4)
Henceforth, we rely on per-capita figures unless stated otherwise.
C.1.2 Households
Each individual household j draws (dis-) utility from consumption and labour. The one-








where ψ is a scaling term to allow for a specific steady-state hours level.
The consumption ct stems from the (non-tradable) final good, acquired at price pt from
the domestic final good producer. In addition, the household may buy (or sell) nominal
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domestic Bt(j) and foreign bonds Ft(j). Prices of these bonds at t are one, the payoff de-
termined by corresponding interest rates. The household receives nominal labour income
(after taxes), Wt(1− τw,t)ht(j) from providing its labour supply ht(j) to the domestic in-
termediary good producers, receives nominal pay-off from t−1 domestic and foreign bond
holdings, Rt−1Bt−1(j) and R
?
t−1Ft−1(j), nominal transfers from the government Tt(j) and
nominal profits Πnt (j) from domestic intermediary good producers. Note that bond prices
and dividends are denominated in local currencies and the household needs to transfer
those via the nominal exchange rate et (price of foreign in local currency). Otherwise, we
assume perfect international capital markets, i.e. all households have access to all bonds.
















+ Tt(j) + Π
n
t (j)
To derive the real budget constraint, we define real terms of wages, bonds, taxes and
profits as wt ≡ Wt/pt, bt ≡ Bt/t, ft ≡ Ft/p?t , τt ≡ Tt/pt and Πt ≡ Πnt /pt and use the
definitions for CPI inflation (C.1) and the real exchange rate (C.2).






+ τt(j) + Πt(j)
Optimization of individual households



























+ τt(j) + Πt(j)
where dt is a preference shock that may affect the households’ discount factor β. The first
order conditions with respect to consumption, labour, domestic and foreign bonds are
dtct(j)
−σ = λt(j) d
?
t+1ct(j)
?,−σ = λ?t (j) (C.5)
ψdtht(j)
ν = λt(j)wt(1− τw,t) ψd?t+1h
?,s
t (j)
ν = λ?t (j)w
?































Last but not least, the Lagrangian multipliers λt(j) and λ
?
t (j) impose the real budget
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constraints as additional conditions











b?t (j) + f
?
t (j) = w
?













+ τ ?t (j) + Π
?
t (j) (C.10)
Households’ aggregated optimality conditions
Per-capita first order conditions for households with respect to consumption and labour
are straightforward (and identical), given symmetry
dtc
−σ















t (1− τ ?w,t) (C.12)































and the per-capita budget constraints2



























Note how these conditions could change if we used aggregate variables, for instance for
the aggregate optimal consumption decision for domestic households
dtct(j)








→ dtn1+σ ĉ−σt = λ̂t
In this case, the relative size parameter does not cancel out.
2In most models, a set of specific assumptions, among which Ricardian equivalence and perfect capital
markets, makes the the households’ budget constraint redundant. This also holds in our case. For the
sake of completeness, we carry on this equation and show that they are indeed redundant once we can
refer to the government’s budget constraint, profits and market clearing, see section (C.1.9).
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C.1.3 Final good producers
The (domestic) final good producer combines domestic and foreign inputs xh,t and xf,t to
a final good yt, purchased by the household at price pt. The final good producer takes the
input prices ph,t and pf,t, in local currency, as given. We assume a continuum of identical
firms under perfect competition, hence profits are zero, but simplify by referring to one
representative firm. The foreign firm is symmetric in the general set-up while preferences

































The parameter v consists of two parameters and conforms two assumptions, following e.g.
De Paoli (2009): First, it shall allow for home bias (α), a preference for home goods vs.
foreign goods (home bias occurs if α < 1). Second, it shall allow us to implement the fact
that the foreign country – representing the rest of the world – only consumes foreign goods
if n → 0, but that the smaller economy always consumes foreign goods. The following
table shows the specifications that satisfy these two assumptions
Household Goods Definition Case n ≈ 1/2 Case n→ 0
Domestic Domestic v = 1− (1− n)α v = 1− 1
2
α v = 1− α
Foreign 1− v ≡ (1− n)α 1− v = 1
2
α 1− v = α
Foreign Domestic v? ≡ nα v? = 1
2
α v? = 0
Foreign 1− v? = 1− nα 1− v? = 1− 1
2
α 1− v? = 1
Profit maximization


















− ph,txh,t + pf,txf,t
The first order conditions with respect to inputs xh,t and xf,t yield the two demand




























and, with the zero profit condition (earnings minus expenditures for inputs)













we also retrieve the prices of the final good
pt =
(
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Aggregated equilibrium conditions
With the assumption of a representative firm, we face no aggregation (issues) at this stage.
The individual conditions correspond to the per-capita conditions.
C.1.4 Retailers and importers
The goods consumed by the final good producers are gathered, bundled and sold by two
sorts of retailers facing perfect competition and zero profits: domestic retailers (which
buy, bundle and sell local intermediary goods and sell to the local final good producer)
and importers (which buy, bundle and sell foreign intermediary goods to the local final
good producer).3 For the sake of simplicity, we again refer to one representative firm only,






















































To simplify reading, we already impose market clearing of retailed and imported good
(xh,t = yh,t and similarly for the others), and use only xh,t henceforth.
Retailers
The retailer maximizes profits with respect to all inputs, xh,t(j), subject to a certain level



















For each input, we get one first order condition that corresponds to the demand function
for this particular intermediary good. Solving for variety j yields (using the production





























3This step could easily be covered by the households themselves (utility derived from a CES con-
sumption bundle) or an extended final good producer that relies upon two inputs with a CES production
function (and cost minimization).
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The importer maximizes profits with respect to all inputs, xf,t(j), subject to a certain



















For each input, we get one first order condition that corresponds to the demand function
for this particular intermediary good. Solving for variety j yields (using the production
function), using aggregates on the first and per-capita figures on the second row. Note


























































These equilibrium conditions will enter the optimality conditions of the intermediary good
producers (following section). In consequence, there is no need to provide aggregated
equilibrium conditions.
C.1.5 Intermediate good producers
The intermediary good producers, a continuum of firms with mass identical to that of
the households, convert labour (as the only input, bought from the households) to inter-
mediary goods (sold to domestic and foreign retailers) and operate under monopolistic
competition. Technology is identical and known across firms, but not necessarily across
countries.
ỹt(j) = atht(j) ỹ
?
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According to the Rotemberg framework, the intermediary good producers face quadratic
(real) price adjustment costs κt(j). These price adjustment costs are measured in units
of yt, following Braun et al. (2013), i.e. total (real) price adjustment costs per firm are
κt(j)yt. In addition, the price adjustment costs are indexed to past (and steady state
or target) inflation to ensure a better comparability with Calvo models. The parameter
χ represents the degree of price indexation (full indexation if χ = 1) and µ the type
of indexation ‘usually employed in the Calvo literature’ (quote from Ascari and Rossi
(2012)). See the introduction of this appendix for additional information. To simplify




















































The firms decide in two steps: First, they minimize costs given a certain level of produc-
tion, then maximize profits by choosing the appropriate price. Beforehand, we define how
firms set prices abroad (pass-through) and derive the total demand that each firm faces.
Pricing, law of one price and total demand
Cross-border pricing for individual goods is assumed to follow the law of one price (first
row of equations below). This pricing implies that the price levels of retailed and imported
goods also follow the law of one price and simplify (second row, plug equations (C.27) into
(C.22) and (C.24) and extract the exchange rate et from the integral). Note, however,
that the law of one price will not hold at the final good level due to home bias. The real

















The demand functions of the importers also simplify under the assumptions of the law of



































Total (per-capita) demand for an intermediary good consists of the demand from the local
retailer and the importer abroad (plug equations (C.21) and (C.29) into the definition
121
C.1. Baseline model Appendix C. Baseline model for an open economy
below)






















Note the implications of the relative size of the economy: As the size of the domestic
economy approaches zero (small open economy), the contribution of the domestic economy





Optimization step 1: Cost minimization
Intermediary good producers minimize nominal costs such that the production/supply of
the intermediary good (C.25) satisfies a specific (total) demand from the local retailers
and importers abroad (C.30). Formally, this corresponds to
min
ht(j)
wtptht(j) s.t. atht(j) = ỹt(j) ≥ xth,t(j)
The corresponding Lagrangian adds a multiplier ψt(j) to the restriction, which represents
nominal marginal costs. The two first order conditions of this maximization problem are
∂L
∂hdt (j)
: 0 = wtpt − ψt(j)at
∂L
∂ψt(j)
: 0 = atht(j)− ỹt(j)
Nominal marginal costs ψt(j) are thus equal given that wages and technology are equal
across firms (ψt(j) = ψt). In the following, we replace nominal marginal costs with a
definition for real marginal costs (mct). The two equilibrium conditions from the first






























t (j) = ỹ
?
t (j) (C.32)
Optimization step 2: Profit maximization (optimal price settings)
The firms receive revenues from selling their good (produced amount set such that it
simply serves demand (C.30)), face (nominal) costs from buying labour (C.31) and face
4If we would work with a continuum of households that purchase intermediary goods directly (which
is quite common given the no profits condition of retailers and final good producers), we would need to
integrate over the mass of households, which is n for domestic households and 1−n for foreign households.
The results would be identical.
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price adjustment costs according to (C.26). Nominal (per-capita) profits per period then
get











The firms maximize nominal discounted profits Πnt+s(j) with respect to ph,t(j), discounting
future expected profits according to the (stochastic) discount factor (Λc,t,t+s) from their


















































































and the first order condition above turns into an equation where the only firm-specific
variable is the (optimal) price ph,t(j), and hence all optimal prices will be equal.
5
ph,t(j) = ph,t(i) ∀j, i (C.34)
and the price indices for the retailed (C.22) and imported goods (C.24) simplify to





which, in turn, also simplifies total demand for intermediary goods (C.30) by replacing





















5Note that this is the main implication of the Rotemberg (1982) model: all firms adjust, and all firms
adjust to their optimal level. In the Calvo (1983) framework, only a fraction can re-optimize prices, thus
price dispersion leads to inefficiencies.
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Aggregated equilibrium conditions
In the open economy, (aggregate) per-capita domestic production (to be denoted as ỹt) is
often different to the per-capita production of the final good (yt). We define per-capita
































which can be simplified to (exploiting symmetry of output, given symmetry of prices
(C.34))











In order to achieve a simple way to simulate shocks to foreign (and/or domestic) demand,

















Using the definition for (PPI) inflation (C.1) and per-capita output of domestically pro-
duced goods (C.37), we can simplify the optimal price setting equation from the previous
paragraph (or, phrased differently, an expression for marginal costs). All variables are
already per-capita
0 = (1− ε)ph,t
pt




















































Similarly, per-capita labour demand from (C.32) yields







Per-capita adjustment costs are also straightforward given equal choices across firms and



























t − w?th?t − κ?ty?t (C.41)
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C.1.6 GDP and international relations
Gross domestic product
It seems worth pointing out the economic relevance of the aggregate (domestic, and per-
capita) production: it also corresponds to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Another
way to derive this expression is by using the aggregate resource constraint (C.52) from the
market clearing section below and the zero-profit condition (C.19). Start with multiplying
(C.37) with domestic PPI, then plug in (C.19) and then (C.52)

















h,t − pf,txf,t (C.42)
and we get the common definition of GDP in an open economy: Domestic expenditures
– such as consumption, government, price adjustment costs (we do not carry investments
in this model) – plus exports minus imports, all in domestic currency. The term with
the relative size parameter n (only) arises due to per-capita terms; we could multiply the
equation by n and replace terms with aggregate terms.
International risk sharing
Combining the optimal bond holdings of the domestic household for foreign bonds and of























This holds in each period, iterating backwards yields (in the last step, assume identical





















Finally, we got the international risk sharing condition in terms of λt. To get the common
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Uncovered interest rate parity
Combining the optimality conditions of the domestic household for domestic bonds and






















This is the uncovered interest rate parity in real terms. For nominal terms, recall and in-
sert the definition of the real exchange rate (C.2) (even better, the following stationarized







Home bias vs law of one price
Due to home bias α, covered through the elasticity of substitution between domestic and
foreign goods v, the law of one price does hold at the intermediary and retailed/imported
good level, but not at the final good (or CPI) level. The law of one price at the CPI































= (v − v?)p1−θh,t + (v
? − v) e1−θt p
?,1−θ
f,t
In the special case of v = v?, the law of one price also holds at final good (CPI) level.
Otherwise, it will generally not be the case, i.e. pt 6= etp?t . This condition is fulfilled if
1− (1− n)α = nα, or α ≡ 1, which corresponds to no home bias. The real exchange rate
(C.2) captures deviations from the law of one price.
Terms of trade

















We can re-write various conditions as a function of the terms of trade, such as the relative
prices, based on final good price equations (C.20). Technically, these are no (additional)
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C.1.7 Government and central bank
Government expenditures are assumed to be a fraction ηt of the (per-capita) final good
production yt We assume a government that runs a balanced (real terms) budget each
period. It faces real expenditures gt that are (stochastic but) proportional to the (per-
capita) final good production yt, and receives (real) labour income taxes τw,thtwt. Finally,
it provides transfers τt to households. The real government budget constraints get
gt ≡ ηtyt g?t ≡ η?t y?t (C.48)
τt = wtτw,tht − gt τ ?t = w?t τ ?w,th?t − g?t (C.49)
In our baseline model, the central bank follows a standard Taylor rule for its desired
interest rate Zt, considering inflation and output gap. This rule will be relaxed – at
least temporarily – once forward guidance or any other unconventional measure gets
























Rt = max{1, Zt} R?t = max{1, Z?t } (C.51)
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C.1.8 Market clearing
Market clearing occurs in six different types of markets: labour, final good, retailed
and imported goods, intermediary goods and international (domestic and foreign) bond
markets.
Labour markets are already cleared by denoting all labour variables as ht and, implicitly,






Final good markets clear if the production yt equals demand, which consists of consump-
tion ct, government expenditures gt and the price adjustment costs κtyt. This condition
is often also referred to as the aggregate resource constraint.











Market clearing of retailed and imported goods has already been applied by replacing
yh,t with xh,t, and equally for the other three markets, and does not impose additional
conditions.
Market clearing for intermediary goods has also already been imposed while deriving the
marginal (total) demand for intermediary goods, and referring to yt(j) instead as xh,t(j)
or similar. Hence there are no additional conditions.
Finally, bond markets clear if
b̃t + b̃
?
t = 0 ↔ bt +
1− n
n
b?t = 0 f̃t + f̃
?





t = 0 (C.53)
C.1.9 Redundancy of budget constraint equations
Under a specific set of assumptions, such as Ricardian equivalence, various equations are
irrelevant for the equilibrium. This commonly includes the budget constraints from the
household and the government, profits and taxes.6
Start with the budget constraint (C.15) and replace profits Πt with (C.41) and taxes/transfers
τt with (C.49), cancel out labour terms, then use the aggregate resource constraint (C.52),
6In a two-country model, there always have to be a buyer and a seller in a bilateral market. For
instance, the imports of one economy are the exports of the other, and vice versa. The constraint of
one economy thus always also affects the other economy. This can be different in a standard small open
economy where the rest-of-the-world is purely exogenous.
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government expenditures (C.48)) and aggregate production/output (C.39).











htat − wtht − κtyt
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Proceed with applying the market clearing for bonds (C.53) to the second, foreign equa-

































































































































Finally, using the law of one price (C.28) combined with the (definition of the) real
exchange rate (C.2), all terms cancel out.
C.1.10 Stationary equilibrium conditions
In our model, growth is absent. However, amid a positive inflation target, all prices are
non-stationary. In order to achieve stationary equations, we will use the definitions for
CPI and PPI inflation from (C.1), if not already used before, and we additionally define
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With relative prices replacing ph,t and similar, we retrieve the following expressions for












































































The equations for the households already satisfy stationarity. The demand functions of
















and the price levels of the final goods get (divide by pt)
1 =
(

































Optimal price setting equations (C.38) change slightly to (also using aggregate demand
(C.37))




(πh,t+1 − 1) πh,t+1yt+1
]



















The following conditions represent an equilibrium (38 equations)
• Households (7 equations)
Optimal consumption (C.11)
Labour supply (C.12)
Optimal bond holdings / Euler equations (C.13) and (C.14)
International risk sharing (C.43)
130
Appendix C. Baseline model for an open economy C.1. Baseline model
• Final, retailed and imported good firms (8 equations)
Demand for retailed and imported goods (C.58) and (C.59)
Price of final good (C.60)
Price of imported good (under LOP) (C.61)
• Intermediary good firms (10 equations)
Optimal price setting (C.62)
Aggregate demand/production / Gross domestic product (C.37)
Labour demand (C.39)
Marginal costs (C.31)
Price adjustment costs (C.40)
• Government (6 equations)
Expenditures (C.48)
Taylor rule (C.50)
Zero lower bound (C.51)
• Market clearing (2 equations)
Aggregate resource constraint (C.52)
• Definitions (5 equations)
Real exchange rate (C.57)
PPI inflation (C.55)
Terms of trade (C.45)
with the following endogenous variables (38 variables)







Final goods yt, y
?
t





Government expenditures gt, g
?
t
Gross domestic product ỹt, ỹ
?
t
• Prices and financial variables (12 variables)





(CPI) inflation πt, π
?
t
(PPI) inflation πh,t, π
?
f,t
Interest rates (set and desired) Rt, R
?
t , Zt, Z
?
t
• Costs, wages etc. (8 variables)






Marginal costs mct, mc
?
t
Langrangian multiplier λt, λ
?
t
• International variables (4 variables)
Exchange rate qt, ∆et
Terms of trade st, s
?
t
In addition, we need to specify a process for each exogenous variable. Productivity enters
the production function linearly. Hence, we need to ensure that production cannot get
zero due to productivity. Similarly for the stochastic discount shock (one in steady state
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with standard deviations σa, σd, ση, στ , and σζ (and AR-terms ρ).
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C.2 Steady state
Inflation-based steady-state variables
The Taylor rules (C.50) and the zero lower bound conditions (C.51) imply – under the
assumption that we return to the ‘good’ steady state – that inflation returns to its steady
state value (inflation target) such that the rule holds.
π = πt π? = πt? (C.68)
π = πt π? = πt? (C.69)
while the definition of PPI inflation (C.55) implies that PPI and CPI inflation are identical
in steady state




In combination with the real exchange rate (C.57), we get symmetric inflation across
borders
π = π? =⇒ πh = π = πt = πt? = π? = π?f (C.71)
Using π = πt in the steady-state expressions of the Euler equations (C.13) and (C.14)

















Given steady-state inflation (C.69), price adjustment costs (C.73) and government expen-
ditures (exogenous process), consumption amounts to a constant fraction of final good
output
y = c+ κy + ηy ⇐⇒ c = (1− κ− η)y
y? = c? + κ?y? + η?y?y ⇐⇒ c? = (1− κ? − η?)y? (C.74)
Symmetry of economies
Gali and Monacelli (2005) analytically show that under identical preferences, output is
symmetric and real exchange rate and terms of trade equal one in steady-state. In this
sub-section, we briefly re-confirm this finding (in the non-linearized case), then exploit
it in the next section. Note that the Rotemberg (1982) framework (also) has slightly
different implications, in particular with respect to price-setting. The aim of this section
is to express everything as a function of the terms of trade, then show that this function
holds only if terms of trade equal one.
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Foremost, recall that both, the terms-of-trade functions for retailed and imported good
prices (C.46) and the real exchange rate (C.47), are (already) functions of the terms of
trades
g(s) = p̃−1h h(s) = p̃
−1
f g












We proceed with deriving two expressions for the ratio of domestic vs foreign aggregate
output/production ỹ, once derived from total labour demand and once from the demand
for goods.
• Combine optimal consumption (C.11) with labour supply (C.12), then replace labour
supply with labour demand (C.39) and wages with marginal costs (C.31) and solve
for aggregate demand/production





cσ = mc a(1− τw)
which yields, under the assumption of identical steady-state values and preferences
for technology (a = a?), taxes τw = τ
?




































• The demand functions for retailed and imported goods (C.59) and (C.58) and ag-
gregate demand/output (C.37) get







(1− v)p̃−θf y + (1− v
?)p̃?,−θf y
?














Next, we derive the remaining expressions of the previous two ratios that are not directly
related to terms of trade yet: marginal costs, consumption, aggregate demand/output vs
final good output and final good output ratios.
• The optimal pricing equations (C.62) for marginal costs simplify to, in the steady
state
0 = (1− ε)p̃hỹ + εmcỹ − γ (π − 1)πy + γβ (π − 1) πy
0 = (1− ε)p̃?f ỹ? + εmc?ỹ? − γ (π? − 1) π?y? + γβ (π? − 1) π?y?
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g(s)−1 + (1− β)γ
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h?(s)−1 + (1− β)γ
ε
(π − 1)π y?
ỹ?
• Aggregate demand/output (C.37) and the demand functions for retailed and im-






























• The aggregate resource constraint (C.74) and the international risk sharing condition
(C.43) yield, using symmetry across countries, κ = κ? from (C.73), η = η? and























































Replacing the corresponding terms in the labour-sided expression of the aggregate de-























g(s)−1 + (1− β)γ
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and replacing the corresponding terms in the demand-sided expression of the aggregate
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Next, recall (the definitions of) home bias from section C.1.9: v = 1− (1− n)α, 1− v =
(1 − n)α, v? = nα and 1 − v? = 1 − nα. Insert these expressions into the second ratio.

















=⇒ (1− α + nα) + (α− nα)
nα + (1− nα)
= 1
Hence, if terms of trade equal one, all terms-of-trade-functions disappear, all home bias
terms cancel out and we have symmetry of aggregate output/demand across borders. This
























Summing up, both ratios equal one if terms-of-trade equal one, symmetry thus holds.
Clearly, and in difference to Gali and Monacelli (2005), we provide no formal proof;
without linearization this seems quite impossible, and we omit a numerical proof for
the sake of simplicity and due to economic intuition: if the economies are symmetric in
terms of preferences, exogenous variables and initial conditions, why should there be any
difference (in per-capita terms)?
Remaining steady-state values (under symmetry)
We know and impose that steady-state terms of trade equal one, i.e. s = 1 and s? =
s−1 = 1. Both the real exchange rate and relative prices are a function of terms of trade
and equal one if terms of trade are one




= 1 p̂f =
1
h(s)
= 1 p̂?h =
1
g?(s)








+ (1− β)γ(πh − 1)πh mc? =
ε− 1
ε
+ (1− β)γ(π?f − 1)π?f (C.80)
Steady-state consumption is given by
c =
[
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ỹ = y ỹ? = y? (C.83)
and via steady-state consumption equality we get y = ỹ = y? = ỹ?. Note that the
steady-state values for consumption and output do not depend on n, in per-capita terms.





xh = vy xf = (1− v)y x?h = v?y? x?f = (1− v?)y? (C.84)
Steady-state government expenditures g are
g = ηy g? = η?y? (C.85)
Steady-state hours worked h (using aggregate labour demand (C.39)) and wages w (using














w = a mc w? = a? mc? (C.87)
Last but not least, the steady-state value for the Lagrangian multiplier gets
λ = c−σ λ? = c?,−σ (C.88)
Given symmetry, bond markets are zero in steady-state (irrelevant, since we canceled all
bond terms from all equilibrium conditions)
b = b? = f = f ? = 0 (C.89)
Scaling labour hours
We set labour weight ψ such that hours worked correspond to one third. Hence, we start
with imposing h = ξ = 1
3
and solve the determining formula (via final good output and/or
consumption) for the scaling factor ψ. Note that marginal costs mc are not affected by





















ψ (1− κ− η)σ
] 1
σ+ν
Solving for ψ yields
ψ =
a1−σmc(1− τw)ν
ξσ+ν (1− κ− η)σ
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Comparison with related papers
Without labour taxes (τw = 0), government expenditures (η = 0), price adjustment costs
(κ = 0, Calvo framework), no steady-state labour parameter (ψ = 1) and zero inflation









which is identical to the finding of Gali and Monacelli (2005, p.729) if we adjust notation
(ν = ϕ), impose subsidies τ instead of taxes, and impose y? = c? (without government
expenditures and price adjustment costs)
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C.3 Calibration
We calibrate the model as following.
• Relatize size of the economies
The model supports relative sizes between zero (small open economy) and 1/2 (two-
country model). Unless stated otherwise, we analyse the small open economy case
and set n = 0.
• Home bias/degree of openness
The preferences of households for domestic and foreign goods are determined by the
relative size n and the degree of openness α. Home bias occurs if α < 1, we follow
De Paoli (2009) and set α = 0.4, or to an import share of GDP/final good of 40%.
• Intertemporal elasticity of substitution
As in the closed economy case, we implicitly use log-utility and set the (inverse)
intertemporal elasticity of substitution to σ = 1. This corresponds to Braun et al.
(2013) or Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2015), and is also covered by the ranges
analyzed in Levin et al. (2010) or Nakov (2008). Generally, a lower σ reduces the
responsiveness of forward guidance in a closed economy.
• Discount factor
The discount factor β determines the steady-state level of the real interest rate. We
set it to β = 0.9975, such that real interest rate equals roughly 1% in annualized
terms.
• (Inverse) elasticity of labor supply
We set the (inverse) elasticity of labor supply to ν = 0.2.
• Intratemporal elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods
We set the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between the retailed and imported
goods to θ = 3, following De Paoli (2009). This seems broadly in line with other
papers on open economies, though values can range between unity (or even below)
and numbers around five or six.
• Intratemporal elasticity of substitution across intermediary goods
We set the intratemporal elasticity of substitution across intermediary goods to
ε = 6. This is, for once, somewhat lower than in De Paoli (2009) and closer to other
papers, such as Wang (2010).
• Price adjustment costs and indexation
We set the price adjustment parameter to a hundred, γ = 100. As baseline, we
assume full indexation to the inflation target and set χ = 1 and µ = 0.
• Government expenditure share and taxes
We set both taxes and government consumption share to 20%, η = 0.2 and τw = 0.2
• Monetary policy parameters
We set the Taylor rule coefficients to standard values: φπ = 1.5 and φπ = 0.5. In
the baseline simulations, we set inertia to zero, i.e. ρr = 0. The inflation target is
set to 2% in annualized terms, i.e. π? = 1.005 (gross inflation)
• Steady-state hours worked
We set the weight on labour disutility ϕ such that the steady-state hours equal
one third h = 1/3. This choice should not matter for the effectiveness of forward
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guidance.
Persistence of exogenous shocks or processes amounts to 0.75 for all shocks. The usual
standard deviation is irrelevant for the non-stochastic analysis, but enters the processes
for the external variables and thus set to 0.0025 for all shocks (it primarily affects the size




Ascari, Guido and Lorenza Rossi. 2012. Trend Inflation and Firms Price-Setting: Rotem-
berg Versus Calvo. The Economic Journal 122(563): 1115–1141.
Braun, R. Anton, Lena Mareen Körber and Yuichiro Waki. 2013. Small and orthodox
fiscal multipliers at the zero lower bound. Working Paper 2013-13, Federal Reserve
Bank of Atlanta.
Calvo, Guillermo A. 1983. Staggered prices in a utility-maximizing framework. Journal
of Monetary Economics 12(3): 383–398.
De Paoli, Bianca. 2009. Monetary policy and welfare in a small open economy. Journal
of International Economics 77(1): 11–22.
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